Hitchings v. Edmands
| Decision Date | 03 March 1882 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | Otis M. Hitchings v. Artemas Edmands & others |
Argued November 3, 1881
Essex. Contract against the defendants as makers of a promissory note for $ 149.50, dated January 18, 1875, payable "on demand after date" to the order of the plaintiff.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J., it appeared that the note was signed by two of the defendants, and that the defendant Artemas Edmands placed his name, in blank, on the back of the note at the time of its execution, and before its delivery to the plaintiff.
There was no evidence of any notice to Artemas of the nonpayment of the note; and he asked the judge to rule, that, as the note was made payable "on demand after date," it was a note "payable on time," and he was entitled to notice, under the St. of 1874, c. 404, the same as an indorser.
The judge declined so to rule, but ruled that the note was not a note "payable on time," within the meaning of the statute.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendant Artemas Edmands alleged exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.
D Dudley, for the defendant.
N. M Hawkes, for the plaintiff.
OPINION
In the opinion of a majority of the court, the promissory note on which this action was brought is not a note payable on time, within the meaning of the St. of 1874, c. 404. [*] It is an ordinary demand note, payable at once on demand, on which an action could have been brought immediately after it was given, without any demand.
This construction of the note renders it unnecessary to determine whether the St. of 1874, c. 404, relates only to such promissory notes as are expressly payable at a fixed and certain time after their date, or includes also promissory notes that are payable at some time after their date which may be made certain by some subsequent act or event.
It has been contended that the words "after date" qualify the meaning of the words "on demand" in such manner that the legal effect of all the words is that the note is payable on demand only after the day of the date, which must be excluded; and the general rule of law in computing time from the date, or from the day of the date, is relied on in support of this view. Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502. It has become the general rule in the construction of a contract, when the time to be computed is one or more days, weeks or years, to exclude the day of the date or event, whether by the contract the time is to be reckoned from date or from the day of the date, or from some act or event. The...
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...159 A.L.R. 1021 (1945), 71 A.L.R.2d 284, 309-19 (1960). 86 Supra note 81. 87 59 App.D.C. at 301, 40 F.2d at 813, quoting, Hitchings v. Edmands, 132 Mass. 338 (1882). 88 Id. 89 Supra note 74. 90 81 U.S.App.D.C. at 60, 154 F.2d at 850. 91 Id. The difficulty in Schupp was that "neither the com......
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...& Pro., 848; Wood, Limitations of Actions (3 Ed.), sec. 124; 2 Dan. Nego. Instr. (5 Ed.), 1698; Fenno v. Gay, 146 Mass. 118; Hitching v. Edmonds, 132 Mass. 338; Cousins Partridge, 79 Cal. 224; Henry v. Roe, 83 Tex. 446; Swift v. Trotti, 52 Tex. 498; Bartholomew v. Seaman, 25 Hun 619; Erwin ......
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