Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie
| Decision Date | 29 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 39796,39796 |
| Citation | 143 N.W.2d 205,274 Minn. 76 |
| Parties | Ralph L. HIRTH, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF LONG PRAIRIE et al., Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's claim by employees of a municipality will not estop the municipality from asserting the defense of failure to file a notice of claim, the filing and service of which is mandatory under Minn.St.1961, § 465.09.
Charles G. Satterlee, Wadena, Ryan, Ryan & Ebert, Brainerd, for appellant.
Donald Gray, Long Prairie, for Seifert.
Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, O. C. Adamson, II, and Roderick D. Blanchard, Minneapolis, for Village.
Appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Village of Long Prairie. The single question before us is whether, assuming fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's claim by village employees, a municipality should be estopped from asserting the defense of failure to file notice of claim required by Minn.St.1961, § 465.09.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint, which we must assume to be true, that on June 8, 1960, while suffering from diabetes and vascular problems of the legs, he was admitted for treatment to Long Prairie Memorial Hospital--owned, operated, and controlled by defendant Village of Long Prairie--and that the employees of defendant were guilty of malpractice in administering to him treatment other than prescribed by his doctor, resulting in partial amputation of his legs. It is conceded that no action was commenced within 2 years following the date of the alleged negligent conduct, as required by Minn.St. 541.07, and that no attempt has ever been made to comply with § 465.09, requiring that notice of claim be filed with defendant.
To justify his failure to take timely action, plaintiff contends that, though he exercised due diligence, he did not know and had no means of discovering the true cause of his condition; that he was deprived of such knowledge by the intentional and willful concealment of the truth by the employees of defendant and by the fraudulent representation to him by the employees that the sole cause of his condition was gangrene and the disease of diabetes; and that he relied upon a relation of trust between himself and defendant and believed that he had been given the true facts. Plaintiff further alleges that at all times the defendant's employees knew that their negligence caused his condition but intentionally concealed the truth and made fraudulent representations with the design of inducing him to rely thereon and thereby fail to commence an action or file a notice of claim.
We agree with the trial court that Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 24 N.W.2d 232, 31 Minn.L.Rev. 751, justifies summary judgment for defendant village upon the ground that fraudulent concealment by the municipal employees will not estop the municipality from asserting the defense of failure to file notice of claim. We need not consider, therefore, the question whether there was sufficient fraud by the village employees to toll the 2-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiff urges us to overrule or distinguish Johnson v. City of Chisholm, supra, which holds among other things that a formal act of the governing board of the municipality is required in order to create an estoppel or waiver of a failure to file a notice of claim. He argues that, because municipalities are generally treated as private corporations when, as here, they act in a proprietary capacity, the same laws applicable to private corporations, which do not require a formal act of a board of directors to create an estoppel or waiver of a failure to file a notice of claim, ought also to apply to municipalities, and that if the 2-year statute of limitations would be tolled (because of fraudulent concealment by employees), so also should the notice statute be tolled. Additionally, plaintiff claims that physical and mental incapacity prevented a timely filing of his notice.
Section 465.09 requires that in all claims against a municipality for loss or injury 'sustained by * * * the negligence of any of its * * * employees' a notice of claim be presented 'to the common council or other governing body within 30 days' following the injury. The statute also reads:
'* * * No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given; and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice.'
In Johnson v. City of Chisholm, supra, plaintiff inquired of the city officials and city attorney what, if anything, he should do to protect his claim for injury from a fall on a public sidewalk. He was told (222 Minn. 181, 24 N.W.2d 234)--
'* * * By and through (the city) Officials and the city attorney * * * that his case would be taken care of * * * and that it would not be necessary for (him) To do anything further to protect his claim * * *.'
Relying on the representations of the city, the plaintiff did not file a notice of claim. Consistent with all our prior decisions, 1 we held that strict compliance with § 465.09 is mandatory; that filing a notice of claim is a condition precedent to maintaining an action; and that there can be no waiver of or estoppel from asserting the defense of failure to file notice except by formal action of the governing board of the municipality.
A majority of courts hold that a governing body, even in its formal and official capacity, cannot waive the strict requirement of filing written notice or be estopped from asserting the defense of failure to serve notice. 2 According to the majority view, even though the same officials required to be notified by statute have all the information which a proper notice would give, failure actually to file a notice of claim will absolutely bar a claimant's action, regardless of hardship.
While recognizing a minority view permitting waiver and estoppel either by officials or representatives of the governing body, 3 we are not persuaded to depart from the majority further than adhering to the exception that formal action by the governing body can accomplish a waiver or estoppel. The principal purpose of the statutory requirement of notice is to protect against dissipation of public funds by requiring that the municipality be promptly furnished with information concerning a claim against it so that full opportunity is provided to investigate it, to settle those of merit without litigation, and to correct any deficiency in municipal functions revealed by the occurrence. By timely service of notice, the municipality is also afforded protection against stale or fraudulent claims or the connivance of corrupt employees or officials.
To find in the case before us that the municipality is estopped from asserting the defense of failure to notify would be to undermine the purposes of the statute and invade the legislative prerogative. Were we to adopt plaintiff's arguments, we would, in effect, be amending the statute contrary to legislative intent clearly revealed by the statute's legislative history. The legislature has had before it Johnson v. City of Chisholm, supra, and other cases where hardship was the result of strict enforcement of the statute. Yet, the only response was an amendment in 1959 granting to those who are physically or mentally incapacitated as a result of the injury for which they claim relief an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tice v. Pennington, 94,171.
...in a trial, on the issue of an active effort to prevent discovery by Shon or Linda. 4. Hospital cites Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205 (1966) for the proposition that fraud and deceit are not grounds to estop the government. That case relied upon M.S.A. § 466.0......
-
Olander v. Sperry and Hutchinson Company
...of timely notice has been followed even where there were allegations of fraud and concealment of injuries, Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205 (1966); 1 where there were representations to claimant by municipal officials that his claim would be taken care of, John......
-
Kossak v. Stalling
...by the occurrence; (4) to prevent stale and fraudulent claims; and (5) to aid in budget planning. See, Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205 (1966). In light of the fact that, in this case, the required notice of plaintiff's claim was received prior to the time suit......
-
Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls
...otherwise provides. Collins v. Memphis, 16 F.Supp. 204 (W.D.Tenn.); Frasch v. New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N.W. 121; Hirth v. Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205. Not only does the present statute not provide otherwise, but it expressly covers functions of both We hold the present clai......