Hoban v. Rice

• Decision Date: 24 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70-154,70-154
• Citation: 267 N.E.2d 311,25 Ohio St.2d 111
• Parties: , 54 O.O.2d 254 HOBAN, Appellant, v. RICE, Registrar, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 111

25 Ohio St.2d 111

267 N.E.2d 311, 54 O.O.2d 254

HOBAN, Appellant, v. RICE, Registrar, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellee.

No. 70-154.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 24, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 4511.191, the implied-consent statute, is constitutional and the proceedings thereunder are civil and administrative in nature and are independent of any criminal proceedings which may be instituted pursuant to other statutes or ordinances. The validity of a driver's license suspension by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, under R.C. 4511.191, is unaffected by such person's plea of guilty to a charge of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. (State v. Starnes, 21 Ohio St.2d 38, 254 N.E.2d 675, approved and followed.)

2. The suspension of a driver's license under R.C. 4511.191(D) by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, will be upheld upon appeal if the court finds that (1) the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of alcohol, (2) the person was placed under arrest, (3) the person refused to submit to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine upon the request of the arresting officer, and (4) the person was advised of the consequences of his refusal.

3. For the purpose of R.C. 4511.191, a refusal to submit to a chemical test of the blood, breath or urine will occur where a person, by his acts, words or general conduct, manifests an unwillingness to submit to the test. Such refusal need not have been knowingly and intentionally made.

4. For the purposes of R.C. 4511.191, a person is advised of the consequences of his refusal to take a sobriety test when he is shown and read a written form prescribed by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, advising him of the consequence of refusing to submit to the test. It need not be shown that the person subjectively understood the consequences of his refusal.

5. R.C. 4511.191(B) does not impose a mandatory duty upon the arresting officer to administer a sobriety test to an arrested person who was in a condition rendering him incapable of refusing to submit to the test. That subsection emphasizes and makes clear that, under the conditions enumerated therein, the consent given under R.C. 4511.191(A) has not been withdrawn.

James J. Hoban, hereinafter referred to as appellant, was arrested on May 25, 1969, by Patrolman Kenneth Whitmore of the Upper Arlington Police Department for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and was taken to the Upper Arlington police station and offered a chemical sobriety test by the arresting officer. The officer swore to an affidavit (1) that he placed the appellant under arrest, (2) that he had reasonable grounds to believe appellant was operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways in this state while under the influence of alcohol, (3) that appellant refused to submit to a chemical test when requested to do so, and (4) that appellant was advised in the prescribed manner of the consequences of his refusal.

On June 3, 1969, appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and paid a fine of $225, in the Mayor's Court of Upper Arlington.

On June 5, 1969, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles advised appellant that his driver's license was suspended for six months, as provided for in R.C. 4511.191(D).

On June 9, 1969, appellant filed a petition in the Municipal Court of Franklin County, pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F), to rescind the order of suspension.

The testimony at the hearing on appellant's petition is summarized as follows:

Appellant testified that he was at a downtown Columbus hotel and, during the course of the evening, he had some drinks. He did not recall leaving the hotel, or getting into the car to drive home. His only recollection was the following morning, when he was awakened by the turnkey at the Upper Arlington jail. At the time of his release, he was told that he had refused to take a sobriety test.

Patrolman Whitmore testified that at 1:30 a. m. on May 25 he and another police officer arrested appellant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; that he advised appellant of his rights and read to him the Bureau of Motor Vehicles form on submission to the alcoholic chemical test, and advised him that he would lose his license for six months if he refused to do so, all in the presence of his supervisor, Sergeant Good; that a breathalyzer test was available, but appellant refused to submit to it; and that appellant refused this test, 'along with all other normal tests on the alcoholic influence report' and 'everything under our normal procedure in handling drunk drivers.' Patrolman Whitmore testified further that he filled out the Bureau of Motor Vehicles Form 09-389, which is an affidavit and certificate, and which was read and shown to appellant.

In answer to the statement, 'Maybe he wasn't capable of refusing a test,' Patrolman Whitmore answered, 'This is possible. I couldn't tell you for sure.'

On redirect examination, Patrolman Whitmore testified that the appellant walked to the police station with his and another officer's help, that, most of the time, appellant 'wasn't passed out.' When asked to take the test, the witness said that appellant completely refused, would not answer or give any reasons for his refusal, but just stood silent, except when he was disobeying a lot of normal operating procedures and had to be calmed down.

The Municipal Court of Franklin County denied the petition, suspended appellant's driver's license for six months and overruled his motion for a new trial. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court (Hoban v. Rice (1970), 22 Ohio App.2d 130, 259 N.E.2d 136). Finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Shelby County in Groff v. Rice (1969), 20 Ohio App.2d 309, 253 N.E.2d 318, the Court of Appeals certified the record to this court for review and final determination.

Wiles, Doucher, Tressler, Martin & Ford and Henry Clay Scott, Columbus, for appellant.

C. Howard Johnson, Pros. Atty., and David H. Bodiker, Columbus, for appellee.

KRENZLER, Justice.

In this case, we are concerned with R.C. 4511.191, the implied-consent statute, which was enacted to protect innocent motorists and pedestrians from injury and death caused by irresponsible acts of unsafe drivers on Ohio streets and highways. The broad purpose of the implied-consent statute is to clear the highways of and to protect the public from unsafe drivers.

Under the provisions of the implied-consent law, a person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated-such test to be administered under the procedures provided for by the statute.

However, if the licensee refuses to take the test, upon the request of the police officer after having been advised of the consequences of his refusal, the test shall not be administered. It has been stated that, because such a person has the physical power to make the test impractical and dangerous to himself and to those administering the test, it is excused upon an indication of his unwillingness to take the test. Bush v. Bright (1968), 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123.

If a sobriety test is administered to the arrested person, there would be no suspension of that person's driver's license under R.C. 4511.191(D), and consequently no further proceedings would be required under R.C. 4511.191(E) through (H).

Under R.C. 4511.191(D), the Registrar has authority to suspend a driver's license only where there has been a refusal by the arrested person to submit to a chemical test, after being advised of the consequences and upon receipt by the Registrar of the report provided for in R.C. 4511.191(C).

R.C. 4511.191(D) requires that four conditions be stated in the affidavit of the arresting officer, and R.C. 4511.191(F) limits the scope of the hearing on the petition in the Municipal Court to the same four conditions, namely:

1. Whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways in this state while under the influence of alcohol.

2. Whether the person was placed under arrest.

3. Whether he refused to submit to the test upon the request of the police officer.

4. Whether he was advised of the consequences of his refusal.

In hearing this matter and determining whether the appellant has shown error in the action taken by the Registrar, the court will decide the issue upon evidence presented by the Registrar or the person whose license is sought to be suspended. The trial court shall impose the suspension provided for in R.C. 4511.191(D) only if it finds that the arrested person has failed to show error in the action taken by the Registrar, or in one or more matters within the scope of the hearing. The burden is on the appellant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was error.

Our decision in State v. Starnes, 21 Ohio St.2d 38, 254 N.E.2d 675, decided on January 14, 1970, resolved some of the issues raised in the lower courts in Groff v. Rice, supra (20 Ohio App.2d 309, 253 N.E.2d 318), and Hoban v. Rice, supra (22 Ohio App.2d 130, 259 N.E.2d 136).

State v. Starnes held that R.C. 4511.191 is constitutional in that it does not violate the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Further, we held in Starnes that proceedings under R.C. 4511.191(F) are civil and administrative in nature, are intended for the protection of the traveling public, are independent of any criminal proceedings which...