Historic Dist. Com'n v. Hall

• Decision Date: 12 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17658.,17658.
• Citation: 923 A.2d 726,282 Conn. 672
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF FAIRFIELD v. Andrew J. HALL et al.

923 A.2d 726

282 Conn. 672

HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF FAIRFIELD v. Andrew J. HALL et al.

No. 17658.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 16, 2007.

Decided June 12, 2007.

Linda L. Morkan, with whom were Jeffrey J. White, Hartford, and, on the brief, John F.X. Peloso, Jr., Stamford, for the appellants (defendants).

Charles W. Fleischmann, Shelton, for the appellee (plaintiff).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

In this action, in which the plaintiff, the historic district commission of the town of Fairfield (commission), seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the issue before the court is whether a sculpture placed on the front lawn of the defendant's property in the Southport Historic District in the town of Fairfield is a "structure" within the meaning of General Statutes § 7-147a(a),¹ and thus subject to the commission's approval. The sculpture is constructed of concrete and steel rebar, is approximately eighty feet long exceeds six tons in weight and lies on a specially prepared trench filled with more than twenty-one tons of gravel and stone. The defendants, Andrew J. Hall and his wife, Christine Hall, appeal² from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the commission's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the sculpture constitutes a "structure" within the meaning of § 7-147a(a). The defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that the sculpture is a "structure" because (1) the plain language of § 7-147a(a) indicates that the commission's jurisdiction extends only to structures that are physically connected to the land, unlike the sculpture in the present case, (2) the legislative history and the origins of the historic district statutes suggest that the commission's jurisdiction should be narrowly construed, and (3) the court improperly relied on facts not in evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The opinion of the trial court sets forth the following undisputed facts. "The commission was established in the town of Fairfield, and the Southport Historic District is one of three historic districts created in that town. The [defendants'] residence and property . . . [lie] within the Southport Historic District.

"In 2003, a sculpture by Anselm Kiefer, a German artist, entitled `Etroits sont les vaisseaux' ([n]arrow are the vessels), was apparently purchased by a corporation controlled by [Andrew] Hall and shipped to and placed on the lawn of the [defendants'] property. The sculpture is made of concrete and steel rebar. It is approximately eighty feet long and consists of seventeen variably sized wavy sections of concrete, some with protruding rebar which rest either on the ground, another section, or both. The maximum height is approximately four feet. The smallest `wave' is approximately four square feet in area and weighs 1200 pounds. The largest is eighteen feet long and weighs approximately five and [one-half] tons. Atop one of the `waves' is a relatively small replica of an open book made of lead. The sculpture is located entirely on the [defendants'] property between the house and a picket fence and bushes that front [on] Harbor Road."

During the installation process, the defendants "leveled a portion of their sloping lawn by excavating a two foot deep trench approximately [eighty] feet long and four feet wide which was then filled with over [twenty-one] tons of gravel and stone to provide a base for the sculpture and for additional drainage.³ The sculpture was disassembled at its former location, a storage facility in New Jersey, and transported [on] five large flatbed trucks to the [defendants'] residence and reassembled by means of a crane on the stone and gravel bed. This procedure of reassembly took two days and necessitated the partial closing of Harbor [Road] traffic and the removal of the fence fronting the street."

The defendants initially filed an application for a certificate of appropriateness, seeking permission to install the structure, but withdrew the application before it could be acted on by the commission. Approximately two months later, the defendants installed the sculpture on the front lawn of their property without the commission's permission. Thereafter, the commission commenced this action against the defendants, seeking a judgment declaring that it has jurisdiction over the matter and that the defendants were required to submit an application for a certificate of appropriateness pursuant to General Statutes § 7-147d(a).⁴ Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the commission's motion and denied the defendants' motion.⁵ The court also granted the commission's motion for injunctive relief and ordered the defendants to remove the sculpture or file an application for a certification of appropriateness within thirty days. This appeal followed.

The defendants claim that the sculpture is not a "structure" under § 7-147a(a) and thus is not subject to the commission's jurisdiction because it is neither "affixed" to the land by direct physical attachment nor embedded in the ground. The commission responds that the sculpture falls within its jurisdiction because it is "affixed" to the land by virtue of its own "multi-ton weight" and the force of gravity. We agree with the commission.

We begin with the standard of review. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . The test is whether the party moving for summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. . . . Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153, 158, 905 A.2d 1156 (2006).

The issue before the court also "involves a question of statutory interpretation that . . . requires our plenary review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751, 756, 900 A.2d 1 (2006).

General Statutes § 7-147d(a) provides: "No building or structure shall be erected or altered within an historic district until after an application for a certificate of appropriateness as to exterior architectural features has been submitted to the historic district commission and approved by said commission." In addition, General Statutes § 7-147a provides in relevant part: "(a) As used in this part . . . `erected' means constructed, built, installed or enlarged; `exterior architectural features' means such portion of the exterior of a structure or building as is open to view from a public street, way or place . . . [and] `structure' means any combination of materials, other than a building, which is affixed to the land, and shall include, but not be limited to, signs, fences and walls. . . ."

The parties do not dispute that the sculpture was "erected" or "installed." Their principal disagreement concerns whether it constitutes a "structure." Section 7-147a(a) does not define the meaning of "affixed to the land," except indirectly by referring to "signs, fences and walls" as examples of objects considered to be "structures." Significantly, the statute contains no limiting language regarding how an object must be "affixed to the land" and, therefore, does not eliminate gravity as a potential means of attachment. There are no other statutory provisions that address the question.

The legislative history of § 7-147a(a) likewise fails to shed any light on the matter. The statutory scheme was amended in 1980 to include the definition of "structure" as part of a comprehensive revision of existing law on historic districts. See Public Acts 1980, No. 80-314 § 1. Prior to 1980, there was no separate section defining the terms used in § 7-147d(a), which sets forth the requirement for a certificate of appropriateness.⁶ Possibly because the 1980 legislation proposed so many technical and substantive changes in the law, there was no discussion regarding the meaning of the phrase, "affixed to the land,"⁷ during the committee hearing on the matter or in the course of the legislative debates. In addition, none of the appellate cases cited by the defendants, in which this court used the term "affixed" to describe "direct...