Hirshfield v. Craig
| Citation | 239 N.Y. 98,145 N.E. 816 |
| Parties | HIRSHFIELD, City Com'r of Accounts, v. CRAIG (two cases). SAME v. RINN. |
| Decision Date | 25 November 1924 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
In the matter of the Applications of David Hirshfield, as Commissioner of Accounts of the City of New York, for warrants of attachment directed against Charles L. Craig, a witness and against Augustus J. Rinn. From orders of Appellate Division, First Department (209 App. Div. 555, 205 N. Y. S. 201), in cases against said Craig modifying and affirming an order of Special Term, denying application to vacate warrant of attachment, and from an order reversing an order of Special Term, continuing proceedings for purpose of taking evidence as to truth of statements contained in certain affidavits, and also from an order in the case against said Rinn, which affirmed an order denying a motion to vacate warrant of attachment, appeals were taken.
Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
Charles L. Craig, of New York City, in pro. per.
George P. Nicholson, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (John F. O'Brien, John Lehman, and Russell Lord Tarbox, all of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
Upon motion of the commissioner of accounts of the city of New York, a warrant of attachment has issued against Augustus J. Rinn, the appraiser of real estate in the department of finance of the city of New York, and two warrants of attachment against Charles L. Craig, the comptroller of the city of New York, for their failure to appear at hearings before the commissioner of accounts, in obedience to subpoenas which he had caused to be served upon them in three investigations or examinations which the commissioner of accounts has attempted to institute, pursuant to powers which he claims are vested in him under section 119 of the charter of the city of New York (Laws 1901, c. 466, Laws 1916, c. 517). Motions to vacate the attachments were thereupon made in each proceeding, and these motions have resulted in orders of the Appellate Division denying the motions, but modifying two of the warrants, by striking out provisions requiring the production of documents or other exhibits. Section 119 of the charter provides that:
‘It shall be the duty of the commissioner of accounts, once in three months, to make an examination of the receipts and disbursements in the offices of the comptroller and chamberlain, in connections with those of all the departments and officers making returns thereto, and report to the mayor a detailed and classified statement of the financial condition of the city as shown by such examinations.
The comptroller urges that, when the Legislature provided for mandatory examinations, every three months, of ‘the receipts and disbursements in the offices of the comptroller and chamberlain,’ it intended to limit the inquisitorial power of the commissioner of accounts over the department of finance to such examinations, and that the subsequent clauses, authorizing the commissioner to make special examinations of the ‘accounts and methods of the departments and offices of the city of New York, and the counties of New York, Richmond, Queens, Kings, and Bronx,’ were not intended to give the commissioner any power to make additional special examinations in the department of finance at the direction of the mayor, or as the commissioner ‘may deem for the best interests of the city.’ He further urges that the subpoenas have been issued by the commissioner, not for the purpose of obtaining information in connection with an examination undertaken in the best interests of the city, but for the purpose of harassing and annoying the comptroller, and of obtaining an opportunity for unfair attacks upon him.
The Appellate Division has decided that the commissioner's power of examination of the accounts and methods of the office of the comptroller is not limited to the mandatory periodical examination, and is not exhausted when such an examination has been held, and that when the commissioner undertakes a further examination the courts cannot permit a prospective witness to challenge the good faith of the commissioner, or to litigate the question of whether the examination has been in fact instituted in the interests of the city.
[1] The question before the courts concerns only the power bestowed by the Legislature upon the commissioner as an administrative officer of the city. We do not pass upon the wisdom of the provision in its present form, nor whether it should be extended or limited. The rights or wrongs of any personal or political controversy between the commissioner and the witness he seeks to examine are irrelevant to the determination of the legislative intent when it enacted the statute. We must find, in the language of the statute interpreted, it may be, in the light of established public policy, or of conditions as they existed when the statute was passed, the extent and limitations of the power conferred. Events which have occurred subsequently can have no bearing on this question, and in considering it we brush aside all charges and countercharges embodied either in the affidavits or briefs of the parties.
