Hinton v. State
| Decision Date | 30 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–16–720,CR–16–720 |
| Parties | Kenneth HINTON, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jason D. Files, Little Rock, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., Little Rock, by: Kristen C. Green, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
On June 7, 2013, appellant, Kenneth Hinton, was charged with one count of battery in the first degree and one count of battery in the second degree. The charges stem from a disturbance at the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (hereinafter "ADC") on October 28, 2012, in which Hinton and other inmates were involved. Hinton was charged in the disturbance for injuring Warden Joe Page and correctional officer Stephen Simmons. On December 14, 2014, the case was tried and resulted in a mistrial. On April 25, 2016, the matter proceeded to trial for a second time, and a Lincoln County jury convicted Hinton of one count of first-degree battery and one count of second-degree battery and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment and fifteen years' imprisonment respectively.
At trial, the testimony demonstrated that ADC Warden Joe Page and ADC Correctional Officer Stephen Simmons were physically injured. Simmons testified that on October 28, 2012, he was working at the Varner Unit as a shift lieutenant. On the day of the incident, a riot began as inmates started to leave the chow hall and the inmates started to fight each other and correctional officers. Simmons further testified that during the riot, Hinton struck him in the back of the head. Kenneth Ridgell, Field Rider at the ADC, testified that on the day of the incident, he witnessed Hinton "blind side" Page and hit Page with a closed fist; Page fell forward unconscious.
The case first proceeded to trial and ended in a mistrial on December 15, 2014.
On June 4, 2015, the circuit court entered a scheduling order setting a new trial date for October 26–29, 2015. On that same date, a second scheduling order was entered setting the new trial date for November 17–19, 2015. On October 9, 2015, Hinton filed a motion to continue the October 26, 2015 trial date asserting that he had not received notice of the trial date and was not available for trial and was aware only of the November 2015 trial date. On November 19, 2015, the circuit court entered a revised scheduling order, granting Hinton's motion for continuance and resetting the trial for April 25–27, 2016.
On April 20, 2016, Hinton filed a motion to dismiss alleging a speedy-trial violation. On April 21, 2016, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. On April 25, 2016, the matter proceeded to trial for a second time, and Hinton was convicted and sentenced as described above. On May 16, 2016, the circuit court entered a judgment and commitment order.
On May 26, 2016, Hinton timely appealed to the court of appeals. On February 8, 2017, we accepted certification of this case. Hinton presents two issues on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in denying Hinton's motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-trial violation and (2) the circuit court erred in denying Hinton's motion to appear in civilian clothing.
I. Points on Appeal
For his first point on appeal, Hinton asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-trial violation. Because this court conducts a de novo review on appeal to determine whether specific periods of time are excludable under the speedy-trial rules, we discuss the relevant time periods below. Yarbrough v. State , 370 Ark. 31, 257 S.W.3d 50 (2007).
Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1(b) (2016), any defendant charged with an offense and incarcerated in prison in this state pursuant to conviction of another offense must be brought to trial within twelve (12) months from the time provided in Rule 28.2, excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Rule 28.3. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.2(c) requires that if a defendant is retried after a mistrial, the time for trial shall commence to run from the date of mistrial. Next, in calculating the speedy-trial period, necessary periods of delay are excluded as authorized in Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3. Under Rule 28.3(c), the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his counsel is excluded. All continuances granted at the request of the defendant or his counsel shall be to a day certain, and the period of delay shall be from the date the continuance is granted until such subsequent date contained in the order or docket entry granting the continuance. Also, the period of time when a defendant's motion for continuance is pending is a period properly excluded under Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.3(a). See Dodson v. State , 358 Ark. 372, 382, 191 S.W.3d 511, 517 (2004). Once it has been determined that the trial took place outside the speedy-trial period of twelve months, the State bears the burden of proving that the delay was the result of the defendant's conduct or was otherwise legally justified. Ferguson v. State , 343 Ark. 159, 33 S.W.3d 115 (2000).
We turn to review the excludable time period in Hinton's case. At issue is the circuit court's April 21, 2015 denial of Hinton's motion to dismiss:
Hinton contends the circuit court's ruling is erroneous. The crux of Hinton's speedy-trial argument is that when the circuit court set the October and the November 2015 trial dates, Hinton was to be tried separately on the two different charges. Further, Hinton argues, because the circuit court did not continue the separate November trial date or enter an order regarding the November trial date, but only addressed the October 2015 trial, the State failed to bring Hinton to trial within the required 12–month time period and violated his right to speedy trial.
We disagree with Hinton. Applying our rules discussed above, the time period began to run from the date of the mistrial, December 15, 2014, until Hinton filed his motion for continuance on October 9, 2015, and tolled the time period. This time period totals 299 days. Next, on November 19, 2015, the circuit court entered an order granting the continuance and setting the trial date for April 25, 2016. Thus, the time period was tolled further from the October 9, 2015 motion for continuance until the November 19, 2015 order, when the circuit court granted the continuance. Also, the time period continued to be tolled from the circuit court's order granting the continuance on November 19, 2015 until the trial date on April 25, 2016. In sum, from the date of the mistrial, December 15, 2014, until the date of Hinton's trial, April 25, 2016, 497 days had accrued. However, pursuant to our rules discussed above, the time period from October 9, 2015, until April 25, 2016 was tolled because of Hinton's motion for continuance. Accordingly, 199 days are excluded from the twelve-month requirement and there were 298 days from the date of mistrial until Hinton's trial date.
Finally, we must note that we do not find merit in Hinton's argument regarding the November 2015 scheduling order. The record demonstrates that the State charged Hinton with one criminal information and the charges were not severed. The two scheduling orders have the same case number and identical language, with the exception of the trial dates and excluded periods. Further, Hinton's motion for continuance stated:
Here, Hinton's argument fails for three reasons. First, the charges were never severed. Second, Hinton expressly acknowledged that the charges were not severed and his counsel was unavailable for the trial, not multiple trials. Third, the circuit court's order granting Hinton's motion for continuance was entered on November 19, 2015, after the November 16, 2015 trial date. If the trial had been conducted on the November 16 trial date, the circuit court would not have entered the November 19 continuance order. Accordingly, the November 2015 trial date was encompassed in the November 2015 continuance order resetting the trial for April 2016. Therefore, based on our discussion above and our standard of review, we do not find error and affirm the circuit court.
For his second point on appeal, Hinton asserts that the circuit court erred in denying Hinton's motion to appear in civilian clothing. On...
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Hinton v. State
...years' imprisonment and fifteen years' imprisonment respectively. Hinton's convictions and sentences were affirmed in Hinton v. State , 2017 Ark. 107, 515 S.W.3d 121. Following this court's decision, Hinton timely filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansa......
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Rayburn v. State
...has passed, the State must show that the delay was because of the defendant's conduct or otherwise justified. Hinton v. State , 2017 Ark. 107, at 4, 515 S.W.3d 121, 123. If the State does not meet that burden, then the defendant must absolutely be discharged. Ark. R. Crim. P. 30.1(a).Here, ......