Ho-Rath v. Corning Inc.

Decision Date27 May 2022
Docket Number2020-227-Appeal.,PC 10-4186,2020-228-Appeal.,PC 17-125
Citation275 A.3d 100
Parties Jean HO-RATH et al. v. CORNING INCORPORATED et al. Yendee Ho-Rath et al. v. Rhode Island Hospital et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Amato A. Deluca, Esq., for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey S. Brenner, Esq., William H. Jestings, Esq., Robert P. Landau, Esq., Stanley F. Pupecki, Esq., for Defendants.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.

In these consolidated appeals the plaintiffs, Jean Ho-Rath, Bunsan Ho-Rath, and Yendee Ho-Rath (collectively plaintiffs),1 appeal from judgments of the Superior Court entered in favor of the defendants, Corning Incorporated (Corning), Quest Diagnostics, LLC (Quest), Rhode Island Hospital (RIH), Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island (WIH), Marsha Sverdrup, M.S., and Jami A. Star, M.D. (collectively defendants).2 The plaintiffs assert that the hearing justice erred in finding that the defendants owed them no duty of care. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

This Court has twice before been presented with questions relative to the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs’ claims. See Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital , 115 A.3d 938, 946, 950 (R.I. 2015) ( Ho-Rath II ) (holding that a minor plaintiff in a medical malpractice action has two options to comply with the applicable statute of limitations: (1) suit may be filed on the minor's behalf within three years of the occurrence or reasonable discovery of the alleged malpractice; or (2) the minor may file suit on their own behalf upon reaching the age of majority, and further holding that a parent's claim for loss of consortium in a medical malpractice action is tolled in tandem with the minor's claim from which it is derived); Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital , 89 A.3d 806, 812 (R.I. 2014) ( Ho-Rath I ) (holding that claims asserted by plaintiffs against laboratories sounded in ordinary negligence and were governed by the statute of limitations set forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19 ). Although many of the facts in this case are set forth in those opinions, because the present appeals involve a substantive challenge to the viability of plaintiffs’ claims, we shall set forth the facts and procedural history in toto .

Jean and Bunsan are the parents of Yendee, who was born January 9, 1998, at WIH. In the months and years following her birth, Yendee underwent genetic testing for alpha thalassemia, a genetic blood disorder

that impairs the production of hemoglobin and can lead to "severe and fatal anemia." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1969 (28th ed. 2006). According to Jean, by October 2003 Yendee was "very ill[,]" and she was ultimately confirmed to have Hemoglobin H disease.

Yendee was Jean and Bunsan's second child. During her first pregnancy, Jean presented to WIH for prenatal care and, due to her Southeast Asian descent, she was offered genetic counseling and testing "to possibly rule out carrier status of beta thalassemia

." The results of two hemoglobin electrophoreses performed by MetPath Teterboro Laboratory (MetPath)3 in February and May 1993 indicated that Jean had a normal pattern.4 Sanhkdee, Jean and Bunsan's first child, was born on November 15, 1993, and, as part of a clinical project, WIH sent both Sanhkdee's and Jean's blood to RIH for hemoglobin electrophoresis

.5 The results from RIH showed that both Jean and Sanhkdee tested positive for the presence of alpha thalassemia. Thereafter, Bunsan's blood was sent to MetPath for hemoglobin electrophoresis ; on December 28, 1993, it was reported that Bunsan had a normal pattern.

While pregnant with Yendee, Jean again presented to WIH for prenatal care and genetic counseling. A counselor and a doctor from WIH's Prenatal Diagnosis Center prepared a report on July 29, 1997, detailing the presence of alpha thalassemia

that became apparent after Sanhkdee's birth. The report opined, based on an evaluation performed by B.E. Barker, Ph.D. at RIH's Special Hematology Laboratory, that Sanhkdee "most likely has a two gene alpha thalassemia deletion as does Ms. Ho-Rath and that Mr. Rath most likely does not carry a two gene alpha thalassemia deletion, however a single gene alpha thalassemia mutation may be present." (Emphasis omitted.) The report stated that the health-care professionals from WIH discussed alpha thalassemia with Jean "in full[,]" and counseled her that if Bunsan carries "a single gene mutation there would be a 25% chance for this fetus to have hemoglobin H disease."

When Yendee became seriously ill in 2003, her blood sample was tested by RIH's Special Hematology Laboratory and it was confirmed that she had "Hemoglobin Constant Spring trait and a two gene deletion

alpha thalassemia trait is present." Approximately sixteen months later, Bunsan was tested by RIH's laboratory; on May 6, 2005, Dr. Barker reported that Bunsan "has been shown to possess Hb Constant Spring trait."

Jean and Bunsan first filed suit individually and on behalf of Yendee on July 12, 2010. The complaint alleged that numerous defendants, many of whom are not parties to the present appeal, were negligent in failing to properly diagnose, test, treat, and care for plaintiffs and that, as a result of the alleged negligence, Yendee suffered injuries and Jean and Bunsan suffered loss of consortium. A Superior Court justice entered judgments in favor of Corning, Quest, and WIH in August 2011 because she found that various claims advanced by plaintiffs were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, this Court found that plaintiffs’ claims against Corning and Quest remained viable because they sounded in ordinary negligence and were tolled by § 9-1-19. Ho-Rath I , 89 A.3d at 812 ; see § 9-1-19 ("If any person at the time of any such cause of action shall accrue to him or her shall be under the age of eighteen (18) years, * * * the person may bring the cause of action, within [three years], after the impediment is removed.").

As to the remaining medical malpractice claims, this Court concluded—after full briefing and argument—that the applicable statute of limitations

"provides a minor plaintiff * * * with two options. First, the minor's parent or guardian may file suit on the minor's behalf within three years of the occurrence or reasonable discovery of alleged malpractice. Alternatively, if the minor's parent or guardian fails to file suit on the minor's behalf within those three years, then the minor may file suit on his or her own behalf, but not until he or she reaches the age of majority. Upon reaching the age of majority, he or she has three years within which to file the action." Ho-Rath II , 115 A.3d at 946.

Thus, the Court held that, because Jean and Bunsan's claims on behalf of Yendee had been brought in July 2010 when Yendee was twelve years old, which was more than three years after the alleged occurrence of malpractice, plaintiffs’ claims were appropriately dismissed. Id. at 941, 948. However, the Court reiterated that Yendee could file suit on her own behalf after she attained the age of majority. Id. at 948. The Court further held that Jean and Bunsan's claims of loss of consortium were derivative of Yendee's claims and were tolled in tandem with her claim. Id. at 950.

The case was returned to the Superior Court, where the parties engaged in discovery and motion practice. On January 9, 2017, Yendee—having reached the age of majority—filed an individual complaint against various defendants; Jean and Bunsan also filed their individual derivative loss-of-consortium claims. Based upon this Court's rulings in Ho-Rath I and Ho-Rath II , the only remaining defendants in the 2010 case were Quest and Corning; the 2010 case was consolidated with the 2017 case for discovery by order of the Superior Court on May 16, 2017.

In 2019, defendants filed motions for summary judgment in both cases. The defendants maintained that Yendee's claim should be characterized as a wrongful life cause of action because "Yendee claims that if her parents had known there was a risk that she would be born with Hemoglobin

H Constant Spring Disease, her mother would have had an abortion and she never would have been born." The defendants argued, however, that wrongful life is not a recognized cause of action in Rhode Island. The defendants further argued that Yendee's claim failed under a traditional negligence analysis because, they maintained, there was no duty owed to Yendee because she was not yet conceived when the alleged negligent conduct occurred.

A hearing on defendantsmotions for summary judgment took place over two days, on November 8 and December 16, 2019. On June 8, 2020, the hearing justice delivered an oral pronouncement granting defendantsmotions for summary judgment. The hearing justice declined to address whether a wrongful life claim is a viable cause of action in Rhode Island, and instead reviewed the case "through the medical negligence lens" as to the hospitals and doctors, and "through an ordinary negligence lens for the labs."

The hearing justice found that "there is no duty owed to Yendee as a matter of law by any of the defendants in this case." In so doing, the hearing justice reviewed the factors outlined in the seminal case of Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp. , 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987),6 and found that (1) there was no foreseeability of harm to Yendee because all the events giving rise to the cause of action "occurred * * * years before Yendee's birth[ ] and the defendants had absolutely no control over whether or not Yendee would ever be born or conceived"; (2) Yendee did not suffer a cognizable injury; and (3) the remaining factors weighed in favor of defendants. In addition, the hearing justice found no merit in Yendee's remaining claims for informed consent, corporate lability, and vicarious liability because there was no duty owed by defendants to Yendee, and Yendee was not a patient at the time of...

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