Hixson v. Barrow

• Decision Date: 02 July 1975
• Docket Number: 2,Nos. 1,3,50317,Nos. 50316,s. 50316,s. 1
• Citation: 135 Ga.App. 519,218 S.E.2d 253
• Parties: Jessie L. HIXSON v. J. R. BARROW et al. R. A. BARROW v. J. R. BARROW et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 253

218 S.E.2d 253

135 Ga.App. 519

Jessie L. HIXSON v. J. R. BARROW et al.

R. A. BARROW v. J. R. BARROW et al.

Nos. 50316, 50317.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3.

July 2, 1975.

Rehearing Denied July 21, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in this intersection collision case against joint defendants, a host driver charged with gross negligence and the driver of the vehicle with which it collided charged with ordinary negligence, is repugnant to an award in favor of the latter against his co-defendant for property damage where the same is for the maximum sum authorized under the evidence.

2. Whether a witness qualifies as an expert so as to be permitted to express a conclusory opinion from observed facts is primarily addressed to the judge trying the case. The witness here, who saw skid marks and debris at the intersection the same night as the collision had formerly, as an insurance adjuster, investigated cases of the same kind; under the circumstances it was not error to allow him to express an opinion as to the speed of the vehicles, the length of time elapsed and the witness' present knowledge or lack of knowledge being matters which the jury could take into account in evaluating his testimony.

3. The interjection of the likelihood of insurance interest into this case was improper, but the stringent corrective measures taken by the trial court rendered unnecessary the grant of a mistrial.

4. Refusal to admit prior notes and memoranda of a witness present and testifying in the case was proper where it was not contended that the notes were offered for purposes of contradiction or impeachment.

5, 6. The court's instructions on negligence in driving under the influence of intoxicants, and on assumption of risk by passengers under such circumstances, were without error.

Murray & Temple, Malcolm S. Murray, William D. Temple, Decatur, for appellant Jessie L. Hixson in No. 50316.

Jack K. Bohler, East Point, Edward L. Savell, Andrew Robert Greene, Savell, Williams, Cox & Angel, Atlanta, for appellees J. R. Barrow et al. in No. 50316.

Jack K. Bohler, East Point, Murray & Temple, Malcolm S. Murray, William D. Temple, Decatur, for appellees J. R. Barrow et al. in No. 50317.

STOLZ, Judge.

John Barrow was a guest passenger in a car driven by his brother, Roy Barrow, which was involved in an intersection collision with an automobile owned and operated by Jessie Hixson. John Barrow and his wife sued the drivers of both vehicles, alleging gross negligence against John Barrow's host driver, Roy Barrow, and ordinary negligence against the driver of the other vehicle, Jessie Hixson. As part of the same action, Jessie Hixson sued his co-defendant, Roy Barrow, for damages to his automobile. The cases were tried together. The jury returned verdicts in favor of both plaintiffs (John Barrow and wife) against both defendants (Roy Barrow and Jessie Hixson) in the main action. The same jury returned the maximum possible verdict in favor of Jessie Hixson against Roy Barrow.

1. This case is controlled by Jarrett v. Parker, 135 Ga.App. 195, 217 S.E.2d 337. Jarrett, supra, held that where two cases arising out of the same occurrence are tried by the same jury, if the two verdicts cannot by reconciled with each other, both must be set aside. There is simply no distinguishing difference between the facts in Jarrett, supra, and those in the case before us. In Jarrett, supra, the wife (Mrs. Parker) sued for personal injuries she sustained while driving her husband's automobile when it was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by Mr. Jarrett. Mr. Parker sued Mr. Jerrett for damages done to his car, medical expenses, and loss of consortium. The two cases were tried together. The jury returned a defendant's verdict in the case brought by Mrs. Parker, but returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Parker in his case. This court affirmed the trial judge's grant of plaintiffs' motions for new trials, holding the judgments to be inconsistent, irreconcilable and illegal. In this case, in order to find in favor of both plaintiffs against both defendants, the jury had to find that both defendants were guilty of certain degrees of negligence which were the proximate cause of the collision and John Barrow's injuries and damages. In returning a verdict in favor of Jessie Hixson against Roy Barrow for the maximum amount allowed under the evidence, the jury, in effect, held that, under the doctrine of comparative negligence, Jessie Hixson was not guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision. The same jury simply cannot find Hixson guilty of negligence which is a part of the proximate cause of a collision in one breath and in the next completely exonerate him by returning a maximum verdict in his favor. Such is completely inconsistent and irreconcilable.

