Hinson v. City of Greensboro
| Decision Date | 04 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA13–404.,COA13–404. |
| Citation | 753 S.E.2d 822 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | James HINSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GREENSBORO, David Wray, former Police Chief of the City of Greensboro, in his official and individual capacity, and Randall Brady, former Deputy Police Chief of the City of Greensboro, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by defendants from order entered 18 December 2012 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2013.
Ferguson Chambers & Sumpter, P.A., Charlotte, by James E. Ferguson, II, for plaintiff-appellee James Hinson.
Van Laningham Duncan PLLC, by Allison O. Van Laningham, Alan W. Duncan, and L. Cooper Harrell, for defendant-appellant City of Greensboro.
Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Seth R. Cohen, and Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Kenneth R. Keller, Greensboro, for defendant-appellants Randall Brady and David Wray.
Defendants City of Greensboro, David Wray, and Randall Brady appeal from a trial court's interlocutory order, denying their motions to dismiss plaintiff James Hinson's complaint, except as to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against defendant City of Greensboro. Based on the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's State claims against defendant City of Greensboro and defendants David Wray and Randall Brady in their official capacities.
On 30 May 2008, plaintiff James Hinson filed a complaint against defendant City of Greensboro (“defendant Greensboro”), David Wray, former Police Chief of the City of Greensboro, in his official and individual capacity (“defendant Wray”), and Randall Brady, former Deputy Police Chief of the City of Greensboro, in his official and individual capacity (“defendant Brady”) (collectively “defendants”). Plaintiff sought compensation and alleged that defendants had subjected plaintiff to discrimination on the basis of race, conspired to discriminate on the basis of race, and conspired to injure plaintiff in his reputation and profession. Plaintiff amended this complaint on 6 February 2009. On 4 September 2009, plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of his claims, without prejudice.
Plaintiff filed a second complaint on 3 September 2010. The complaint alleged the following, in pertinent part: Plaintiff, an African–American, started working for the Police Department of the City of Greensboro in 1991 as a police officer in training. Plaintiff received numerous awards and received evaluations at the level of “exceeds expectations” and “superior performance” from the years 2000 through 2010. On 1 December 2001, plaintiff was promoted to Lieutenant. In 2003 and 2004, Chief of Police defendant Wray and Deputy Police Chief defendant Brady began “targeting plaintiff and creating problems for him in his workplace because of plaintiff's race.”
The complaint further alleged that in 2003, defendants Wray and Brady directed two officers to gather pictures of various black officers employed by the Greensboro Police Department, including a photograph of plaintiff, to be used in line-up books or to be used in line-up photos while similarly situated white officers were not treated in this manner. From 2003 to 2004, defendants Wray and Brady caused some black officers of the City of Greensboro Police Department, including plaintiff, to be investigated by the Special Investigation Division (“SID”) for alleged misconduct when SID was not created for this purpose. The Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”) and Internal Affairs units were designed to investigate matters involving Greensboro Police Officers. Defendants required white officers suspected of wrongdoing to be investigated by the CID, Internal Affairs Division, or caused some white officers not to be investigated at all.
Plaintiff was transferred from the Operation Support Division to the Central Division under the direction of a Commanding Officer who required plaintiff to complete a detailed monthly schedule. Plaintiff alleges that similarly situated white officers were not treated in this manner. Plaintiff's department-issued computer was installed with a device that would monitor his activity while no other lieutenants in the Greensboro Police Department were monitored. Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging retaliation and a hostile work environment but dropped the grievance after a meeting on 2 February 2005 where defendant Wray, defendant Brady, an Assistant Chief, a Commanding Officer, and Police Attorney were present. In March 2005, at the instruction of defendant Wray, a tracking device was placed on plaintiff's patrol car. Defendant Brady advised plaintiff that he was under surveillance because he was “possibly working off duty while on duty in violation of the Greensboro Police Department Departmental Directives and Procedures.” Plaintiff alleged that his race was the motivation in initiating these investigations.
Defendant Wray falsely reported to the City Manager, Deputy City Manager, City Attorney, and media that plaintiff was suspected of being associated with illegal drug activity and other criminal activity. On 17 June 2005, plaintiff was suspended by defendant Wray for alleged on-going relationships with prostitutes and others who have a reputation in the community for involvement in criminal activity. Defendant Wray also delivered a public media statement falsely alleging that plaintiff was part of an “ongoing multi-jurisdictional criminal investigation” and that plaintiff's actions were under “internal review.” Even though plaintiff was cleared by SID for any alleged wrongdoing, defendant Wray initiated an additional investigation of plaintiff by hiring retired and former officers of the Internal Affairs Division. Defendants Brady and Wray approved an additional investigation which did not adhere to the Greensboro Police Department's policies and Standard Operating Procedures. It was completed on 31 August 2005. On 5 June 2005, plaintiff was placed on leave. He was reinstated in January 2006. Since 2001, plaintiff has not been promoted and has not received any awards or commendations within the department.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged discrimination on the basis of his race, conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of race, and conspiracy to injure plaintiff and his reputation and profession in violation of federal law, 42 USC § 1981, § 1983, and § 1985 and in violation of North Carolina common law. Plaintiff argued that defendants had waived their governmental immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, as provided in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–4851 , and that defendant Greensboro was liable as respondeat superior as to each of the state common law claims against defendants Wray and Brady.
On 22 November 2010, defendant Wray and defendant Brady filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 24 November 2010, defendant Greensboro filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6).
Following a hearing held on 16 October 2012, the trial court entered an order on 18 December 2012. The order denied defendant Wray's motion to dismiss and defendant Brady's motion to dismiss. The order denied defendant Greensboro's motion to dismiss, except as to the claim for punitive damages against defendant Greensboro. As to that claim only, the motion to dismiss was allowed.
From this order, defendants appeal.
“On appeal of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, our Court conducts a de novo review[.]” Ventriglia v. Deese, 194 N.C.App. 344, 347, 669 S.E.2d 817, 819–820 (2008) (citation omitted). “We consider ‘whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.’ ” Bridges v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 541, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (2013) (citation omitted). “The court must construe the complaint liberally and should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Enoch v. Inman, 164 N.C.App. 415, 417, 596 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“Dismissal is proper, however, when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim.” Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 784, 618 S.E.2d 201, 204 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
As a preliminary matter, we must first identify the issues that are properly before this Court.
“This Court has held that appeals from interlocutory orders raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.” Williams v. Devere Const. Co., Inc., 215 N.C.App. 135, 137, 716 S.E.2d 21, 25 (2011) (citation omitted). However, this only applies Horne v. Town of Blowing Rock, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 732 S.E.2d 614, 621 (2012). Therefore, defendants' challenges to the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) based on governmental immunity grounds are properly before us.
Defendants have also sought immediate review of the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss based on non-immunity related challenges by petitioning this Court.2 However, defendants have not stated...
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