Hintrager v. Mahoney

• Decision Date: 18 October 1889
• Parties: HINTRAGER v. MAHONEY ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

78 Iowa 537

43 N.W. 522

HINTRAGER

v.MAHONEY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 18, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Dubuque county; C. F. COUCH, Judge.

Action to quiet title of real estate. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.Powers & Lacy, for appellant.

Utt Bros., for appellees.

GRANGER, J.

The controversy involves the title to certain lots in the city of Dubuque. The basis of the plaintiff's title is a tax-deed signed by the treasurer of said city. When the lots were sold for taxes, D. A. Mahoney and others were the owners, as heirs to C. Mahoney, deceased. Within the statutory period for redemption, D. A. Mahoney paid to the proper officer the amount claimed, and received a certificate of redemption.Some years thereafter the city treasurer issued to plaintiff a deed in pursuance of the sale for taxes. Plaintiff in this proceeding seeks to quiet the title to lots by virtue of his deed, and to avoid the effect of defendant's certificate of redemption, by showing that at the time of the redemption Mahoney did not pay the amount necessary to redeem, and afterwards neglected to make such payment, when requested by the city treasurer to do so. We think it must be conceded that the requisite amount was not paid. The record, in this respect, hardly admits of a question. The particular facts in brief are that Mahoney went to the treasurer, and asked the amount necessary to redeem. The treasurer examined the books, and stated the amount, which was paid without question. Mahoney took no part in the examination of the books, and wholly relied on the information given him by the treasurer as to the amount to be paid. The amount necessary for redemption was $63.70, and the amount actually paid was $47.29. No question of fraud or deception is made as against Mahoney. Within a month after redemption, the treasurer notified Mahoney of the mistake, and requested him to make the additional payment, which he neglected to do. No effort was made to set aside or avoid the redemption; but the treasurer, because of the deficiency in payment, treated the redemption as of no effect, and made the deed to the plaintiff.

The record presents the question if a treasurer's deed, under such circumstances, is valid to convey title. The specific point urged in argument is that there was a “redemption, or no redemption;” and, as we understand, if a redemption, no deed could issue. If no redemption, then the deed could issue. If the expression is designed for acceptance without qualification, its correctness might be doubted; that is, if counsel claim that a redemption that would save the issuing of a deed must be one that could not be set aside because of defects in the proceeding, we are not at present prepared to accept it as a correct expression of the law. A person desiring to redeem land from a sale for taxes must apply to the officer designated by law; the amount necessary for redemption must be determined from calculations based upon data from books or records of the office; and, of necessity, the question of amount must be determined by the officer. In this respect he must act for the tax-sale purchaser and the redemptioner. The laws prescribing the forms and methods for redemption are enacted in the light of the existing facts that many persons applying to redeem are not competent to make the calculations, nor to ascertain from the records the data necessary therefor; and an attempt so to do would result in confusion and failure. Many who are competent to make the calculations with the proper data are unfamiliar with the records of the office; and an attempt to trace the records would be impracticable, and often a serious impediment to the business of the office. The case of Town Co. v. Davis, 44 Iowa, 622, may be profitably consulted, on this branch of the case, as to duties of officers, and reliance thereon. Now, when a party entitled to redeem applies to the proper officer, and asks for the proper amount to redeem, and, upon information, pays it, and takes his certificate, and by mistake of the officer the amount paid is too small, is it a redemption?

Barring one feature of the case to be hereafter noticed, the supreme court of Pennsylvania seems to have had the same question before it. In the case of Bubb v. Tompkins, 47 Pa. St., 359, by mistake of the officer, subsequent taxes paid by the purchaser were not included in the redemption. This is...