Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. 2012–208–Appeal, 2012–211–Appeal, 2012–212–Appeal, 2012–214–Appeal.,s. 2012–208–Appeal, 2012–211–Appeal, 2012–212–Appeal, 2012–214–Appeal.
• Citation: 89 A.3d 806
• Parties: Jean HO–RATH et al. v. RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

89 A.3d 806

Jean HO–RATH et al.

v.RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL et al.

Nos. 2012–208–Appeal, 2012–211–Appeal, 2012–212–Appeal, 2012–214–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 2, 2014.

Amato A. DeLuca, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.

Robert P. Landau, Esq., Jeffrey S. Brenner, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

These consolidated appeals, arising from a single medical negligence case, came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised therein should not summarily be decided. Before this Court are four appeals which arise from the entry of separate final judgments in favor of certain defendants in this action. The judgments were entered after a Superior Court hearing on motions to dismiss filed by four groups of defendants, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. At issue in each appeal is the application of G.L.1956 § 9–1–14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor.¹ After hearing the arguments of counsel and carefully examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has been shown in part, and that some, but not all of the issues raised by these appeals may be decided at this time, and that the remaining claims shall be assigned to this Court's full argument calendar. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the Superior Court judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC. With respect to the appeals and cross-appeals filed by the plaintiffs and defendants Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital, and each hospital's associated medical professionals, we direct that the questions raised by these appeals be assigned to the Court's full argument calendar.

Facts and Travel

On July 16, 2010, plaintiffs Jean and Bunsan Ho–Rath, individually and per proxima amici Yendee Ho–Rath (collectively plaintiffs),² filed suit against numerous defendants, alleging negligence, lack of informed consent, corporate liability, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter Yendee, who was born on January 9, 1998, with alpha thalassemia, a genetic blood disorder. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a 124–page, 78–count amended complaint on September 17, 2010, naming twenty-four defendants and three John Doe defendants.³ The gravamen of plaintiffs' amended complaint is that, although testing for the specific genetic disorder was performed on Jean, Bunsan, and Yendee's older brother as early as 1993, defendants failed to correctly test, diagnose, and treat plaintiffs, resulting in Yendee manifesting the debilitating genetic disorder at birth.

On January 4, 2011, defendant Corning Incorporated (Corning) moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against it on the ground that such claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 9–1–14.1.⁴ Specifically, Corning argued that Jean and Bunsan's individual loss of consortium claims—as well as the claims made on behalf of Yendee—were not made within three years of the incident or occurrence giving rise to the suit. Corning also cited to Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I.1995), in support of the argument that once a medical malpractice action is filed on behalf of a minor, the complaint cannot then be amended to add additional parties outside of the three-year statute of limitations. As a result, Corning argued that all claims against it should be dismissed becausethe entity was not named in plaintiffs' original complaint.

On February 8, 2011, defendants Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, and four associated medical doctors (collectively RIH defendants) filed a motion to dismiss Jean and Bunsan's derivative claims against those defendants. ⁵ The RIH defendants argued that, although a minor may benefit from the tolling provision found in § 9–1–14.1(1), the statute of limitations is not tolled for the derivative claims of parents. Accordingly, the RIH defendants argued that the parents' claims for loss of services, companionship, comfort and consortium—although derivative in nature—were time-barred based on the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims set forth in § 9–1–14.1.

The defendant Women & Infants' Hospital, along with three associated medical professionals (collectively W & I defendants), filed a motion to dismiss all claims contained in plaintiffs' amended complaint against those defendants on February 28, 2011.⁶ In this motion, the W & I defendants argued that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, found in § 9–1–14.1(1)—in conjunction with plaintiffs' failure to plead the applicable discovery rule contained in § 9–1–14.1(2)—barred the parents' claims as well as claims made on behalf of Yendee. The W & I defendants further cited to Bakalakis v. Women & Infants' Hospital, 619 A.2d 1105, 1107 (R.I.1993), for the proposition that § 9–1–14.1(1) precludes Yendee from filing a complaint on her own behalf once she reaches the age of majority because her parents filed a claim on her behalf prior to that time.

On April 13, 2011, Quest Diagnostics, LLC (Quest) moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against that entity.⁷ In this motion, Quest argued that the claims contained in the amended complaint solely concerned the analysis of blood tests performed on Bunsan in December 1993, and were therefore time-barred pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations set forth in § 9–1–14.1(1). Quest also argued—similar to the argument made by the W & I defendants—that because an action had already been filed on Yendee's behalf while she was a minor, she may not benefit from the tolling provision found in § 9–1–14.1(1) and was therefore precluded from filing suit on her own behalf even after she reached the age of majority.

The aforementioned motions were heard together before a Superior Court justice on June 27, 2011. In arguing against Rule 12(b) dismissal, plaintiffs posited that § 9–1–14.1(1) suspends the statute of limitations for a minor filing medical malpractice claims up until three years after the child reaches the age of majority. The plaintiffs also argued that, because the parents' claims are derivative, the statute of limitations for the parents' loss of consortium claims also are tolled along with the minor child's underlying medical malpractice claims. Finally, counsel for plaintiffs argued that § 9–1–19—the general disability tolling statute applicable to causes of action other than medical malpractice—rather than § 9–1–14.1(1), would be the operative statute in regard to defendants Corning and Quest, whose services strictly were limited to laboratory testing and analysis.

The trial justice rendered a bench decision on all motions on July 7, 2011. The trial justice determined that all of plaintiffs' claims, both direct and derivative, sounded in medical malpractice and were therefore governed by § 9–1–14.1. Based on her reading of § 9–1–14.1(1), the trial justice determined that two options were available to a minor seeking to commence a medical malpractice action: either an action could be commenced on behalf of the child within three years of the injury—or reasonable discovery of the injury—or the injured minor could bring suit on his or her own behalf within three years of attaining the age of majority. The trial justice therefore concluded that all of plaintiffs' claims were time-barred, because those allegations of injury had arisen more than three years before the action was commenced in 2010, and because plaintiffs did not plead any applicable discovery rule which would account for such delay.

Specifically concerning Corning and Quest, the trial justice found that, because plaintiffs added those entities more than three years after any testing or diagnosis which could give rise to a cause of action, the claims against those entities also were barred. Finally, the trial justice held that the child retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. Final judgments subsequently entered on behalf of these defendants pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs and Corning, Quest, and W & I defendants each filed a timely and separate appeal.

Standard of Review

“[T]he sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.” Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 277 (R.I.2011) (quoting Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I.2002)). “In passing on a Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice.” Id. at 278 (citing Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1233 (R.I.2009)). “We thus are confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff's favor.” Id. (citing Laurence, 788 A.2d at 456). This Court will affirm a trial justice's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiffs claim.” Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1251 (R.I.2012) (quoting Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149–50 (R.I.2008)).

Discussion

In their respective appeals and cross-appeals, each party contends that the trial justice incorrectly interpreted § 9–1–14.1(1). The plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to § 9–1–14.1(1), medical negligence claims may be brought on behalf of a minor at any time before the minor attains the age of majority, at which point that minor—who is now an adult—has an additional three years to bring suit on his or her own behalf. The plaintiffs also contend...