Hinson v. M/V Chimera
| Decision Date | 24 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-4382. |
| Citation | 661 F.Supp.2d 614 |
| Parties | Johnny Ray HINSON, et al v. M/V CHIMERA, its Engines, Tackle, Furniture, Equipment, Apparel, etc., in rem. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
David W. Leefe, Brett D. Wise, Liskow & Lewis, Stephanie D. Skinner, Fowler Rodriguez, New Orleans, LA, for Johnny Ray Hinson, et al.
Robin Bryan Cheatham, Adams & Reese, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for M/V Chimera, its Engines, Tackle, Furniture, Equipment, Apparel.
ORDER AND REASONS
Presently before the Court is "Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability" (Rec. Doc. 19). Considering the parties' submissions and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to the extent stated herein.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The materiality of facts is determined by the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Lavespere v. v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir.2001).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir.2002), and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 764 (2001). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." See id. (emphasis in original) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).
Although the Court is to consider the full record in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 does not obligate it to search for evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.2003) (). Thus, the nonmoving party should "identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate" precisely how that evidence supports his claims. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994).
The nonmovant's burden of demonstrating a genuine issue is not satisfied merely by creating "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," "by conclusory allegations," by "unsubstantiated assertions," or "by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Rather, a factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment only if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir.2002).
The key facts relative to this motion are not in dispute.1 Plaintiffs are persons and entities that provided services and/or materials between July 2006 and April 7, 2007 to a vessel—the M/V Chimera—that they believed to be owned by Grande Rouge Charters, LLC ("GRC").2 With their motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that they hold maritime liens against the Chimera for these good and services, in amounts to be determined at trial, pursuant to the "Maritime Commercial Instruments and Liens Act" ("MCILA"), 46 U.S.C. § 31301, et seq. In short, Plaintiffs maintain that GRC contracted with them to provide goods and services "necessary" to the Chimera, that GRC had authority— or is statutorily presumed to have had authority—for this procurement, that they have not been compensated, and that the Chimera, as well as Defendants, have unjustly benefitted from this nonpayment.3
Relative to Plaintiffs claims, the MCILA establishes maritime liens for persons who have provided "necessaries" to a vessel on the order of the vessel owner or a person authorized by the owner. The MCILA also includes a statutory presumption of authority for such procurement to certain persons. Specifically, the statute provides, in pertinent part:
§ 31342. Establishing maritime liens
(1) has a maritime lien on the vessel;
(2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and (3) is not required to allege or prove in the action that credit was given to the vessel.
§ 31341. Persons presumed to have authority to procure necessaries
(1) the owner;
(2) the master;
(3) a person entrusted with the management of the vessel at the port of supply; or
(4) an officer or agent appointed by—
(A) the owner;
(B) a charterer;
(C) an owner pro hac vice; or
(D) an agreed buyer in possession of the vessel.
In response to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants argue (1) that GRC was not authorized to procure necessaries for the Chimera, and (2) that Plaintiffs Johnny Hinson and James Hinson are not entitled to a maritime lien, even if the other Plaintiffs are, because they both were "joint venturers" with GRC. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and applicable authorities, the Court disagrees. More particularly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to satisfy their summary judgment burdens relative to these contentions, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to the existence (but not the amount) of their maritime liens.
In first contesting GRC's authority to procure necessaries for the Chimera, Defendants acknowledge that GRC inquired as to the Chimera's record owner when it entered into an "Agreement to Purchase" with Caribbean Maritime Excursions, Inc. ("CME") in July 2006. Defendants urge, however, that GRC failed to exercise due diligence by not also investigating the existence of any liens or encumbrances existing on the Chimera. Specifically, Defendants point to a January 10, 2005 "First Preferred Mortgage" in favor of ULM (hereinafter, "ULM Mortgage") that was recorded with the United States Coast Guard Vessel Documentation Office on March 10, 2005, and thus would have been reflected on the Coast Guard's "Abstract of Title" in July 2006.4 Defendants maintain that, if GRC had reviewed the ULM Mortgage, it would have discovered that document's prohibition against the sale of the vessel absent ULM's written consent thereto, as well as other security documents concerning the Chimera.
The Court assumes arguendo that Defendants' assertions concerning the ULM Mortgage and its restrictions on the sale of the Chimera are correct. That being said, the parties seeking relief in this action are Plaintiffs—persons who supplied goods and services to and for the benefit of the Chimera—not GRC. With respect to those suppliers, § 31341 establishes statutory presumptions of authority for certain procurers. Significantly, a 1971 statutory amendment removed a "duty of reasonable inquiry" as to the procurer's authority that the statute previously imposed on the supplier of necessaries. See Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Caribe Mar, 757 F.2d 743, 746-49 (5th Cir.1985)(discussing amendment). Thus, the statutory presumptions of authority set forth in § 31341 apply unless rebutted by a showing that the supplier of necessaries had actual knowledge that the procurer in fact lacked authority. See, e.g., Stevens Ship. and Term. Co. v. JAPAN RAINBOW II MV, 334 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Gulf Oil Trading Co., 757 F.2d at 749); Belcher Co. v. M/V Maratha Mariner, 724 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Belcher Oil Co. v. M/V Gardenia, 766 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985) ().
Here, notwithstanding the pending dispute as to the actual ownership of the Chimera in July 2006, the Court finds there to...
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