Hisaw v. Ellison Ridge Consolidated School Dist

• Citation: 198 So. 557,189 Miss. 664
• Decision Date: 11 November 1940
• Docket Number: 34380
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Parties: HISAW et al. v. ELLISON RIDGE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST

198 So. 557

189 Miss. 664

HISAW et al. v. ELLISON RIDGE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST

No. 34380

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 11, 1940

APPEAL from the circuit court of Winston county, HON. JOHN F. ALLEN Judge.

Proceeding on petition by a majority of electors of Ellison Ridge Consolidated School District for the issuance of bonds of the district, to which W. H. Hisaw and others filed objections. The Board ordered the issuance of the bonds and the objectors appealed to the circuit court. From a judgment of the circuit court approving the issuance of bonds, the objectors appealed. Reversed and petition dismissed.

Reversed and petition dismissed.

W. A Strong, Jr., of Louisville, for appellants.

Orders of the Board of Supervisors authorizing a bond issue must definitely express the purposes for said issue and be free from ambiguity.

Bd. of Sup'rs. of Forrest County v. Clark, 163 Miss 120, 140 So. 733.

The petition of the qualified electors for a bond issue must definitely express the purposes for said issue and be free from ambiguity.

Bd. of Sup'rs. of Forrest County v. Clark, 163 Miss. 120, 140 So. 733.

Appellants respectfully submit that by using the abbreviation, "etc.", in the petition filed with the Board of Supervisors and the Board using the abbreviation, "etc.", in its order designating the purposes of said bond issue, a purpose not authorized by law was designated, thereby rendering said proposed bond issue illegal.

The abbreviation, "etc.", means, "and other things; and so forth, and others of the like kind; and so on."

Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary, p. 585; Shuler v. Dutton, 75 Iowa 155, 39 N.W. 239; Ingram v. Sherwood, 75 Ark. 176, 87 S.W. 435; Muir v. Kay, 66 Utah 550, 254 P. 901; Stansberry v. First M. E. Church, 79; Ore. 155, 154 P. 887; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 96 Ky. 604, 29 S.W. 449; Lodwick Lbr. Co. v. Taylor, 39 Tex.Civ.App. 302, 87 S.W. 358; Gallop v. Elizabeth City Mill. Co., 178 N.C. 1, 100 S.E. 130; Wagner v. Brady, 130 Tenn. 554, 171 S.W. 1179; Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Met. (Ky.), 199, 81 Am. Dec. 541; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Sewell, 142 Ky. 171, 134 S.W. 162; Doty v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.E. 1053, Ann. Cas., 1912C, 167; Tefft v. Tellinghast, 7 R. I. 434; Gover v. Davis, 29 Beav. 22, 54 Eng. Reprint 612; Twining v. Powell, 2: Colly Ch. Cas. 262, 63 Eng. Reprint 726; Kendall v. Kendall, 4 Russ. Ch. 360, 38. Eng. Reprint 841.

In all bond issues the purposes for same should be free from ambiguity. The proceedings should clearly show such purposes upon their face, and show with certainty that their issuance will be wholly within the statutory power.

Bd. of Sup'rs of Forrest County v. Clark, 163 Miss. 120, 140 So. 733.

E. M. Livingston and Chas. D. Fair, both of Louisville, for appellee.

Appellants contend that the petition filed by the qualified electors of the district asking for the issuance of the bonds and the orders of the Board of Supervisors with reference thereto are void because they do not sufficiently designate the purposes for which the funds are to be spent.

The statute, Sec. 6643, Code 1930, provides that the bonds may be issued to erect, repair and equip school buildings, teachers home, school barn, transportation vehicles and for purchasing lands for schools. The petition does not recite all of the things for which bonds may be issued, but prays that the bonds be issued "to erect, repair and equip school building, teachers home, etc." Appellants contend that the orders are void because all of the purposes for which bonds can be issued were not incorporated in the petition, or because only part of the purposes were incorporated in the petition, and the abbreviation, "etc.", was inserted following those things set out in the petition. We respectfully submit that this contention is without merit.

