Hinson v. Department of Transp.
| Decision Date | 13 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 50116,No. 2,50116,2 |
| Parties | Virgil HINSON v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Hutto & Palmatary, Edward E. Boshears, Brunswick, for appellant.
Fendig, Dickey, Fendig & Whelchel, J. Thomas Whelchel, Donald B. Napier, Brunswick, for appellee.
The Department of Transportation initiated condemnation proceedings against a portion of appellant's land. A jury trial was held to assess the value of the property taken, the extent of consequential damages to the remaining property, and the possible business loss to condemnee's salvage business. A verdict for condemnee in the amount of $65,000 was returned. From the trial court's denial of a new trial, condemnee brought this appeal. Held:
1. Appellant asserts, in his first two enumerations, that the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate in that there was no award of damages for his loss of business. The constitutional provision that private property is not to be taken for public purposes without just and adequate compensation requires that the condemnee be adequately compensated, not only for the value of the land taken, but also for any damages to the condemnee resulting from the condemnation. Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884; State Highway Dept. v. Thomas, 115 Ga.App. 372, 154 S.E.2d 812. The destruction or loss of a business being operated upon the condemned property requires compensation where the land is shown to be 'unique.' Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga.App. 515, 518, 142 S.E.2d 93, 95.
In the case sub judice, appellant's contention that similar property upon which to conduct his profitable salvage is unavailable and appellee's denial of the property's unique character formed the central issue for the jury's determination. Appellee's witnesses testified to the availability of similar property within the vicinity of appellant's land and suitable for the relocation of his business. While the evidence in this regard was conflicting, it was within the jury's province to believe appellee's witnesses and to conclude that appellant would not be damaged by the relocation of his business. The verdict for $65,000 was within the range of values offered into evidence and therefore was authorized and not inadequate. State Highway Dept. v. Jernigan, 123 Ga.App. 393, 181 S.E.2d 287; Lassiter v. State Highway Dept., 117 Ga.App. 128, 159 S.E.2d 302; Swiney v. State Highway Dept., 116 Ga.App. 667, 158 S.E.2d 321.
2. Appellant enumerates error in the trial court's allowance of testimony interpreting the County zoning ordinance. Over appellant's objections, condemnor's expert witness testified to the following:
'The construction of a zoning ordinance, under the facts, is a question of law for the courts.' City of Rome v. Shadyside Memorial Gardens, Inc., 93 Ga.App. 759, 763, 92 S.E.2d 734, 736; Ervin Company v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 15, 183 S.E.2d 743.
As a general and widely accepted rule, questions of law or questions involving the interplay of law and facts are inadmissible conclusions. 32 C.J.S. Evidence, § 453, p. 91; McCormick, Evidence § 12 (2d Ed. 1972). Our courts have embraced this rule in numerous decisions holding that testimony of this sort must be excluded. Fett v. Alderman, 117 Ga.App. 677, 161 S.E.2d 350; Douglas v. McNabb Realty Co., 78 Ga.App. 845, 854, 52 S.E.2d 550; Davies v. Blasingame, 177 Ga. 450(4), 170 S.E. 477; Hunt v. Lavender, 140 Ga. 157, 78 S.E. 805. Thus, in Kimbell v. State Highway Department, 115 Ga.App. 435, 154 S.E.2d 832, wherein the condemnor asked one of its witnesses whether condemnee could 'go into the court of ordinary' to acquire a private way into that portion of his property which would be...
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