Hoadley v. Hammond

• Decision Date: 05 June 1884
• Citation: 19 N.W. 794,63 Iowa 599
• Parties: HOADLEY v. HAMMOND ET AL
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

19 N.W. 794

63 Iowa 599

HOADLEY v. HAMMOND ET AL

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 5, 1884

Appeal fro Superior Court of Cedar Rapids.

ACTION at law to recover damages resulting from a violation of a contract entered into by defendants to sell and convey certain lands to plaintiff. The cause was tried by a jury and a judgment was rendered upon a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant, Hammond, appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Hubbard Clark & Dawley, for appellant.

Stoneman Rickel & Eastman, for appellee.

OPINION

BECK, J.

I.

The plaintiff declares upon a written contract for the sale of the lands therein described, and alleges a compliance on his part with its terms, and a tender of the money which he is required to pay under it, and that defendants refuse to convey to him the lands. The contract is expressed in the following language:

"CEDAR RAPIDS, 4, 17, 1882.

"Received of G. H. Hoadley twenty-five dollars on first payment of west one-half of section 35, and east one-half southeast quarter section 27, all in township 91, range 44, being 400 acres, in Plymouth county, Iowa, which land is this day sold to said G. H. Hoadley at and for the sum of four thousand and one hundred dollars, ($ 4,100,) on the following terms:--one-third cash, and the balance in three equal payments, to be secured by mortgage, and draw 8 per cent interest, payable annually; title to said land to be perfect and conveyed by warranty deed.

"CHAS. HAMMOND, by J. W. BULL, Agent.

J. W. BULL."

The defendant, Hammond, denies the execution of the instrument, and avers that his signature thereto is spurious, and that J. W. Bull had no authority as his agent to sign the writing. The defendant, Bull, admits all the allegations of the petition, except those pertaining to the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff, and alleges that his co-defendant holds the legal title to the lands, while his own interest therein is equitable, and that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and has done all he can do to induce his co-defendant to execute a conveyance for the lands. Other objections of the pleadings need not be recited.

II. We will proceed to notice the objections to the judgment of the court below, urged by Hammond, in the order of their discussion in the printed argument of his counsel.

The plaintiff appears to have claimed upon the trial that Bull was authorized in two ways to execute the contract for Hammond: First, by express verbal authority; Second, by his authority as a partner, there existing a partnership between these parties under which the lands were held and owned by them. There was evidence tending to support each of these positions, and, on the other hand, there was evidence introduced by Hammond in contradiction thereof.

As applicable to this branch of the case, the court below instructed the jury that Bull's direct and express authority should be established by evidence which must be, to the minds of the jury, "clear, satisfactory and conclusive." Another instruction, applicable to the other theory of plaintiff, that Bull was authorized to make the contract as a co-partner of Hammond, is in these words:

"5. If you find from the evidence that the defendants, Hammond and Bull, entered into a co-partnership for the buying and selling land, and that by the terms of the co-partnership Hammond was to pay for the land, take the title in his own name, and, when the same was sold, after Hammond had received the amount paid for the land, with taxes and interest, the profits were to be divided equally between the parties to the co-partnership, you are instructed that the terms of the co-partnership must be such as would authorize defendant Bull to sell the land in question. The evidence must be clear in your own minds that by the terms of the partnership the authority to sell was so granted. By this is not meant that the evidence must be uncontradicted, but that the co-partnership giving the power to sell must be established by a preponderance of testimony clear and satisfactory in your own minds."

Counsel for Hammond insist that the verdict is not supported by evidence of the character contemplated by these instructions, and, as the principles announced therein must be regarded as the law of the case, the verdict ought to have been set aside as being in conflict with the evidence.

It is certainly true that these instructions must be regarded as announcing the law of this case, and in determining it they will be so treated. But we cannot assent to their soundness, and give them recognition as expressing correct rules. We regard them only as applicable to this case, for the reason that it is not in a condition to authorize us to review them.

By these instructions, the court below did not attempt to weigh the evidence for the jury, but simply directed them that, in order to reach certain conclusions, the evidence must be "clear, satisfactory and conclusive" to their minds. The jury, under the instructions, were left to determine whether the evidence possessed the qualities described by the instruction. The word "conclusive" is not used in its legal sense as possessing weight and force that cannot be contradicted, but rather in its common acceptation, in which it means "decisive;" "putting an end to debate or question;" "leading to a conclusion or decision."

While the evidence was conflicting, with possibly the strong preponderance in favor of Hammond, (if we should be permitted to express our opinion upon that point,) we cannot say that the jury honestly and intelligently, without bias or passion could not have been satisfied in their own minds that the evidence in support of their verdict was "clear, satisfactory and conclusive." To authorize us to reverse the decision of the court below upon this point of the case, we should so find. We must regard the verdict as not in conflict with the law of the case, as announced by the...