[2] It seems to us that the language of the statute is clear, and that the Appellate Division correctly decided that this section of the charter conferred upon the commissioner of accounts the same permissive power to make special examination of the accounts and methods of the department of finance as was granted to him in regard to other departments. The fact that the financial accounts of the city would naturally be kept in the department of finance might well lead the Legislature to impose upon the commissioner of accounts, as his primary duty, a definite command to make a periodic examination of the receipts and disbursements in the offices of the comptroller and chamberlain, but the Legislature has seen fit, in addition, to give the commissioner a permissive power to make special examinations of the accounts and methods of the departments and offices of the city of New York, and of the counties embraced within the territorial limits of the city, and there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest that the Legislature, in using the term ‘departments of the city,’ meant to exclude the department of finance. We may assume that it was the opinion of the Legislature that the mandatory periodic examination would provide all such safeguards and information as would contribute constantly and normally to the best interests of the city; yet, on occasion, further information might be of benefit to the city and its officers. We may assume, also, that ordinarily such information could be obtained, without a formal special examination, by mere request from one public official to another, yet the Legislature might reasonably decide that special examinations in regard to matters pertaining to the accounts of the department of finance might, on occasion, serve a useful purpose; and no possible inference can be drawn from the express command to the commissioner of accounts, to make, periodically, a particular examination of matters pertaining to the accounts in the comptroller's office, that the Legislature intended that the commissioner's permissive power to make occasional special examinations should not include examinations in this office, as well as the other offices of the city. The fact that until now no commissioner of accounts has ever undertaken to hold any special examination of the department of finance may, perhaps more reasonably, be regarded as evidence sustaining the correctness of the assumption that occasion for the use of this power would rarely arise than as evidence that all previous commissioners of accounts have construed the statute as withholding from them the power to conduct such special examination, should such occasion arise.
[3] We find no force in the claim that under this construction of the statute the mayor can interfere, through the commissioner of accounts appointed by him, in the administration of the comptroller's office, and that the independence of the department of finance, which hitherto has been safeguarded as a matter of sound public policy, is diminished or destroyed. The department of finance, though not subject to the control of the mayor, is a part of the city government, and its administration, and especially the amount and nature of the public funds in its custody, are matters of concern to the mayor and other officers of the city government. It can hardly be disputed that even independent officers of the city must work in cooperation, in order to secure proper government efficiency. Section 119 of the charter does not give the mayor any right to control the actions of the comptroller, or of the heads of departments, or offices of the city or the counties named. Some of these officers are appointed by the mayor, and are subject, in a sense, to the mayor's control by virtue of other sections of the charter, but other officers, such as the county officers and the presidents of the boroughs, are elected independently, and are in no wise responsible to the mayor for the proper administration of their offices; yet we have consistently held that the commissioner of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Slochowsky
...the very power to subpoena (See also Matter of Sheeler v. Buffalo Wire Works, 50 Misc.2d 158, 269 N.Y.S.2d 897) In the Matter of Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N.Y. 98, 145 N.E. 816, Mr. Justice Lehman stated as follows at pages 117-118, 145 N.E. 816, "The power to issue a subpoena requiring a pe......
-
A and M, Application of
...the privilege." (Matter of Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 318, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591, 347 N.E.2d 915, 917; Matter of Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N.Y. 98, 145 N.E. 816). There is no invasion of privacy in requiring the respondents to appear before the Grand Jury. "(W)ith the rarest of po......
-
People v. Norman
...case' even though those words are not expressly used in the statute here as they were in the statute considered in Matter of Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N.Y. 98, 145 N.E. 816. A proper case is ordinarily one where the books and papers called for have some relevancy and materiality to the matte......
-
Abrams v. Kearney
...subpoenae in the conduct of an investigation, the courts should not interfere in the decision to exercise that power. (Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N.Y. 98, 110, 145 N.E. 816). These non-judicial subpoenae must bear only a "reasonable relation to the subject matter under investigation and to th......