Hoagland v. Railway Exp. Agency

• Decision Date: 05 October 1954
• Citation: 75 So.2d 822
• Parties: Estelle Parker HOAGLAND, doing business as Estelle Parker, Appellant, v. RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 822

75 So.2d 822

Estelle Parker HOAGLAND, doing business as Estelle Parker, Appellant, v. RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, Inc., Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

Oct. 5, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1954.

J. Luther Drew, West Palm Beach, Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Ausley & Ausley, Tallahassee, Mizell & Carmichael, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the question of the applicability of the remedial provisions of Section 95.06, Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., to a suit instituted against a common carrier by a shipper where the uniform express receipt under which the carrier undertook the interstate shipment of the goods provided that 'suits shall be instituted only within two years and one day after the date when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof.'

The plaintiff-appellant's original suit to recover for the loss of her goods was filed well within the two-year period specified in the receipt, and a verdict and judgment was entered in her favor. This judgment was, however, reversed by this court, but not on the merits. See Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Hoagland, Fla., 62 So.2d 756. The instant suit was filed shortly after the mandate in that appeal went down, by which time the two-year period specified in the receipt had expired. Being of the opinion that the saving provisions of Section 95.06 could not be applied in the circumstances here present, the lower court entered summary judgment for defendant. This appeal followed.

Section 95.06 provides that 'If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal or writ of error, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one year after the reversal.' It is the contention of the appellee, however, that this statute is not applicable here for the reason that the federal statute regulating the shipment of goods in interstate commerce, Title 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11), has pre-empted this field and supersedes all state legislation on this subject.

Paragraph (11) of Section 20, 49 U.S.C.A., in its original form, was added to the interstate commerce act of 1887, Chapter 104, 24 Stat. at L. 370, 386, by the so-called Carmack Amendment of 1906, Section 7, Chapter 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584, 595. This amendment provided in part as follows:

'That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.'

Prior to the Carmack Amendment, the liability of carriers to shippers for interstate shipments of property, as enforced in both federal and state courts, was determined in accordance with the general common law, as declared by the United States Supreme Court and enforced in the federal courts throughout the United States, or as determined by the public policy of a particular state, or as prescribed by statute law of a particular state. See Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 1912, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314, 319; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 24 S.Ct. 132, 48 L.Ed. 268; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed. 688.

After the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, however, it was established by decisions of the United States Supreme Court that questions relating to the liability imposed on interstate carriers by this Amendment, and the validity of stipulations in contracts limiting the liability thereby imposed, were federal questions to be determined under the general common law, as declared by the United States Supreme Court, and not in accordance with state legislation or the state public policy on the subject. Such questions were said to be 'withdrawn from the field of state law or legislation.' Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657, 33 S.Ct. 397, 401, 57 L.Ed. 690; See also Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, supra, and cases therein cited.

But the Carmack Amendment did not grant to shippers and carriers the right to contract as to the time within which claims should be filed to recover for loss of goods; this right existed and was upheld, as against state statutes of limitations providing a different limitation period, long before this amendment was enacted into law. As stated in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros., supra, 'Such limitations in bills of lading are very customary and have been upheld in a multitude of cases. We cite a few: (Citations).' This Amendment did, however, have the effect of withdrawing from state legislatures any legislative determination of the reasonableness of such contractual limitations. As stated in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros., supra:

'The liability sought to be enforced is the 'liability' of an interstate carrier for loss or damage under an interstate contract of shipment declared by the Carmack amendment of the Hepburn act of June 29, 1906. The validity of any stipulation in such a contract which involves the construction of the statute, and the validity of a limitation upon the liability thereby imposed, is a Federal question to be determined under the general common law, and, as such, is withdrawn from the field of state law or legislation.'

Thus, a state law declaring invalid a contract which required the bringing of an action for a carrier's liability in less than the state statutory period was held in that case to be ineffective to invalidate a contractual provision requiring suit to be brought against the carrier within 90 days. (This case was decided prior to the Cummins Amendment of 1915 and the Transportation Act of 1920, referred to hereafter.) In other words, the state law was a legislative determination of the minimum requirements of reasonableness of such a contractual limitation in a bill of lading; and since under the Carmack Amendment this became a federal question to be determined under the general common law, the state's attempt to determine the question by legislative fiat was held to be invalid.

It should be noted that nowhere in the Carmack Amendment did the Congress attempt to regulate by statute the permissible limits of contractual agreements in bills of lading as to the time within which claims and suits should be filed against the carrier. This it did in 1915 by the Cummins Amendment, March 4, 1915, Chapter 176, 38 Stat. at L. 1196, 1197, prohibiting a common carrier to contract for 'a shorter period for giving notice of claims than ninety days and for the filing of claims for a shorter period than four months, and for the institution of suits than two years'. By Section 20 of the Transportation Act of 1920, February 28, 1920, Chapter 91, 41 Stat. at L. 456, 494, Section 20(11) of the interstate commerce act was again amended by deleting the provision as to the four-month period within which to file claims and by specifying the time at which the two-year period for the filing of suits would begin to run, that is, from the time of the disallowance, in writing, of the claim.

But neither the Cummins Amendment of 1915 nor the Transportation Act of 1920 was intended to operate as a statute of limitations. They merely 'restricted the freedom of carriers to fix the period within which suit could be brought-prohibited contracts for any shorter period than the one specified.' Louisiana & Western Railroad Co. v. Gardiner, 1927, 273 U.S. 280, 47 S.Ct. 386, 388, 71 L.Ed. 644. In the absence of such a contractual limitation or in the event such a contractual limitation was void because contrary to the requirements of the Transportation Act, the applicable state statute of limitations is applied. Thus, in Louisiana & Western Railroad Co. v. Gardiner, supra, the bill of lading provided that suit must be brought within two years and one day after delivery of the property, whereas the Transportation Act specifies that such a contractual limitation period shall run from the date of the disallowance in writing of the shipper's claim. The court said: 'Here, although the rights of the parties depended upon instruments the meaning and effect of which must be determined according to rules approved by the federal courts, there was no federal statute of limitations and the local one applied.'

The history and development of the interstate commerce act has been set forth in some detail to show its scope and purpose and to point up the fact that the Congress has not yet seen fit to enact into law a statute of limitations governing suits against an interstate carrier by a shipper. While, as noted, the question of the reasonableness of such contractual limitations is to be determined in accordance with federal law, it certainly cannot be said that there is no field whatsoever for the operation of state statutes of limitation since, as has been shown, such local statutes apply when there is no valid stipulation to the contrary in the bill of lading or express receipt.

The United States Supreme Court has often said that in those fields of commerce where national uniformity is not essential, either the state or federal government may act. Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L.Ed. 421; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114, 61 S.Ct. 930, 85 L.Ed. 1219, 1221; Cloverleaf...