Hinton v. State

Decision Date28 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. CR--76--16,CR--76--16
Citation537 S.W.2d 800,260 Ark. 42
PartiesOtis HINTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

John D. Bridgforth, Forrest City, for appellant.

Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by Terry Kirkpatrick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Otis Hinton was found guilty, by a jury, of the crimes of robbery by use of a firearm, kidnapping and assault with intent to rape. He seeks reversal alleging that the court erred in permitting Mrs. Georgia Ruff, the alleged victim, to identify him, that the evidence was insufficient to prove assault with intent to rape and that his sentence was excessive and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The robbery was committed on December 17, 1974, at approximately 7:00 p.m. The robbers took Mrs. Ruff away from her grocery store in Round Pond after one of them had struck her on the head with a pistol. She was forced into the back sent of an automobile which was driven from the scene by one of the robbers to a point on a rural road near Widener. During the trip one of the robbers got into the back seat with Mrs. Ruff. She testified that it was appellant. She said appellant tried to put his hands 'up her dress' and when she fought him, he told her to move her hands or he would beat her brains out. She added that when she continued to fight appellant, he hit her three times with a pistol and then returned to the front seat of the car, which was shortly thereafter stopped along the road. Then, according to her, she was directed by appellant to get out of the car and, when she did, both of the robbers started trying to remove her underclothes. She stated that shortly thereafter the two fled when one of them detected the approach of another automobile.

The police investigating the crime, in checking the area where the robbers had stopped their automobile, found a pistol which they traced into appellant's possession a short time before the robbery. Appellant was taken into custody on December 19 and placed in the St. Francis County jail. He was advised of his constitutional rights. He refused to sign a waiver of his rights and advised the officers that he had an attorney. A 'lineup' was conducted on Friday, December 20 at which appellant was identified by Mrs. Ruff as one of the robbers. At the trial she testified that appellant was the one who held a gun on her at the store, struck her in the face with the pistol in her living quarters, got in the back seat of the car with her and tried to put his hand under her dress, and with his companion tried to remove her clothing after they stopped the car. Appellant was charged with the crimes of which he was found guilty by information filed on January 29, 1975.

Appellant's motion to suppress the lineup identification was heard and denied on August 19, 1975, before the trial commenced. In his motion, appellant alleged that the identification should be suppressed because he was forced to participate in the lineup without the benefit of counsel, and that he was forced to confront the victim in a small hallway with several other prisoners, at which time he was called by name and asked to stand directly under a light in the room. He asserted that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive and gave rise to a substantial likelihood or irreparably mistaken identification.

One facet of appellant's argument on this point is the fact that the lineup was held without his attorney being present, and, as a matter of fact, without any effort being made to notify the attorney or even ascertain his identity. It is sufficient to say that appellant was not entitled to the assistance of counsel at the lineup conducted before the commencement of prosecutorial proceedings by the filing of an information against him. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Pollard v. State, 258 Ark. 512, 527 S.W.2d 627; King v. State, 253 Ark. 614, 487 S.W.2d 596.

We cannot say that there was error in the denial of appellant's motion to suppress or the circuit judge's finding that the pretrial identification proceedings were not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to any substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. There were five persons in the lineup. The victim had viewed an earlier one in which appellant was not a participant and did not identify anyone. She said that she had not looked at a group of pictures shown her by Deputy Sheriff Irwin between the time she reported the incident and the lineup. Appellant contends the group included pictures of him and his brother that were newer and different in characteristic from the others, most of which were 'penitentiary pictures.' There was testimony that an officer, by calling appellant by name and directing him to stand under a light, directed attention to him so that Mrs. Ruff immediately connected him with the crime. The evidence on this point is in considerable conflict and we must defer to the judgment of the trial judge on credibility of the witnesses. Anthony King, a jail inmate who was a participant in the lineup said that, after viewing the lineup for four or five minutes, Mrs. Ruff had not identified anyone until the jailer (Buford Hopkins, called 'Jackie') told Otis Hinton to move under the light, calling him by name. Charles Pruitt said 'they' told Otis to move under the light, but said that the lineup participants were told to move under the lights 'before the people came in.' Appellant said that it was Irwin who directed him, by name, to stand under the light, and that Irwin made a gesture with his hand at the time, and all but put his hand on appellant's shoulder. He said that he was the first to be directed to move under the light. Appellant denied that he and the others were told to move under the light before Mrs. Ruff came in. Mrs. Ruff testified that nothing was said during the lineup. The jailer testified that he did not say anything to anyone during the course of the lineup.

On the other hand, Mrs. Ruff stated positively that her identification was based upon her observation of appellant on the evening of the crime. She said she was only three feet from him in the store when she first saw him and had opportunities to see his face as the robbers' automobile passed under lights while she was lying in the floor of the back seat. She said that he was the one who got into the back seat and was trying to put his hand up under her dress and that she was fighting with him.

The central question is whether, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the courtroom identification was reliable, even if we should find that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). When we consider the opportunity the witness had to view her assailant during the progress of the crimes committed against her, her attention to her assailant, her certainty of identification at the lineup, at the suppression hearing at the lineup, room, after she had failed to identify anyone in a previous lineup, and the short period of time...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Beed v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 22, 1980
    ...not reverse the trial judge's decision unless, viewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clearly erroneous. See Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800; Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420. Identification testimony is properly admissible, if from the totality of the cir......
  • Henderson v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1995
    ...225 (1979); Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976); Carter & Burkhead v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969); G......
  • Clark v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 27, 1978
    ...551 S.W.2d 212 (1977). The cumulative effect of consecutive sentences does not make the punishment cruel and unusual. Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976). Here appellant was convicted of two felony murders and received the death sentence in each, as authorized by statute for......
  • Harrison v. State, CR
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1982
    ...the totality of the circumstances, it is clearly erroneous. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976). In James & Elliot v. State, 270 Ark. 596, 605 S.W.2d 448 (1980), we stated at It is the likelihood of misidentification that t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT