Smith v Amedisys Inc.

Citation298 F.3d 434
Decision Date26 July 2002
Docket Number01-30044,5
PartiesLORI SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMEDISYS INC.; PROMOD SETH; MITCHELL MOREL; WILLIAM BORNE, Defendants-Appellees.UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before JONES, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Lori Smith ("Smith") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for her former employer and three former supervisors on her claims under Title VII, Louisiana employment discrimination statutes, and Louisiana tort law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Smith was employed by Amedisys, Inc. ("Amedisys") from October 20, 1995 through September 28, 1996. Smith alleges that during her employment with Amedisys, she was subjected to sexual harassment by Chief Operations Officer Promod Seth ("Seth"), who was her immediate supervisor, Chief Financial Officer Mitchell Morel ("Morel"), and Chief Executive Officer William Borne ("Borne") (collectively "individual Defendants"). Because the district court disposed of this case by way of summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most favorable to Smith.

Seth was flirtatious with Smith at the office and would put his arm around her in front of other employees. Seth requested to have dinner and drinks with Smith on numerous occasions, he would touch her hands at dinner, he would repeatedly touch her leg and hold her hand when she would drive him to work or to appointments. Smith would immediately take Seth's hand off her leg, pull her hand back, and tell him not to hold her hand because it was inappropriate and it made her feel uncomfortable. Further, there were several business trips that Smith and Seth took together where he would make sexual advances toward her. On one business trip, Seth came to Smith's hotel room under the guise of watching television and, while he was there, grabbed her hand and pulled her to the bed next to him, kissing, holding, and touching her and saying that he wanted her to lay down and watch television with him. She told him no, pushed him away, squirmed away from him, and asked him to leave several times before he finally complied with her requests. Seth also told Smith to wear shorter skirts, low cut blouses, tighter fitting clothing, and high heels to improve sales for Amedisys. For example, in a meeting involving a physician recruitment project, Seth said that he wanted "good looking women" wearing "short skirts" to go on appointments with the doctors and told the employees, including Smith, "whatever [they] had to do to get the contract signed, get them signed and it didn't matter."

Morel was also present at that particular physician recruitment meeting and agreed with everything that Seth said. Further, Morel made repeated comments about Smith's clothing and her physical appearance, as well as the appearances of other women. On Smith's first day at work, Morel told her that he was glad to see a "good looking" woman in the sales position because the previous woman in Smith's position was "tall and she had bleached blond hair and she was real thin and wrinkly." Additionally, Morel always commented about who Smith was previously and currently dating, made sexually oriented comments about how Smith obtained certain contracts and business, commented about her sex life, and repeatedly suggested that she prostitute herself in order to obtain business for the company. Borne also made sexually oriented and offensive comments about other women's appearances, involving their sizes, shapes, height, weight, faces, and hair; the type of women he found attractive; and "what turned him on."

On September 27, 1996, Borne called Smith into his office and told her that he had received reports from a client that she was making derogatory statements regarding Amedisys and Borne. Cindy Doll ("Doll"), the Head of Human Resources, was also present at this meeting. Smith was permitted to resign, in lieu of termination. Smith's letter of resignation was dated September 30, 1996. Smith entered into a separation agreement with Amedisys ("Separation Agreement"), dated November 12, 1996, in which she released "AMEDISYS of any and all employment related claims."

On September 3, 1997, Smith sued Amedisys and the individual Defendants in Louisiana state court, alleging claims arising under Louisiana employment discrimination statutes and Louisiana tort law. Specifically, she alleged sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On February 2, 1998, the state court denied an exception of no right and no cause of action that sought to dismiss Smith's claims against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities relating to their liability under Louisiana employment discrimination law. Seth then filed a third-party demand against Agricultural Excess and Surplus Insurance Company ("Agricultural Excess") for indemnity, defense costs, statutory penalties, and attorneys fees. The parties engaged in discovery, the matter was scheduled for trial in state court on September 30, 1999, and a pretrial order was filed on July 12, 1999.

Amedisys and the individual Defendants removed the case to the Middle District of Louisiana following Smith's amendment of her petition on August 6, 1999 to add claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. Smith then filed a motion to remand, seeking remand of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 based upon procedural defects, or alternatively, remand of all or part of her claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). This motion was denied. On October 26, 1999, Smith filed a supplemental and amending complaint. Subsequently, Amedisys and the individual Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, the matter was reassigned to the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. By order entered on August 4, 2000, the trial court granted the summary judgment motions and dismissed all of Smith's claims against Amedisys and the individual Defendants. The trial court concluded that Smith (1) could not pursue the individual Defendants, in either their individual or official capacities, under Title VII or Louisiana employment discrimination statutes, La. Rev. Stat Ann. §§ 23:1006, 51:2231 et seq.; (2) released her claims against Amedisys under Title VII and Louisiana employment discrimination statutes; and (3) failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning her intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Following settlement of all remaining claims by and between Seth, Amedisys, and Agricultural Excess, a formal judgment was entered by the trial court on December 21, 2000, dismissing all of Smith's claims and the indemnification claims.

DISCUSSION
I.

Smith first challenges the trial court's refusal to remand the entire case or her state law claims under the discretionary provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).1 We review the trial court's refusal to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 231 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2000).

Under § 1441(c), whenever a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" that is based on federal-question jurisdiction is "joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). "Thus, for remand to be proper, the claim remanded must be (1) a separate and independent claim or cause of action; (2) joined with a federal question; (3) otherwise non-removable; and (4) a matter in which state law predominates." Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 1998). Because it found that Smith's federal claims were not "separate and independent" from her state law claims, the trial court refused to remand the entire action or her state law claims.

"[W]here there is a single wrong to [the] plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441." Id. (quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951)) (internal quotations omitted). "A case involving the violation of a single primary right or wherein a party seeks redress for one legal wrong cannot contain separate and independent claims, despite multiple theories of liability against multiple defendants." Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, "[w]e have held that a claim is not independent if it involves substantially the same facts." Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Addison v. Gulf Coast Contracting Servs., 744 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotations omitted).

All of Smith's claims, state and federal, are seeking redress for Smith's allegations that the individual Defendants sexually harassed her, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her during her employment with Amedisys. Both Title VII and Louisiana employment discrimination statutes prohibit sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and Louisiana courts routinely look to federal law for guidance in determining whether a viable claim has been asserted. E.g.,Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989); McMillon v. Corridan, No. 97-3981, 1998 WL 560334, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 1998); Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 739 So. 2d 893, 899 (La. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the proof required by Smith on the federal and state employment discrimination claims will involve "substantially the same facts." Further, Smith's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is based on the "outrageous"...

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