Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1911
• Citation: 139 S.W. 693,124 Tenn. 334
• Parties: HITT v. CANEY FORK GULF COAL CO. SAME v. GIBBONS et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

139 S.W. 693

124 Tenn. 334

HITT v. CANEY FORK GULF COAL CO.

SAME v. GIBBONS et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 24, 1911

Appeal from Chancery Court, White County; T. M. McConnell Chancellor.

Consolidated suits by H. D. Hitt against the Caney Fork Gulf Coal Company and against Rose Gibbons and others. From a decree for defendants in both cases, complainant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Robinson Fancher & Meredith, for complainant.

W. T Smith, for defendants.

NEIL J.

These were consolidated cases heard together in the chancery court of White county. There was a decree in favor of the defendants in both cases, and the complainant has appealed and assigned errors. Both suits involved the same land, but the controversy in the first suit turned mainly upon a question of boundary, or the location of a line. [1] Then there was also a question of res adjudicata made in the arguments at the bar, but this matter not having been specially pleaded, it could not be considered. There were some other questions, but these appear also in the second case, and will be there examined. All of the points pertaining to the first case are disposed of in a memorandum opinion, and this case need not be further noticed.

The facts pertaining to the second case are substantially stated in the body of the opinion in addition to the various contentions discussed or treated. We need now state only some general matters which are necessary to a proper understanding of the particular facts referred to.

These actions were brought to recover 780 acres of land, part of what is known generally, in the record as the "1,200-acre Coville tract." Subsequently, it developed that a part of the 780 acres--that is, what is known as the "200-acre Elizabeth Allen tract"--was conceded by the defendants, leaving under contest 580 acres of the Coville 1,200 acres, lying in White county. Of this 580 acres, the complainant in the course of the litigation conceded to the defendants two small tracts known as the McKay and Welsh lands, lying within the boundaries of the 580 acres.

The Coville, title or claim passed by a regular chain of conveyances to Catherine P. Hatch, and Marie L. Harback. They sold by deed, retaining a lien, to one Mitchell. He failed to pay the purchase money when due, and a bill was thereupon filed against him to enforce the vendor's lien. A decree was rendered in that case directing the land to be sold for the payment of the debt. It was sold subject to the two-year right of redemption. At this sale the owners of the decree became the purchasers. They resided out of the county where the land lay. They subsequently transferred their right in the decree to Mitchell and another, each of whom claimed a half interest. Mitchell sold his right of redemption to complainant Hitt. Before the redemption period expired Hitt paid the redemption money to the clerk of the chancery court in which the land had been sold.

The first question arises on the validity of the redemption. We are of opinion that under our redemption statutes (Shannon's Code, §§ 3813, 3823, and Acts 1897, c. 132) the party whose land is sold may pay the redemption money to the clerk of the court in which the land was sold. He may also pay it to the purchaser or any one claiming under him. Of course, if he pay it to the purchaser after he has notice of a transfer by him to another, the redemption would not be a good one. Likewise, if he pay it to one claiming under the purchaser he takes the risk of the claim being valid. He is not bound to decide such a controversy actual or possible. We believe that a true construction preserving the beneficent right of redemption, is that the debtor may always make certain his redemption by paying the redemption money, in case the land has been sold by the judgment or decree of a court, to the clerk of the court from which the sale was made; in other cases to the clerk of the circuit court.

Complainant having purchased Mitchell's right of redemption, and having redeemed under him, acquired his title. Mitchell claimed the Coville title which passed by a regular chain from Coville to him. Coville purchased from Hiram Spafford, Jr., and he from Hiram Spafford, Sr., the latter from Thomas Eastland, and Thomas Eastland from Thomas B. Eastland, and he was the grantee of the state.

At this point a contest arises between the Coville title and that under which the defendants claim. The defendants trace their title from the state through Thomas B. Eastland, Thomas Eastland, and Hiram Spafford, Sr. Then by the will of Hiram Spafford, Sr., to Hiram Spafford, Jr., an undivided one-half interest, and to A. E. Spafford, Hettie Gibbons, and Abbie A. Proctor, each an undivided one-sixth; then a deed from E. A. Spafford to his father, Hiram Spafford, Jr., conveying his one-sixth; then the will of Hiram Spafford, Jr., devising to E. A. Spafford his four-sixths or two-thirds, then the deed of E. A. Spafford to Abbie A. Proctor conveying to her the said two-thirds, she thereby becoming vested with five-sixths undivided interest; then the deed of Abbie A. Proctor of this five-sixths to F. T. Fancher, then the deed of the same five-sixths made by F. T. Fancher to the defendant Caney Fork Gulf Coal Company.

