Hobbs v. Abrams
| Citation | 657 P.2d 1073,104 Idaho 205 |
| Decision Date | 28 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 13923,13923 |
| Parties | Bill HOBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dean L. ABRAMS, Robert M. Hull, Dale F. McKay, Franklin County Commissioners; M.D. Kunz, Clerk Franklin County Commission; Dean Gunnell, Sheriff for Franklin County, Idaho; and the County of Franklin, State of Idaho, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
J.D. Williams and Lowell D. Castleton, Preston, for defendants-respondents.
The plaintiff-appellant, Hobbs, has an interest in two businesses located in Preston, Idaho and Franklin, Idaho, that are licensed to sell beer in Franklin County. On April 28, 1980, Franklin County Commissioners passed an ordinance (1) banning the sale of keg beer within Franklin County and (2) making it illegal for any person, not a licensed wholesaler or dealer, to possess a keg of beer in the unincorporated areas of Franklin County. 1 This ordinance, 80-1, went into effect on May 1, 1980. On May 28, 1980, Hobbs filed a declaratory judgment action against the Franklin County Commissioners, the Franklin County Clerk, the Sheriff for Franklin County and the County. Hobbs claimed that the ordinance prohibited him from carrying on a lawful business and asked that the district court declare the ordinance void. Hobbs filed a motion for summary judgment on July 16, 1980. After a hearing the district court declared that ordinance 80-1 was valid and enforceable and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Hobbs appealed this decision.
The respondents claim that following this statute the declaratory judgment action is The appellant is only relying on I.C. § 23-1007 in an attempt to persuade this Court that the county ordinance is unconstitutional because a conflict exists between this state statute and the county ordinance. He alleges that a conflict exists because the statute gives him the right to sell beer in kegs and the county ordinance now forbids him from selling beer in kegs. Even assuming he has no statutory right to sell beer under I.C. § 23-1007, his status was affected because before the passage of the ordinance he was able to sell beer in kegs and after its passage he was prohibited from selling beer in kegs. Therefore, we hold that he is a proper party to challenge the validity of the section of the ordinance that prohibits the sale of beer in kegs in Franklin County.
[104 Idaho 207] improper because the appellant, a retailer, is attempting to establish his right to sell beer in kegs under I.C. § 23-1007 and § 23-1007 only refers to wholesalers and dealers. 2 Because the appellant has no rights under I.C. § 23-1007 the respondents argue that he is not affected by the ordinance.
The main argument raised by the appellant is that this ordinance is unconstitutional under Article 12, § 2 of the Idaho State Constitution. It provides:
"Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws."
This Court has stated that there are three general restrictions that apply to ordinances enacted under the authority conferred by this constitutional provision: "(1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment." State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 374, 399 P.2d 955, 960 (1965).
Concerning the first restriction, that the ordinance must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the ordinance, the appellant argued before this Court that the portion of the ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer in kegs in "Franklin County" applies to incorporated municipalities within the county, and therefore, the ordinance should be found void. He argued it should be void because a county has no power to prescribe police regulations effective within a municipality.
This Court has previously held that following Article 12, § 2 of the Idaho State Constitution, a county cannot make police regulations effective within a municipality. Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 510, 210 P.2d 798, 801 (1949), cited with approval in Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968). It is irrelevant that the ordinance in question is not in conflict with any existing ordinance of a municipality because "[t]he question is one of power and not one of conflict." Id. at 511, 210 P.2d at 801. However, "[t]he fact that the regulation in question does not, in terms, exclude municipalities, does not make it invalid in the territory to which it is applicable." Id. at 512, 210 P.2d at 802. Therefore, while the Franklin County ordinance is without force and effect within the limits of the incorporated municipalities located in Franklin County, the failure to expressly exclude municipalities does not invalidate the ordinance.
The appellant's businesses are both located in incorporated towns, but as stated above, the ordinance can only apply to the unincorporated areas of the county. The possession portion of the ordinance specifically states that it only applies to the "unincorporated areas of Franklin County." Because of this the ordinance does not affect the appellant's activities within the incorporated municipalities in Franklin County. Thus, this Court will not address the remaining constitutional arguments challenging the portion of the ordinance that prohibits the selling and possessing of keg beer in the unincorporated areas of the county.
The district court issued a memorandum opinion concluding that the ordinance was valid and then requested counsel for the defendant to submit "proposed findings and conclusions and a proposed judgment" in accordance with the memorandum opinion. However, the appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed prior to the trial court's entering any declaratory judgment in this matter but the record indicates that the district judge intended to enter a judgment in accordance with his decision and the parties did stipulate on appeal that the Memorandum Decision should act as a judgment. Therefore, based on the trial court's statement in his Memorandum Decision and the parties' stipulation this Court can consider this civil matter, but because a formal judgment is not a part of the record, we remand with directions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion.
No costs or attorney fees on appeal.
I concur in the majority's holding that the ordinance is without force and effect within the limits of the incorporated municipalities located within Franklin County, but do not agree with the holding that appellant has no standing to challenge the ordinance insofar as it prohibits the possession of keg beer within the county. There is, of course, a considerable portion of the county which lies outside the confines of the few scattered municipalities.
I.C. § 10-1202 provides that "[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ... municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
Section 2 of the ordinance as written prohibits not only the sale of keg beer within Franklin County, but also the purchase, consumption, or possession of keg beer in Franklin County. 1 Under the Court's construction of the ordinance, appellant, whose licensed retail premises are situated in two incorporated municipalities, is not prohibited from selling keg beer. However, the Court ignores the impact on appellant of Section 3 of the ordinance which prohibits the consumption or possession in the unincorporated areas of the county. Can it be that prohibiting the possession of beer within the county in all areas outside of the incorporated city limits will not affect appellant's "rights, status or other legal relations"? I think not. This ordinance is obviously intended to and will destroy a large segment of appellant's trade; those customers who might purchase in Preston and Franklin a keg of beer which they intend to take home or elsewhere in parts of the county...
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...not conflict with the general laws of the State; and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 207, 657 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1983). In this case, Doe does not argue, nor does the Ordinance indicate, that it extends beyond the territorial limits o......
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