Hittel v. Rosenhagen

• Decision Date: 18 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1821,85-1821
• Citation: 492 So.2d 1086,11 Fla. L. Weekly 1385
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1385 Robert HITTEL, Sr., Thomas Edward Doriety and Mary Doriety, his wife, and Anthony M. Nardotti and Linda M. Nardotti, his wife, Appellants, v. Joseph ROSENHAGEN, as the Director of Revenue Collection, Broward County, Florida, and the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1086

492 So.2d 1086

11 Fla. L. Weekly 1385

Robert HITTEL, Sr., Thomas Edward Doriety and Mary Doriety, his wife, and Anthony M. Nardotti and Linda M. Nardotti, his wife, Appellants, v. Joseph ROSENHAGEN, as the Director of Revenue Collection, Broward County, Florida, and the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida, Appellees.

No. 85-1821.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

June 18, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1986.

John A. Thabes of Saunders, Curtis, Ginestra & Gore, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Nancy Little Hoffman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Susan F. DeLegal, General Counsel for Broward County, Larry E. Lymas-Johnson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Alexander Cocalis, Chief Trial Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, J. Terrell Williams and J.C. O'Steen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae, State Dept. of Revenue.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellants filed a taxpayers' class action in the Circuit Court of Broward County against appellees, Broward County, The Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida, and Joseph Rosenhagen, as the Director of Revenue Collection. The multi-count complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on due process and equal protection violations; the statute of limitations; equitable estoppel; unjust enrichment; and civil rights violations.

A motion to dismiss or abate the action was filed by appellees upon the grounds that the case of State Dept. of Revenue v. Markham, 426 So.2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 450 So.2d 487 (Fla.1984), constituted a bar to the prosecution of this case. The parties and court treated this motion as raising the legal defenses of res judicata and estoppel by judgment (the pleading deficiency having been waived by stipulation). Said motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court with prejudice based "upon the grounds of res judiciata/estoppel by judgment." Said judgment certifies to this court the following question as one of great public interest to the citizens and taxpayers of Broward County:

DOES THE PRIOR CASE OF MARKHAM v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE (sic) 426 So2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), Pet. for rev. den. 450 So.2d 487 (Fla.1984) EFFECTIVELY BAR PLAINTIFFS HEREIN FROM PROSECUTING THEIR PRESENT CLASS ACTION UPON THE BASIS OF RES JUDICATA OR ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT?

It should be noted that the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not allow certification by the circuit court to this court. Appellants timely appealed the final judgment, however, and therefore this case is properly before this court for review.

Since the focal point of this case is the impact of the Markham case upon appellants' present claims, some allusion to the facts and history of that case is necessary. On December 4, 1979, the Department of Revenue issued a directive to William Markham, the Broward County Property Appraiser, disapproving the 1979 Broward County real property assessment roll as being less than "just valuation," and directing that the 1980 assessment roll be reappraised at one hundred percent of just value. Markham was unable to complete the reappraisal in time for the 1980 assessment roll to be approved, millages set, taxes levied and collected, and disbursements made of the taxes so collected to the various governing bodies within the county. Because essential government services and functions would be impaired, Markham filed suit against the Department of Revenue in April 1980, seeking an extension of time to complete preparation of the 1980 real estate rolls, and leave to prepare an interim tax roll for 1980 based upon 1979 property values and millages. Broward County and several individuals intervened in the action.

A final judgment was entered in the Markham lawsuit on July 22, 1980, granting the relief sought and ordering that the reassessment go forward establishing schedules to set and collect both the interim as well as the final tax. After Markham completed his reassessment, and it was approved by the Department of Revenue, he moved, in March 1981, for entry of an order to establish tax roll procedures in order to determine whether reconciliation between the interim and final rolls for 1980 should be declared final for 1980, and whether supplemental bills should be sent. In June of 1981 the trial court in the Markham lawsuit entered an order directing that taxes levied on interim assessments for the year 1980 be confirmed as final, that there be no reconciliation between the interim and final assessment rolls, and that the 1980 taxes levied and collected on the interim roll would stand as being the final tax for 1980.

The Department of Revenue appealed the above order and this court reversed in State Dept. of Revenue v. Markham, 426 So.2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 450 So.2d 487 (Fla.1984), and held that the trial court erred in dispensing with reconciliation of the rolls and ordering the interim roll final, because the interim roll did not satisfy the constitutional requirement of just valuation as set forth in Article VII, section 4, of the Florida Constitution. All motions for rehearing were denied, and the cause was remanded to the trial court for reconciliation of the interim and final 1980 rolls in compliance with section 193.1145, Florida Statutes.

After remand, further hearings in the Markham case were conducted, and on March 19, 1985, the trial court entered its order setting forth a timetable within which the property appraiser and the tax collector were to comply with the mandate of this court. In compliance with the above order, Markham issued to all class members a "Notice of Change of Assessed Valuation--Real Property--1980 Assessment Roll," and the revenue collector sent a final notice to the taxpayers notifying them of additional taxes or refunds due for the year 1980. Receipt of bills for additional taxes for the year 1980 precipitated this suit.

On appeal it is contended by appellants that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because neither res judicata nor estoppel by judgment apply here. In addition, appellants submit that the complaint states a cause of action for equitable estoppel against the county, which precludes it from ever collecting the taxes in question. Appellees' response is that the Markham case directed the Property Appraiser of Broward County to reappraise the county property for 1980 and to use an interim assessment roll for 1980 based on the 1979 roll while he was completing the reassessment of the entire county for the corrected 1980 tax roll. Thus, the payment of taxes pursuant to the 1980 interim tax roll did not preclude the tax collector from collecting more taxes for that year, if shown to be due by the final approved 1980 tax roll. Furthermore, appellees also contend that appellants cannot rely on equitable estoppel to avoid the collection of additional taxes.

In order for a final judgment to bar further litigation based upon principles of res judicata the judgment must reflect 1) identity in the thing sued for; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of persons and parties of the action, and 4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla.1953); Signo v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 454 So.2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The doctrine of estoppel by judgment, however, may apply where two causes of action are different, in which case the judgment in the first suit only estops the parties from litigating in the second suit issues common to both actions that were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Industrial Contracting Company, 260 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). It is essential that the question common to both causes of action was actually adjudicated and that, if there is any doubt as to whether a litigant has had his day in court such doubt must be resolved in favor of the full consideration of the substantive issues of the litigation and against the rigid application of any principle that would defeat the ends of justice. Id. at 865.

As noted previously, if there is a lack of identity of causes of action, a defendant cannot prevail on the defense of res judicata. The present case demonstrates that the causes of action are not only not identical but they are quite dissimilar. In Markham the property appraiser's concern was with his official duties, i.e., what action he should take to rectify the numerous problems that had arisen because of the invalid 1980 tax roll such as funding government operations for the ensuing year while he was trying to reassess the property countywide. The county, as the governmental agency required to furnish the services, was concerned over its ability to function properly without the collection of adequate taxes. On the other hand, the issues raised in this suit by appellants concern deprivation of their constitutional rights resulting from the assessment of additional taxes for 1980 and their claims bottomed upon equitable estoppel arising out of the alleged misrepresentations of the property appraiser and the tax collector. It seems clear that none of these issues were, or could have been, adjudicated in the Markham suit.

A test frequently used to determine whether causes of action are identical is whether the evidence in both cases is in essence the same. Gordon v. Gordon, 59...