Hettie Gibbons died, and the defendant Rose Gibbons became heir at law of her undivided one-sixth interest. Rose Gibbons died, but, before her death, devised her interest to her father, defendant John W. Gibbons.

The question as to the superiority of these respective titles or claims of title depends upon the effect of three deeds; one of which Hiram Spafford, Sr., made to Hiram Spafford, Jr., on March 1, 1851; the deed of H. Spafford, Jr., of October 20, 1851, purporting to reconvey this land; and the deed of H. Spafford, Jr., to Edward Coville made on September 21, 1859. All three of these deeds had defective certificates, so that although each was put on record in the register's office, as below indicated, such registration could not operate as notice under our registration laws. It is not shown that Edward Coville had any notice of the deed of reconveyance made by H. Spafford, Jr., to H. Spafford, Sr.

We shall now state the foregoing facts with more particularity, and also what we conceive to be the legal principles controlling them.

The deed of H. Spafford, Sr., to H. Spafford, Jr., was made on March 1, 1851, and registered on a defective certificate on the 23d of March, 1851. The deed of H. Spafford, Jr., to H. Spafford, Sr., reconveying the same land, was made October 20, 1851, and registered October 21, 1856, on defective certificate. The deed of H. Spafford, Jr., to Edward Coville was made September 21, 1859, and registered October 18, 1859, on defective certificate. The will of H. Spafford, Sr., went into effect March 14, 1876, the date of his death. By this will he purported to devise one-half of his land to his son Hiram Spafford, Jr., and one-sixth to his grandson, E. A. Spafford, son of Hiram Spafford, Jr., one-sixth to his granddaughter defendant Abbie A. Proctor, one-sixth to his granddaughter Hettie Gibbons, who left as her heir defendant Rose Gibbons. E. A. Spafford conveyed his one-sixth interest to his father, Hiram Spafford Jr., by deed dated March 22, 1893. Hiram Spafford, Jr., died October 5, 1893, having devised his property to E. A. Spafford, by will which went into effect October 5, 1893. Under this will of his father, E. A. Spafford, on the face of the papers, acquired four-sixths or two-thirds undivided interest in the land which Hiram Spafford, Sr., purported to own, and by his deed E. A. Spafford conveyed the said two-thirds undivided interest to Abbie A. Proctor, March 2, 1901, and she thus with her own one-sixth interest devised to her by her grandfather Hiram Spafford, Sr., apparently became the owner of five-sixths undivided interest in the land. Abbie A. Proctor undertook to convey the said five-sixths to F. T. Fancher June 30, 1903. Abbie A. Proctor had no actual knowledge of the Coville deed when she purchased from E. A. Spafford, but Fancher had knowledge of it, and E. A. Spafford had knowledge of it.

Now as to the Coville title, under the foregoing facts.

When H. Spafford, Jr., reconveyed the land on October 20, 1851, to H. Spafford, Sr., the title passed into the latter as between him and H. Spafford, Jr., and the heirs and representatives of the latter, notwithstanding the fact that the deed was registered on a defective certificate. But when prior thereto, on March 1, 1851, Hiram Spafford, Sr., conveyed to Hiram Spafford, Jr., the title passed into the latter notwithstanding the deed was registered on a defective certificate, and so was good not only against Hiram Spafford, Sr., but also against his heirs and representatives as well; and subsequently when Hiram Spafford, Jr., conveyed the land, on October 18, 1859, to Edward Coville, he, Coville, acquired through that deed the title which Hiram Spafford, Sr., had conveyed to Hiram Spafford, Jr., by the deed of March 1, 1851, notwithstanding the fact that on October 20, 1851, Hiram Spafford, Jr., had reconveyed the land to Hiram Spafford, Sr., the latter deed, as already stated, having a defective certificate, and it not appearing that Edward Coville had any notice of such deed, since the deed having a defective certificate was not entitled to registration, and the registration thereof on the certificate was not notice to him. But the Coville deed (Hiram Spafford, Jr., to Edward Coville, September 21, 1859) had also, as stated, a defective certificate, which did not entitle it to registration, and hence conveyed only an inchoate title as to Hiram Spafford, Sr., though good as to Hiram Spafford, Jr., and his heirs and representatives.

Now by our statute, ...