Hobbie v. Zaepffel
Decision Date | 13 May 1885 |
Citation | 23 N.W. 514,17 Neb. 536 |
Parties | GEORGE C. HOBBIE, APPELLEE, v. JOSEPH G. ZAEPFFEL ET AL., APPELLANTS |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from Washington county. Heard below before WAKELEY, J.
Judgment of the district court reversed and cause dismissed.
W. J Connell, for appellants.
Congdon Clarkson & Hunt, for appellee.
The first proposition which presents itself for consideration in this case is: Was the consideration for the note upon which this action was brought a legal and valid one as between the makers and the payee?
The consideration for the giving of the said note, with other notes, was expressed in the following written contract, which was introduced in evidence at the trial and preserved in the bill of exceptions, to-wit:
If at the date of this contract the said C. L. Bristol was the holder of a license from the government of the United States to trade with the Indians at the New Red Cloud agency, as was evidently claimed by him, or elsewhere in the Indian country, then the consideration which he was to give and Zaepffel was to receive for the said note was a one-half interest in the franchise rights and privileges contemplated by such license.
Section 2129 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides as follows: "No person shall be permitted to trade with any of the Indians in the Indian country without a license therefor from a superintendent of Indian affairs, or Indian agent, or subagent, which license shall be issued for a term of not exceeding two years for the tribes east of the Mississippi, and not exceeding three years for the tribes west of that river."
Section 2133 provides that, "Any person other than an Indian, who shall attempt to reside in the Indian country as a trader, or to introduce goods, or to trade therein, without such license, shall forfeit all merchandise offered for sale to the Indians, or found in his possession, and shall moreover be liable to a penalty of five hundred dollars."
It will thus be seen that a license to reside in the Indian country as a trader, and to trade with the Indians, is a personal privilege of a high official character; so that if C. L. Bristol was the holder of such a license he possessed no right to sell it, either in whole or in part, and a pretended or simulated sale thereof would convey no right or franchise whatever to the purchaser.
After due consideration, I am unable to agree to the distinction sought to be made by counsel between the case at bar and that of Gould & Kennard v. Kendall & Smith, 15 Neb. 549, 19 N.W. 483. The contract above quoted provides, "That, with the consent of J. W. Paddock, if there is sufficient business, that J. Zaepffel shall be employed at a reasonable salary, to be paid out of the profits of the business." While not fully expressed, this clause evidently means that Zaepffel shall be employed at the site of the trade. And again, "That if at any time J. Zaepffel may think his interests require it he shall have the right to take personal control of the business." Both of these provisions clearly contemplate the introduction of an unlicensed and unauthorized trader into the Indian country, and a clear violation not only of the public policy of the government of the United States but of the letter of the statute above cited.
But, while the evidence might be and I think should have been made fuller and clearer on that point, yet I think it fairly deducible from the whole evidence that Bristol had no license to trade with the Indians at New Red Cloud agency, or elsewhere. So that whatever view may be taken of the lawfulness or policy of upholding a sale of an interest in an Indian trader's license in a case where the vendor has one to sell, I do not think that it can be seriously claimed that the sale of such license by a party who had none will constitute a consideration for a promissory note.
Having seen to my own satisfaction, at least, that there was no legal and valid consideration for the note in its inception, and that it was void in the hands of the payee, the next question demanding our attention is, whether such facts and the invalidity of the consideration of the note can be inquired into in the present action.
The plaintiff, in and by his petition in the action, as well as by his reply to the answer of the defendants, claims to hold the note sued on as a bona fide holder for value paid therefor, before its maturity, without notice of any infirmity or want of consideration, and in the usual course of business. If it appears from the evidence that the above claim on the part of the plaintiff is true, then he is undoubtedly entitled to recover, notwithstanding the want of consideration for the note as between the original parties. In other words, if the plaintiff is a bona fide holder of the note for a valuable consideration at or before it became due, in the usual course of business, without notice of any infirmity therein, the want of consideration for the note between the maker and payee cannot be availed of as a defense to this action.
The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the plaintiff received and became the endorser of the note before maturity, and for a valuable consideration. But did he receive it without notice of the want of consideration for its execution between the makers and the payee? C. L. Bristol, whose deposition was read on the trial and is preserved in the bill of exceptions, testified as follows:
The defendant, Joseph G. Zaepffel, was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and testified as follows:
Q. You are one of the defendants in this case, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the other defendant is your wife?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the plaintiff, George C. Hobbie?
A. I do.
Q. How long have you known...
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