Hoard v. Maddox
| Decision Date | 16 May 1947 |
| Docket Number | 15777. |
| Citation | 42 S.E.2d 744,202 Ga. 274 |
| Parties | HOARD et al. .v MADDOX. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
W E. Watkins, of Jackson, and George C. Grant and Martin Martin 3 Snow, all of Macon, for plaintiffs in error.
Ellis B. Barrett, A. Walton Nall, and Andrews & Nall, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Statement of facts by JENKINS, Chief Justice:
Mrs Maddox obtained a judgment against Indian Springs Swimming Pool Corporation for $5000, as the result of the tortious death of her minor child, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Indian Springs Swimming Pool Corporation v. Maddox, 70 Ga.App. 842, 29 S.E.2d 724. Execution was levied upon a certain parcel of land containing the Indian Springs Swimming Pool and other improvements. At the time of levy the property was in prossession of Dan Hoard and Elbert Mullis, his brother-in-law, who held the property jointly under a deed from the defendant corporation, of which E. D. Hoard, uncle of Dan Hoard, was president and sole stockholder. These persons interposed a claim to the property. On the trial of the claim, the deed from the defendant corporation to the claimants was attacked a being made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, and also upon the ground that it was a voluntary conveyance from an insolvent creditor. The evidence shows that title to the property levied upon was originally in Indian Springs Swimming Pool Corporation, which, so far as the record discloses, was its only asset. At a time when the suit for the tortious death of the child was pending against E. D. Hoard, individually, and against the corporation, the claimants obtained a deed to the property from E. D. Hoard, individually, without having examined the recorded title, for a reputed consideration of $6000, which Dan Hoard and another witness testified had been paid in currency. The evidence further discloses that, approximately one year later, but before judgment against the corporation, the claimants procured a second deed to the same property, but this time from E. D. Hoard as president and sole stockholder of the defendant corporation, for an expressed consideration of $1. It was further shown by the administrator of the E. D. Hoard estate that he had been unable to find day assets belonging to the defendant corporation, and that the $6000 consideration of the first deed from E. D. Hoard individually had been applied by E. D. Hoard to the payment of personal obligations, and none of it had ever been received by the corporation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. Exceptions are to the order of the trial court overruling the claimants' amended motion for new trial, based upon the usual general grounds, and several special grounds one of which assigns error on the admission of certain documentary evidence, while the other grounds attack various portions of the charge.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court.
1. On the trial of a claim case involving the bona fides of a deed of conveyance, it is improper to instruct the jury that 'transactions between near relatives are to be scanned with care and scrutin ized closely, and slight evidence of fraud shown between them may be sufficient to set the transaction aside,' in the absence of qualification that this rule does not apply unless there is proof otherwise suggesting fraud. McCallie v. McCallie, 192 Ga. 699(1), 701, 16 S.E.2d 562. See also Edge v. Calhoun National Bank, 155 Ga. 821, 118 S.E. 359. The impropriety in the charge arises from its ambiguity, since the jury might reasonably have understood that the charge presented two propositions: First, that all transactions between near relatives are to be scanned with care and scrutinized closely, and second, that slight evidence of fraud shown between such persons may be sufficient to set the transaction aside; whereas the true rule is that proof of near relationship between the parties to the deed, other than that of husband and wife, without more carries no presumption of fraudulent intent. Hicks v. Sharp, 89 Ga. 311(3), 15 S.E. 314; Fouts v. Gardner, 157 Ga. 362(2), 121 S.E. 330. It might properly be stated that the instruction as thus given by the judge in this case is in conformity with what has been said by this court in McLendon v. Reynolds Grocery Co., 160 Ga. 763(5), 129 S.E. 65, and as quoted in Hilburn v. Hightower, 178 Ga. 534(3), 173 S.E. 389. But the court in those cases was not considering excerpts taken from the language of a charge, and was merely stating the rule applicable where there was evidence of fraud as well as proof of near relationship. Since it is true that the excerpt might also be taken to mean correctly that proof of fraud between near relatives must be supported by other evidence, even though slight, the error in the charge is not flagrant; but since the charge is to an extent ambiguous, and since the court has twice held in terms that such a charge is error, and since the case must be reversed on another and different ground, it is thought well to disapprove again specifically the language here employed.
(a) The exception taken to giving in charge the principle involved in the excerpt just dealt with, on the ground that it is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case where the relationship was that of a corporation of the one hand and the nephew of the president and sole stockholder of such corporation on the other, is without merit. While we have been unable to find where this court has defined or limited the degree of relationship such as to authorize the charge with respect to 'transactions between near relatives,' it would seem that--since this principle has been held applicable to the relationship of brothers-in-law (McLendon v. Reynolds Grocery Co., supra) and of a parent and children-in-law (Martin v. Martin, 180 Ga. 782, 783, 180 S.E. 851)--it would, a fortiori, be applicable to the blood relationship of uncle and nephew. It has been recognized that the rule subjecting such transactions to close scrutiny has equal force in determining the character and purpose of a transaction between an individual and a corporation controlled by him. S. T. & W. A. Dewees Co. v. Paul B. Carter & Co., 190 Ga. 68, 73, 8 S.E.2d 376; Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, 181 Ga. 774, 777, 778, 184 S.E. 286. See also ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schaefer v. Mayor and Council of City of Athens
...and particularly Jones v. Hall, 57 Ga.App. 477(3), 195 S.E. 879, and Duncan v. Bailey, 162 Ga. 457(1, 2), 134 s,. e. 87; Hoard v. Maddox, 202 Ga. 274(4), 42 S.E.2d 744. Judgment BELL, P.J., and DEEN, J., concur. 1 For exceptions to this general rule, see Morehouse College v. Russell, 219 Ga......
-
Southeast Transport Corp. v. Hogan Livestock Co., Inc.
...Paper Co., 84 Ga.App. 181, 183, 65 S.E.2d 832; General Supply Co. v. Toccoa Plumbing Co., 138 Ga. 219, 75 S.E. 135; Hoard v. Maddox, 202 Ga. 274(4), 42 S.E.2d 744; Harper Warehouse, Inc. v. Henry Chanin Corp., 102 Ga.App. 489, 493, 116 S.E.2d 641; Lanier v. Lee, 111 Ga.App. 876, 878, 143 S.......
-
Langston v. Allen
...the Langstons' requested charge was an incomplete statement of the law, it was correctly refused by the trial court. Hoard v. Maddox, 202 Ga. 274(1), 42 S.E.2d 744 (1947). 3. Allen contends in her cross-appeal that the trial court erred by directing a verdict against her on the issue of lia......
-
Moore v. Moore
...relevant to a claim of fraudulent conveyances. See Lewis v. Lewis, 210 Ga. 330, 334-335(2), 80 S.E.2d 312 (1954); Hoard v. Maddox, 202 Ga. 274, 275(1)(a), 42 S.E.2d 744(1947). The relationship between Husband and Ms. Minshew, along with other facts and circumstances, would be admissible at ......