Hobbs through Eagle v. Integrated Fire Protection, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 October 2020
• Docket Number: A20A0984
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: HOBBS, THROUGH his Legal Guardian, Joshua William EAGLE v. INTEGRATED FIRE PROTECTION, INC.

357 Ga.App. 790

850 S.E.2d 256

HOBBS, THROUGH his Legal Guardian, Joshua William EAGLE

v.INTEGRATED FIRE PROTECTION, INC.

A20A0984

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 21, 2020

Reconsideration Denied November 18, 2020

Certiorari Denied July 7, 2021

Lance T. McCoy, Robert Lige Walker, Cartersville, for Appellant.

Shannon Vise Barrow, Y. Kevin Williams, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

In this wrongful death action, Ethan Wayne Hobbs, through his legal guardian Joshua William Eagle, filed suit against Integrated Fire Protection, Inc. ("IFP"), relating to his mother's death after a vehicular accident. Hobbs appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to IFP, arguing that (1) genuine issues of fact remain as to whether IFP was negligent under the respondeat superior doctrine; (2) genuine issues of fact remain as to whether IFP was negligent in its hiring, retention, and supervision; (3) genuine issues of fact remain as to whether IFP negligently entrusted its vehicle to its employee; and (4) genuine issues of fact remain on his claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment to IFP.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing the denial [or grant] of a summary judgment motion, we owe no deference to the trial court's ruling and we review de novo both the evidence and the trial court's legal conclusions. Moreover, we construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions arising therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Yim v. Carr , 349 Ga. App. 892, 893 (1), 827 S.E.2d 685 (2019).

So viewed, the record shows that Ethan Hobbs is a minor child who resides with his legal guardian, Joshua William Eagle, and that Victoria Ann Eagle was Hobbs’ mother.¹ At the time of the accident, Victoria Eagle was in a relationship with Jason Johnson. Also at the time of the accident, Johnson worked as a superintendent for IFP, a fire and life safety company. John Bennett served as IFP's president. In connection with Johnson's employment, IFP provided Johnson with a company vehicle, and it also gave him a gas card to purchase gas for the vehicle. IFP was aware that Johnson had been convicted of driving under the influence prior to working for the company.² According to Bennett, IFP's policy was that its vehicles were to be used for business purposes only, and he never "broke policy" for Johnson. Bennett acknowledged, however, that IFP's policy manual states that "employees may use [c]ompany vehicles for non-business purposes only with the prior approval of their manager."³ Bennett nevertheless stressed that "[i]n no way, ever, would [he] have ever allowed [Johnson] to take [the] company vehicle and go to a bar and consume alcohol in [the] vehicle." According to Johnson, IFP allowed him to use the truck around the area where he lived without obtaining prior approval.

On June 13, 2015, at approximately 10 p.m., Johnson and Victoria left Johnson's home in IFP's vehicle and went to the 2nd Half Sports Pub & Grill for a social gathering. Denise Martin and Dawn Remington were also at the sports pub at the same time. Johnson admitted that he drank a "few" beers at the pub, and Martin and Remington had also consumed alcoholic beverages. Victoria "walked off" after an incident with another patron. Johnson got into IFP's vehicle and left the pub to search for Victoria. Around the same time, Martin and Remington also left the sports pub. As Johnson drove in search for Victoria, he spotted her walking along the roadway. Johnson exited his truck, which he left "a little bit in the road[,]" and ran across the roadway to where Victoria was walking. While driving along the same roadway, Remington came upon IFP's vehicle which she testified was parked "in the middle of the road." As Remington drove around IFP's vehicle, Martin observed Victoria "in the road" and then she heard a "noise." Martin told Remington, "I think you just hit somebody." Victoria died at the scene of the accident. Remington was indicted on driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle in the first degree, and driving with an expired tag. Johnson was also indicted on involuntary manslaughter, reckless conduct, and driving under the influence.⁴

Hobbs, through his legal guardian, filed the instant action against IFP, 2nd Half Sports Pub & Grill, Johnson, and Remington alleging negligence and wrongful death against all of the defendants, and requesting punitive damages and attorney fees. Following discovery, IFP filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable because Johnson was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that it was not negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising Johnson. IFP also argued that it did not negligently entrust its vehicle to Johnson because it had no actual knowledge that Johnson had a pattern of driving under the influence or illegally parking the company vehicle and because Johnson was not an incompetent or reckless driver. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting IFP's motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that IFP was not vicariously liable on Hobbs’ negligence claim because Johnson was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The trial court also determined that there was no evidence demonstrating that IFP was negligent in hiring and supervising Johnson and that IFP's awareness of Johnson's prior conviction for driving under the influence did not "qualify as actual knowledge sufficient to raise a jury question regarding dangerous propensity" for Hobbs’ negligent entrustment claim. The trial court further concluded that Hobbs was not entitled to punitive damages and attorney fees because all of his substantive claims failed. This appeal followed.

1. First, Hobbs argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to IFP because genuine issues of fact remain as to whether IFP was liable for Johnson's actions under the respondeat superior doctrine. We conclude that IFP is not liable under the respondeat superior doctrine, and the trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment to IFP on this claim.

"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee when the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment." (Punctuation omitted.) Yim , supra, 349 Ga. App. at 898 (1) (b), 827 S.E.2d 685.

Two elements must be present to render a master liable for his servant's actions under respondeat superior: first, the servant must be in furtherance of the master's business; and second, he must be acting within the scope of his master's business. If a tort is committed by an employee not by reason of the employment, but because of matters disconnected therewith, the employer is not liable. Furthermore, if a tortious act is committed not in furtherance of the employer's business, but rather for purely personal reasons disconnected from the authorized business of the master, the master is not liable.

(Citations omitted.) Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc. , 302 Ga. App. 545, 546 (1), 691 S.E.2d 356 (2010). Here, both Hobbs and IFP argue that Johnson was operating a vehicle at the time of the accident, and both parties therefore argue that a presumption arose that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. It is true that

[w]here a tort occurs as a result of a vehicle collision in which the employee was driving his employer's vehicle. however, the employer's liability must be analyzed under the burden-shifting framework espoused by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes , 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979). Under this framework, a presumption arises that the employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and the burden is then on the employer to show otherwise. An employer may overcome this presumption as a matter of law by presenting uncontradicted evidence showing that the employee was not acting in the course and scope of his employment.

(Citation omitted.) Dougherty Equip. Co., Inc. v. Roper , 327 Ga. App. 434, 436 (1) (a), 757 S.E.2d 885 (2014). "The employer is thereafter entitled to summary judgment unless other facts are proffered[.]" (Citation omitted.) Id. If the "other facts" presented consist of direct evidence, that evidence is sufficient to present a jury question. Id. "Where the ‘other facts’ are circumstantial, however, such evidence will not defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment, unless it is sufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor." (Citation omitted.) Id.

Even if the presumption in Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. applies, given the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err by ruling that IFP was not liable for Johnson's conduct. The record shows that Johnson was not working at the time of the accident but had instead left a bar after socializing with friends to search for Victoria. The evidence that Johnson was not working at the time of the accident is sufficient to rebut the presumption that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See id. at 437 (1) (a), 757 S.E.2d 885 (holding that the presumption that the employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident was rebutted where the employee was not working at the time of the accident).

Still, Hobbs argues that the record contains other evidence that is sufficient to...