Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-5753,92-5753
• Citation: 44 F.3d 278
• Parties: 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2376, 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1347, 68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 925, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,866, 129 Lab.Cas. P 11,291 Sandy Diana HIRRAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 278

44 F.3d 278

148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2376, 66 Fair

Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1347,

68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 925,

67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,866,

129 Lab.Cas. P 11,291

Sandy Diana HIRRAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-5753.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 31, 1995.

James A. Kosub, Kosub & Gaul, El Dorado, TX, Mitchell M. Kraus, Gen. Counsel, Rockville, MD, Malinda A. Gaul, Kosub & Gaul, San Antonio, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.

George P. Parker, Jr., Robert Shaw-Meadow, Matthews & Branscomb, San Antonio, TX, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation's Petition for Rehearing is DENIED; and no member of this panel nor judge in active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED. However, we withdraw our prior opinion, Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 39 F.3d 522 (5th Cir.1994), and substitute the following:

This matter is on remand from the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). ¹ In Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir.), vacated, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2732, 129 L.Ed.2d 855 (1994), we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sandy Diana Hirras' Title VII, ² state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress, and state-law negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In light of the Court's recent decision in Hawaiian Airlines, we now reverse the district court's rulings as to Hirras' intentional infliction of emotional distress and Title VII claims. ³

I

Hirras alleges that her employer, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), "failed to provide her with a non-hostile workplace." (R. on Appeal at 552.) She complains of verbal abuse from her co-workers and abusive telephone calls, notes, and graffiti from anonymous sources. Amtrak contends that it initiated a thorough, if unsuccessful, investigation of the anonymous acts.

Hirras sued Amtrak in federal district court for Title VII violations, and for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the state-law negligent infliction of emotional distress claim on the grounds that Texas does not recognize such a claim. The court further held that Hirras' Title VII and state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151 (1988). Hirras appealed the district court's dismissal of both her federal and state-law claims.

II

First, Hirras argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaiian Airlines supports her contention that her state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not preempted by the mandatory arbitration provisions of the RLA. Hirras contends that her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not a "minor dispute" for the purposes of the RLA because it is grounded in rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA") that governed the terms of her employment.

Generally, all disputes growing out of "grievances" or out of the interpretation or application of a CBA are preempted by the RLA's mandatory arbitration provisions. See 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151a. One of the goals of the RLA is to "provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Id. Because such disputes concern an existing CBA, they "seldom produce strikes" and are known as the "minor disputes of the railway labor world." Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945), aff'd on reh'g, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct. 721, 90 L.Ed. 928 (1946). Minor disputes are to be contrasted with "major disputes," which "present the larger issues about which strikes ordinarily arise" because they "seek to create rather than to enforce contractual rights," see id., and with those disputes that seek neither to create nor enforce the contractual rights created by a CBA. Under the RLA, only minor disputes "may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the [National Railroad] Adjustment Board" ("NRAB") for arbitration. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151a).

The language of Sec. 151a thus limits the RLA's preemption of claims, including state-law claims, to those involving the interpretation or application of a CBA. Hawaiian Airlines, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). While Sec. 151a governs "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application [of CBA's]," 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151a (emphasis added), the Supreme Court held in Hawaiian Airlines that "the most natural reading of the term 'grievances' in this context is as a synonym for disputes involving the application or interpretation of a CBA." Id., --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2245. ⁴ This interpretation is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2482, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) ("The distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [CBA]"); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 501 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 2584, 2592 n. 12, 105 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989) ("Minor disputes are those involving the interpretation or application of existing contracts.").

The Court in Hawaiian Airlines noted that claims involving only factual questions "about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives" do not require an interpretation of the CBA. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2248. The Court cited for support its decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), in which it held that when the elements of a cause of action are "purely factual questions" that pertain to "the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer," no interpretation of the CBA is necessary. ⁵ Id. at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882. Lingle involved a state-law claim of retaliatory discharge, requiring the plaintiff to set forth the following facts: "(1) he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise of those rights." Id. The Court concluded that "neither element requires a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.... Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement ...: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Id.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that "substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever labor agreement might govern, are not pre-empted under the RLA." Hawaiian Airlines, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246. The Court noted that state laws "have long regulated a great variety of conditions in transportation and industry," a number of which might be the subject of a dispute "which would have such an effect on interstate commerce that federal agencies might be invoked to deal with some phase of it." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246 (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 423, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943)). "But it cannot be said that the minimum requirements laid down by state authority are all set aside. We hold that the enactment by Congress of the [RLA] was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves." Id. (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 318 U.S. at 7, 63 S.Ct. at 423).

The Court in Hawaiian Airlines discussed three examples of state-law substantive protections that it considered to be independent of any labor agreement for the purposes of the RLA. A claim based on a state law prohibiting employers from firing employees "in violation of public policy or in retaliation for whistleblowing," does not require an interpretation of a CBA, and thus is not preempted, id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246, ⁶ even if the CBA in question contained provisions that could be interpreted to justify the termination, id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2251. Similarly, a claim based on a state law requiring cabooses on all trains is not preempted by the RLA, even if the CBA required cabooses only on some trains. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246 (citing Terminal R.R. Ass'n ). Finally, a claim based on a state law "regulating the number of workers required to operate certain [railroad] equipment" is not preempted, see id. (citing Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 51 S.Ct. 458, 75 L.Ed. 1010, modified on other grounds, 283 U.S. 809, 51 S.Ct. 652, 75 L.Ed. 1428 (1931)), even if the railroad's agreement with the union allows it to employ a smaller crew, id. at 254, 51 S.Ct. at 461.

The Court also provided an example of a case in which it held that preemption by the RLA was justified. In Andrews v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972), a railroad employee challenged his employer's decision not to restore him to his regular duties after being injured in a car accident. Id. The Court held that "a state law claim of wrongful termination was pre-empted, not because the RLA broadly pre-empts state law...