We are unable to follow the logic of the dissent. The size of the respective verdicts does not control the application of the rules of law. The dissent correctly notes that the jury is not required to accept as correct, opinion evidence of value even where there is no other evidence of facts and data upon which the jury might base an independent conclusion. Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga.App. 328(3), 147 S.E.2d 782; Crowe v. Harrell, 122 Ga.App. 7, 8, 176 S.E.2d 190; Southern v. Cobb County, 78 Ga.App. 58(2), 50 S.E.2d 226. The present case is not controlled by what the jury was not required to do, but by what the jury did. Had the jury returned a verdict less than the maximum allowed under the evidence, this appeal would be written differently. The fact is, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jessie Hixson for the maximum amount allowed under the evidence. In doing so, the jury held that, as between the drivers of the vehicles involved in the collision, Roy Barrow was completely at fault and that Jessie Hixson was not guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision. While there may have been evidence from which a jury could have found Hixson guilty of ordinary negligence, the same jury could not do so in one case and then, in effect, find him blameless in another case arising out of the same occurrence. 'This type of result breeds an inconsistency into our system that undermines its foundation through destruction of its credibility.' White v. Hammond, 129 Ga.App. 4088 412, 199 S.E.2d 809, 813; Jarrett v. Parker, supra.

2. John Cage, a friend of the plaintiff, visited the scene of the wreck before dawn of the same night, after a time span of four hours or less, and remained until after sun-up. His estimate of the length of skid marks found there and which he was able to see before daylight coincided approximately with those of the police officer investigating at the time, but in addition Cage testified to a lighter continuation of the line of marks which he was only able to see in the daylight. This testimony would be admissible whether or not Cage was an expert. Opinion evidence of speed on the part of an eyewitness is admissible, its credit for the jury who may take into account the witness' ability and opportunity to judge. Shockey v. Baker, 212 Ga. 106(4), 90 S.E.2d 654. Evidence of what remains at the scene may be testified to by anyone who saw it, his opportunity to see and the length of tie elapsed also going to his credit and being jury questions. However, opinion evidence of speed inferred from an examination of the scene (as, for example, the speed of the vehicle concluded from an examination of tire skidmarks or physical damage to the vehicle) is the subject of expert testimony, which may be offered by a qualified person after stating facts which would so qualify him as having special knowledge in the field, the issue of qualification vel non being for the trial judge. Central Container Corp. v. Westbrook, 105 Ga.App. 855, 860, 126 S.E.2d 264.

In the case sub judice the witness, after testifying to the physical state of the intersection where the accident occurred, was allowed over objection to state his conclusion as to the speed of the Barrow automobile. This was done on the basis that the witness had for two years worked as an insurance adjuster and stated that he had investigated hundreds of collisions and had an informed opinion on the subject. Under these circumstances it was not error to allow the testimony. Enumerations of error 10 and 11 are without merit.

3. Enumerations 12, 13 and 14 deal with the denial of a motion for mistrial on the part of Hixson (Murray-Temple) on the ground that the codefendant had injected the issue of insurance into the case. See Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga.App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571; Southeast Transport Corp. v. Hogan Livestock, 133 Ga.App. 825, 212 S.E.2d 638. 'It is the general rule that, where the mere exclusion of such evidence, and appropriate instructions from the court to disregard it and remarks of counsel thereon, cannot disabuse the prejudicial impression created upon the jury, a mistrial should be granted. O'Neill Mfg. Co. v. Pruitt, 110 Ga. 577, 578, 579, 36 S.E. 59.' Heinz v. Backus, 34 Ga.App. 203, 128 S.E. 915, 916. Ordinarily it is the plaintiff who hankers after some clue to reach the jury's ears that the size of the verdict will not in fact bankrupt the tortfeasor. Here, however, the plaintiff's conduct throughout was exemplary. The word 'insurance' was first used by counsel for defendant Barrow in cross examining defendant Hixson about a statement he had given concerning the wreck prior to trial. However, counsel for Hixson had already elicited the information that the interviewer said he was an 'agent of Crawford and Company, Ponce de Leon . . . Crawford Adjusting Company on Ponce de Leon Avenue,' statements which undoubtedly conveyed to a knowledgeable Cobb County jury that insurance adjusters were interested in the case. The court, nothing that the plaintiff did not join in the motion for...