Hixon v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 1908
• Citation: 61 S.E. 14,130 Ga. 479
• Parties: HIXON v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

61 S.E. 14

130 Ga. 479

HIXON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 14, 1908

Syllabus by the Court.

The admission of testimony as to the statements of a party other than the defendant in a criminal case, over objection made on the ground that it was hearsay, was not error requiring a new trial, in view of the statement made by the court at the time as to the purpose of its admission and the limitation of it by the court to such purpose, and in view of other testimony regarding such statements by the witness giving the testimony, and by the person whose sayings were testified to going to and remaining before the jury without objection.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3137-3143.]

Any statement or conduct of a person which indicates a consciousness of his being guilty of a crime which has been committed, where at the time, or thereafter, he is charged with or suspected of the crime, is admissible as a circumstance against him upon his trial for having committed it.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, § 778.]

Where a threat is made to kill some one, and the testimony indicates that the threat was directed against a person who was afterwards murdered, evidence of such threat is admissible against the person making it upon his trial for such murder.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 26, Homicide §§ 332-334, 337.]

The evidence warranted the verdict, and no sufficient reason appears for disturbing the judgment overruling the motion for a new trial.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 26, Homicide, §§ 518-538.]

Error from Superior Court, Meriwether County; R. W. Freeman, Judge.

Emmet Hixon was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

W. R. Jones and Hill & Culpepper, for plaintiff in error.

J. R. Terrell, Sol. Gen., and Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HOLDEN J.

Upon the trial of the case the defendant's counsel objected to the following testimony of George Brown: "Two places were pointed out to me where he was struck, one on the Pike side above the bridge, I suppose 200 yards. There was a place where Nannie Chunn said it was over there; at the south of the branch, close to where she said Emmet killed Joe. Said where he was struck was close up there to the south of the branch, and the boat paddles were just across the branch, both of them. From the way she talked it was between 30 and 50 yards." The objection was this testimony was hearsay, and complaint is made that the court committed error in overruling this objection. Before George Brown delivered the testimony objected to Nannie Chunn testified about having made statements in George Brown's presence, and her testimony in regard to these statements was admitted without objection and remained before the jury. The statements which she testified she made were not in detail exactly the same as the statements testified to by George Brown as having been made by her to him, but in view of all the other testimony in the case their meaning was substantially the same. The same is true of other testimony of George Brown as to statements made by Nannie Chunn, which was not objected to and remained before the jury. The statements made by Nannie Chunn, as detailed in this other testimony of George Brown, were not exactly the same as the statements embraced in his testimony objected to, but, in the light of all the testimony, had substantially the same meaning. No motion was made to rule out the testimony of Nannie Chunn, or this other testimony of George Brown; and, in view of this testimony going to and remaining before the jury without objection, and in view of the further fact that at the time the testimony objected to was admitted the court made the following statement: "I let it in only to locate how far the body was from some particular point. That evidence is not for the purpose of showing what the woman said was true"-we do not think that the action of the court in allowing the testimony to which objection was made to remain before the jury was a sufficient ground upon which to set aside the verdict. Payne v. Miller, 89 Ga. 73, 14 S.E. 926; Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 37 Am.Rep. 76; Bailey v. Ogden, 75 Ga. 874; Daughtry v. Sav. & S. R. R. Co., 1 Ga.App. 393, 58 S.E. 230; Lovett v. State, 60 Ga. 257; O'Shields v. State, 55 Ga. 696; Harrison v. State, 125 Ga. 267, 53 S.E. 958; Summerford v. Davenport, 126 Ga. 153, 54 S.E. 1025.

2. Complaint is made that the court committed error in allowing over defendant's objections, the following testimony of George Brown: "He came to me, and wanted to leave. He came to me two or three times. Wanted to leave. Wanted to run away from here. Of course, he owed me money, and I told him: 'You stay on here. If you run off, they will catch...