Hinson v. Roof
| Decision Date | 10 March 1924 |
| Docket Number | 11439. |
| Citation | 122 S.E. 488,128 S.C. 470 |
| Parties | HINSON ET AL. v. ROOF. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Petition for Rehearing Dismissed April 23, 1924.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Lexington County; E. C Dennis, Judge.
Action by M. C. Hinson and others against Mrs. Lillie Roof. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Martin & Sturkie and Timmerman & Graham, all of Lexington, for appellant.
T. C Callison, of Lexington, and Cooper & Winters, of Columbia for respondents.
Action for $4,081.22 damages on account of the alleged breach of a contract relating to the cutting and sawing of certain timber. The facts appear as follows: The defendant, Lillie Roof, owned a tract of land in Lexington county upon which there was a large body of timber. The plaintiffs owned a sawmill outfit and were engaged in that business. On April 16, 1921, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract with C. S. Roof, the husband of the defendant (as if he had been the owner of the land), by which the plaintiffs agreed to cut the timber upon a certain piece of land, described as the property of C. S. Roof, at an agreed compensation. The plaintiffs moved their outfit upon the land and began operations. After they had been operating about six weeks, having cut and sawed a considerable quantity of timber into laths and lumber, by reason either of his dissatisfaction with the manner of the sawing or of a fall in the market price of the product, C. S. Roof demanded a reduction in the agreed price of cutting and sawing, or an abandonment of the contract. The plaintiffs declined to accede to his demand, whereupon C. S. Roof ordered them off of the place. In the meantime it appears that C. S. Roof had settled with the plaintiffs for the work done up to that time. The plaintiffs moved off, and instituted this suit for loss of profits which they would have made if they had been allowed to complete the contract. When the suit was about to be commenced, the plaintiffs learned for the first time that the land belonged to Mrs. Roof and not to C. S. Roof, who had entered into the contract. They accordingly brought suit against Mrs. Roof, upon the written contract, alleging that in the making of it C. S. Roof acted as the agent of his wife. Mrs. Roof, in her answer, denied that C. S. Roof was or acted as her agent in the matter and denied all connection with or liability upon the contract.
The evidence tended to show that the plaintiffs acted upon the belief that the land belonged to C. S. Roof; that, while they were operating, Mrs. Roof came down to the sawmill with her husband and observed the mill in operation; that the laths and lumber turned out by the plaintiffs were hauled away by C. S. Roof and sold; that he paid the larger part of the proceeds to Mrs. Roof; that she was fully aware of the location of the plant and of the plaintiffs' operations; that her husband negotiated the transaction by which the land was bid off by him at public sale and the title made to her; that he transacted business for her. From the relations of the husband and wife, her ownership of the land, her statement that Mr. Roof attended to the greater part but not all of her business, her admitted knowledge of the operation, her acceptance of a part of the proceeds of the sale of the product, it may not have been an unreasonable inference that she was fully aware of the terms of the contract under which the plaintiffs entered upon the land. It certainly does not appear that after knowledge she made any objection to their operations.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Roof testified that she had previously (verbally) sold all of the timber covered by the contract to him. In the absence of any circumstantial details of such sale in the matter of time, place, terms, or performance, the jury was not obliged, or we may say reasonably expected, to accept that statement.
At the close of the evidence for the plaintiffs the defendant moved for a nonsuit, and at the close of all of the evidence, for a directed verdict, upon the ground that there was no evidence to connect the defendant with the contract or to show any liability upon her. The motions were refused. His honor, the presiding judge, held that there was sufficient evidence of the husband's agency, the estoppel upon the defendant, and her ratification of his action in executing the contract, to require submission of these matters to the jury and charged them upon those issues. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,168.72, and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant has appealed.
The main question upon this appeal is whether or not the evidence was sufficient to require a submission to the jury of the following issues:
(1) Did C. S. Roof act as agent for his wife in making the contract?
(2) If not, is the defendant estopped by her conduct in denying the fact of such agency?
(3) Did the defendant by her conduct ratify the contract made by her husband?
The existence of an agency is a question of fact to be determined by the relation, the situation, the conduct, and the declarations of the party sought to be charged as principal. If there be in the evidence any facts from which the inference of such agency might legitimately be drawn, the question is one of fact for the jury.
While of course, the existence of the marital relation is not of itself an indication that the husband dealing with the wife's property was acting as her agent, it is a circumstance, from the intimate and normally confidential character of the relation, proper to be considered. It is highly improbable that a husband would conceal or attempt to conceal his dealings with the wife's property, particularly where such dealings were open and impossible of concealment; in the case at bar they were actually known to the wife. There is evidence tending to show that the wife visited the sawmill with her husband and observed it in actual operation; that she sat silent and made no objection; that all the while during the six weeks of operation she knew that the plaintiffs were cutting down her trees and sawing them up into laths and lumber; she must have known that the husband was hauling the lumber away and selling it; a part, the husband says nearly all, of the proceeds of the sale were paid to her; not a word of protest came from her; she says that her husband attended to some of her business for her. She attempts...
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Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 0838
...competent evidence from which an inference of such agency may be legitimately drawn, the question is one for the jury. Hinson v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924). See also 15 S.C. West Digest, Principal and Agent, Key No. With the above backdrop, let us examine the record; upon doing......
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...be charged as principal. American Fed. Bank, FSB v. Number One Main Joint Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 467 S.E.2d 439 (1996); Hinson v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924). In Barber v. Carolina Auto Sales, 236 S.C. 594, 115 S.E.2d 291 (1960), this Court stated the It is well settled that the......
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Reid v. Kelly
...liability, under the principles of agency, to the jury. Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S.C. 378, 114 S.E.2d 493 (1960); Hinson, et al. v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924). Finally, appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground the punitive damages award......