Hoard v. Beveridge
Decision Date | 07 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. S15A1685.,S15A1685. |
Parties | HOARD v. BEVERIDGE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael J. Bowers, Joshua Michael Moore, Balch & Bingham, LLP, Atlanta, for appellant.
Elizabeth Green Lindsey, Davis, Matthews & Quigley, PC, Atlanta, for appellee.
, Chief Justice.
This appeal involves a challenge to a trial court's award to one party in a divorce action of attorney fees under OCGA § 9–15–14
and OCGA § 19–6–2. Because we conclude the trial court made sufficient findings to sustain the full amount of the fee award under OCGA § 19–6–2(a), we affirm.
In 2009, Brett Beveridge filed an action for divorce against his wife, Vivian Hoard. One child was born of the marriage, and the primary issue in the case involved custody of the parties' minor child. With the parties' consent, therefore, the trial court appointed as custody evaluator, Dr. Carol Webb, who concluded both parties were fit and loving parents and recommended a joint custodial arrangement. After a hearing, the trial court in April 2011 entered a temporary order granting the parties joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time. In the meantime, Hoard learned that in 2006, Dr. Webb asked opposing counsel's husband, then state representative Edward Lindsey, for a letter of recommendation for re-appointment by the governor of Georgia to a professional board. Believing that Dr. Webb's request created a conflict of interest, Hoard throughout much of the remainder of the divorce proceedings filed numerous motions seeking to disqualify Dr. Webb, as well as motions to set aside, for new trial, for mistrial, and to amend, reopen and rehear her motions to disqualify, each of which was related to Hoard's efforts to disqualify Dr. Webb and was denied by the trial court.1
In October 2012, following a ten day trial, the trial court issued a final order granting the parties joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time. The order specifically stated that the trial court did not rely on Dr. Webb's report in making its custody determination but noted that the report was not inconsistent with the other evidence presented by the parties. Both Hoard and Beveridge filed cross-motions for attorney fees and expenses seeking, respectively, fees and expenses of $431,411.25 and $400,974.90. In an October 2014 order, the trial court denied Hoard's fee motion and granted Beveridge's motion, awarding him $232,114 in fees and expenses, the exact amount of all costs he claimed to have incurred from the date of the temporary hearing and after the trial court's denial of Hoard's first motion to disqualify Dr. Webb. Seeking leave to challenge the trial court's fee award, Hoard subsequently filed an application for discretionary appeal which this Court granted pursuant to Rule 34(4).
and OCGA § 9–15–14, based on its conclusion that Hoard's numerous attempts to disqualify and discredit Dr. Webb unnecessarily expanded the litigation and that although "neither party [could] afford the extensive litigation and the extensive fees they incurred," Hoard had a "superior ability to pay." Hoard contends the trial court erred by failing to identify which portion of the fees was awarded pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14 and which portion was awarded pursuant to OCGA § 19–6–2(a). She further argues that without such apportionment, the award must be reversed because the trial court's findings are not sufficient to independently sustain the full award under either statute. See Park Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Callais, 290 Ga.App. 875, 878, 660 S.E.2d 736 (2008) ( ). Compare Taylor v. Taylor, 293 Ga. 615, 618–619(4), 748 S.E.2d 873 (2013) ( ).
We begin our analysis with OCGA § 9–15–14(b)
, a statute which authorizes a trial court to award reasonable attorney fees upon a finding that an action or any part thereof "lacked substantial justification or that the action ... was interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct." Here, the trial court concluded that Hoard's numerous attempts to disqualify Dr. Webb based on her request for a letter of recommendation unnecessarily expanded the litigation, thus authorizing under OCGA § 9–15–14(b)
an award to Beveridge in an amount limited to the fees and expenses he incurred in defending against Hoard's sanctionable conduct. See Hardman v. Hardman, 295 Ga. 732, 740, 763 S.E.2d 861 (2014) ( ); LabMD, Inc. v. Savera, 331 Ga.App. 463, 467(2)(a), 771 S.E.2d 148 (2015) ( ); Trotter v. Summerour, 273 Ga.App. 263, 267(2), 614 S.E.2d 887 (2005) ( ). The trial court's order, however, makes no specific allocation of fees awarded pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14(b) and awards Beveridge $232,114 in fees and expenses, the same amount he claimed to have incurred from the date of the temporary hearing related to all aspects of the litigation. In fact, Beveridge's own evidence does not support the conclusion that the full amount of the court's fee award is sustainable under OCGA § 9–15–14(b) inasmuch as it shows that his costs related to Hoard's sanctionable conduct did not exceed $65,000. We agree then with Hoard's argument that the trial court's full award cannot be upheld under this section of the Georgia Code.
was the only basis stated for the fee award, we might at this juncture simply vacate the award and remand to the trial court. See Hardman, 295 Ga. at 740, 763 S.E.2d 861. Vacation and remand are unwarranted in this case, however, because the full amount of the trial court's award can be independently sustained under OCGA § 19–6–2(a). See Taylor, 293 Ga. at 618–619, 748 S.E.2d 873. That section "authorizes a trial court in a divorce action to exercise its sound discretion and, after considering the financial circumstances of the parties, to award attorney fees as necessary to ensure the effective representation of both parties." Simmons v. Simmons, 288 Ga. 670, 673, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011). A trial court's decision "[w]hether to award attorney fees ... pursuant to OCGA § 19–6–2 is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed unless manifestly or flagrantly abused." Mongerson v. Mongerson, 285 Ga. 554, 558–559, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009), overruled on other grounds, Simmons, 288 Ga. at 672, n. 4, 706 S.E.2d 456.
The record in this case shows that evidence was presented at the motions hearing regarding the parties' financial circumstances, including evidence of their income, their respective equity interests in real property, and Beveridge's obligation under the final decree to pay for the cost of their child's private school education.2 The trial court also had before it evidence that Hoard during the divorce proceedings liquidated marital assets to pay for a portion of her attorney fees while Beveridge used his own non-marital assets and obtained a loan against his 401(k) to pay for a portion of his fees.3 The record and fee hearing transcript thus show that the trial court carefully considered the parties' relative financial positions, their obligations under the final decree, and the substantial costs incurred by both parties, and awarded Beveridge substantially less than the total amount of fees he claimed to have incurred in the litigation. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making its award which ensured...
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