Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n
| Decision Date | 29 March 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 9456.,9456. |
| Citation | 117 F.2d 310 |
| Parties | HINTON et al. v. COLUMBIA RIVER PACKERS ASS'N, Inc. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ben Anderson, of Portland, Or., for appellants.
Jay Bowerman and C. W. Pecore, both of Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before GARRECHT, HANEY, and STEPHENS, Circuit Judges.
Appellee was successful in its suit brought under the anti-trust laws to obtain a decree enjoining appellants from interfering with appellee in its purchase of fish and other marine products and adjudicating that all contracts entered into between the Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union and processors and dealers, whereby the latter agreed not to purchase such products from persons not members of such union, to be void.
The Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union, hereafter called the union, is an organization of persons engaged in fishing, and is chartered by the International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America and the Congress for Industrial Organizations. The union is also a member of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific which is a federation of labor organizations of the Pacific Coast including the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, the Alaska Fishermen's Union, the United Fishermen's Union, the Cannery Workers Union, the Marine, Cooks and Stewards Union, the Ships Radio Operators Union and other organizations.
The union issues charters to various local unions in various ports of the States of Oregon and Washington, and the contracts hereinafter referred to are entered into between the packers of and dealers in fish and the union or such locals.
The packers of and dealers in fish belong to an organization called the Commercial Fisheries Association. Such Association has throughout its existence bargained with the union, and has been the collective bargaining agency for the packers and dealers. The union and the Association reach an agreement as to the terms of the contracts to be entered into between it or the locals and the packers of and dealers in fish.
It has been and is the practice of the packers of and dealers in fish to purchase fish and other marine products of the Pacific Ocean and its tributaries from various fishermen who are independent contractors. About 90 per cent of the fishermen belong to the union. We may assume that the union has an effective monopoly on the supply of fish caught, and that interstate or foreign commerce is affected thereby, so that the facts regarding these matters need not be stated. Of course there is nothing to prevent operation of their own fishing fleets by the packers.
The union had procured contracts with the packers and dealers for the 1936, 1937 and 1938 seasons which contained the provision: "That it is further understood by all parties herein that the union members shall not be required to work with and/or alongside non-Union employees."
It is conceded that such provision prohibited the packers and dealers from purchasing from any one but members of the union.
The navigable waters of the Umpqua River and its tributary Smith River are principal sources of supply of shad. The shad is available there for about 60 days each year beginning in April. Under the laws of Oregon the season for commercial fishing opened on April 20, 1939. Fishermen captured fish and sold them to appellee from that date until April 29, 1939. Appellee withdrew from the Commercial Fisheries Association, and declined to enter into a contract with the union on the ground that its execution thereof would violate the anti-trust laws of the United States. The union, thereupon, by threats, intimidation and coercion induced the fishermen not to sell fish to appellee, and prevented appellee from buying any fish caught in the waters mentioned until May 4, 1939, when the court below issued a temporary restraining order against appellants. Appellee was damaged in the amount of $600 by the refusal to sell and deliver fish to it for the period from April 29, 1939, until May 4, 1939.
The court below held that the contracts entered into were void because in restraint of trade, that appellants entered into a plan, scheme and conspiracy in restraint of trade. It enjoined appellants interfering with appellee in the purchase of fish. This appeal followed.
Appellants contend that the injunction is prohibited by the Norris-La Guardia Act, §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115, because of the failure to comply with the procedural prerequisites stated in the act. Appellee makes no argument in reply to this contention.
Section 7 of that act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 107, provides in part: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after * * * findings of fact by the court, to the effect — * * *."
Five matters are mentioned in the statute. The court below did not make findings as to one or more of them. If this is a as defined in the act, then the court below lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction.
The particular words of section 7 which are in controversy are "in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined". The definitions are given in § 13 of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113, as follows:
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