Counsel for appellant relies largely upon the case of Board of Supervisors of Forrest County v. Clark, 140 So. 733. We submit that the case is not in point and is certainly not controlling in this case. The petition in that case prayed for the issuance of bonds for the purpose of rebuilding, remodelling, and repairing the present school building and teachers' home; which provisions are contained in the statute, but this petition went further and requested the Board to issue bonds for the purpose of equipping said school building and furnishing same with all necessary school supplies. The statute contains no provision whatsoever for the issuance of bonds to furnish a school building with all necessary supplies. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed in that case because the petition and orders there expressly provided for the issuance of bonds for a purpose not authorized by statute.

There is nothing in the petition and order of the Board of Supervisors in this cause asking for the issuance of bonds for an illegal purpose, nor is there anything in the petition which might have had a tendency to mislead those who signed the petition.

We submit that this case turns on the accepted meaning of "etc."

When the generally accepted meaning of "etc." is applied, we are driven to the conclusion that it would include the other things mentioned in the statute and which were not set out in the petition and order. It could mean nothing more than that.

Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary, p. 585; Fleck v. Harmstad et al., 77 A. L. R. 874; Lathers v. Keogh (N. Y.), 39 Hun. 576, 579; Whitmore v. Bowman (Iowa), 4 G. Green 148, 149; State v. Wallichs, 12 Nebr. 407, 11 N.W. 860, 861; Tefft v. Tillinghast, 7 R. I. 434, 436; Bagley v. Rose Hill Sugar Co., 111 La. 249, 35 So. 539, 548; Doty v. Am. T. & T. Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.W. 1053, Ann. Cas., 1912C, 167; L. & N. R. Co. v. Sewell, 142 Ky. 171, 134 S.W. 162, 164; State ex rel. Haw v. Three States Lbr. Co., 274 Mo. 361, 202 S.W. 1083; Osterberg v. Section 30 Development Co., 160 Minn. 487, 200 N.W. 738; Naylor v. McColloch, 54 Ore. 305, 103 P. 68; Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Stansbery v. First M. E. Church, 79 Ore. 155, 154 P. 887; Dano v. Miss. O. & R. River R. Co., 27 Ark. 564; Bryan v. Bates, 15 Ill. 87; Dickerson v. Stoll, 24 N. J. 550; State v. Hackett, 5 La. Ann. 91; State v. Arnold, 140 Ind. 628, 38 N.E. 820; O'Connor v. N. Y., 178 A.D. 550, 165 N.Y.Supp. 625, 224 N.Y. 644, 121 N.E. 881.

We respectfully submit that in view of the numerous authorities above cited the overwhelming meaning of "etc." simply includes those things embraced in the statute which were not copied in the petition and decree, and the use thereof could in no way affect the validity of the bonds here sought to be issued. There was nothing indefinite about the use of the abbreviation and nothing misleading about it.

Griffith, J., Ethridge, J., dissenting.

OPINION

Griffith, J.

Section 6643, Code 1930, in so far as material to the point now to be decided, reads as follows: "On petition of the majority of the qualified electors residing in a consolidated school district, the board of supervisors may issue bonds for such consolidated school district in the manner provided for by law, to erect, repair, and equip school buildings, teachers' homes, school barns, transportation vehicles, and for purchasing lands for schools; . . ."

A petition signed by the majority of the qualified electors residing in Ellison Ridge Consolidated School District was presented to the board of supervisors, reciting "that it is necessary to issue the bonds of the said district in an amount not to exceed $ 15, 000.00 to erect, repair and equip school buildings, teachers' homes, etc., that the proposed bond issue"--and here follow further recitals not material to the present question.

Over the objections of other qualified electors of the district, the board ordered the bonds issued and the objectors appealed to the circuit court, and to this Court from an adverse judgment there.

The order of the board to issue the bonds is, in our opinion, invalid for other reasons than the one to be now dealt with, but the reason last mentioned lies at the threshold, making it unnecessary to pursue the others.

The quoted statute expressly states the purposes for which the bonds may be issued thereunder, and it contains no such language as to permit the indefinite construction that it would be available for purposes of...