Hobbs v. Beard

• Decision Date: 25 March 1895
• Citation: 21 S.E. 305,43 S.C. 370
• Parties: HOBBS et al. v. BEARD.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

21 S.E. 305

43 S.C. 370

HOBBS et al. v. BEARD.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 25, 1895

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; T. B Fraser, Judge.

Action by Martha Hobbs and others against Frances Beard. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

The following was the charge to the jury:

"This is an action to recover the tract of land described in the complaint. The complaint goes on and sets out a cause of action--a complete cause of action--as to that tract; that the plaintiffs were seised in fee simple of the land, and entitled to the possession of it; and that defendant was in possession of it. If they had stopped there and demanded possession after the allegation of damages, that would have been enough; but plaintiffs went further than that, and stated the mode by which that title was obtained. I don't know that that was necessary. It was putting in the complaint what we sometimes call 'evidential facts,'--facts which could have been proved just as well without having been in the complaint at all, therefore surplusage; and therefore, under the terms of this complaint the plaintiff had a right to establish any title that he could establish by proper testimony. This is an action on the part of these plaintiffs to recover the whole of that lot of land. As one of the plaintiffs died since the commencement of the action, his children, heirs at law, have been substituted in his place. That is the reason of the order which you heard taken in this case. Bringing them forward entitles them to the share which their parent would have been entitled to.

The rule is, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, not only in this case, but in all cases. There have been a good many requests to charge submitted, but, in the view I take of it, I propose to charge you generally without saying anything about them. If I am in error, the error can be corrected as well that way as any other. When you undertake to prove title to personal property,--a horse, for instance,--all that is necessary to do is to prove that the person had the horse in his possession. Possession is evidence of title,--one hour's possession. If I have a horse in my possession to-day, and somebody else is found in possession to-morrow, unless he can prove I never had possession, never had title to him, my possession would be evidence against him. Possession of personal property is prima facie evidence of title. Not so with reference to possession of land. In proving title to land, the first thing to do is to prove that the plaintiff has some title in the estate. That is done in several ways. The first and most complete way is to produce the original grant, signed by the governor and secretary of state under the great seal of the state, and then connect this by a regular chain of title. That has not been done here. There is another mode just as good as that, and it is the one which is resorted to in the large number of cases which find their way to the courts in consequence of the loss of original papers; that is, either to get a certified copy of that original grant from the secretary of state's office, or to prove that some person or a number of persons claiming one under another directly, one from another, had possession of that land for twenty consecutive years. When you do that, the presumption is there was a grant commencing at the beginning of possession; and, if in this case it was shown to you that Mrs. Wolfe had twenty years' consecutive possession of that land, it is just as good as though she had produced on the stand the original grant from the secretary of state's office, and all you have got to do is to connect your possession with Mrs. Wolfe's. There is another way: Sometimes they are unable to produce the original grant or a certified copy of the grant, or to prove twenty years' possession. In those cases, if they prove that both parties to the action claim under the same common person, then neither of them is permitted to deny that that person had a good title in the estate. That is what is called proving title by common source. In this case you have heard the testimony. You can prove title from a common source in a good many ways. Sometimes it is done by proving a deed. If there be a deed shown here from Mrs. Wolfe to James L. Beard for life, and the defendant in this case claims under James L. Beard, and these plaintiffs show that they were the heirs at law of Mrs. Wolfe, then no one can go behind that, and whoever has a good title from Mrs. Wolfe will prevail, provided it was filed (?) in time.

In this case the plaintiffs were not allowed to introduce secondary evidence of some papers which they said they had, and which they proposed to claim under. I ruled that out. They claim, however, that they are heirs of Mrs. Wolfe. Well, that depends upon the proof. Now, gentlemen, as to the statute of limitations. If James L. Beard was in possession of that land, and admitted, while he was in possession, that he was only a life tenant, then it is an admission, in the absence of other proof, that he was a life tenant, holding under one who had a title in fee; and if it be true that he claimed under Mrs. Wolfe, or if it be true that Mrs. Wolfe had possession for twenty years, then it is an admission on the face of that paper that he was a life tenant under her. If he was, then ten years, or forty years, could not make out such adverse title as to make out a complete title against her heirs. Therefore, while possession in James L. Beard may have been a very long one, yet, if he held that possession in subordination to Mrs. Wolfe's title, then it was not adverse title, and it conferred no rights upon him, no matter how long. In that view of the case, the only question is whether these parties have proved that they are heirs at law. You have heard the testimony of the witnesses. I cannot tell you. If there were six brothers and sisters, or children of deceased brothers and sisters, and only six of them, then those six were entitled to that property after her death. If only three are here, those are entitled each to one-sixth. If one is dead, represented by three, then each is entitled to one-third of one-sixth. I think I have covered about all the case. It is one of those cases, I see no reason why I should say anything to the jury about expecting them to do their duty. It is plain matters of fact and law, like adding up a sum in arithmetic. Indicate your verdict, and the lawyers will put it in shape when you come out."

The following are exceptions of plaintiffs:

"(1) Because his honor, the presiding judge, erred in ruling that the letter of James L. Beard, of date 20th June, 1887, was inadmissible to prove the existence and contents of the deed of Mary Anne Wolfe, conveying the premises in question to the said James L. Beard for life, with remainder to the children of Thomas Beard; whereas his honor should have ruled that the same was competent and admissible both to prove the existence and contents of the said deed. (2) Because his honor erred in refusing to allow the witness H. G. Guerry to testify that the said Wolfe deed was on record in the office of the register of mesne conveyances for Richland county; and his honor erred, further, in refusing to allow the said witness to testify to the contents of the said record, as secondary evidence of the contents of the said Wolfe deed, it appearing in the evidence that the said records had been destroyed in 1865; whereas his honor should have held that, under the facts proved, the record of the said deed was admissible as evidence to prove both the existence and contents of the said deed. (3) Because his honor erred in ruling that the declarations of Mary Anne Wolfe were inadmissible as evidence to prove the existence and contents of the deed previously executed by her to James L. Beard, conveying the premises in dispute to the said James L. Beard for life, with remainder to the children of Thomas Beard; whereas his honor should have held that the said declarations were admissible as evidence in corroboration of other evidence, and in proof of the contents of the said deed."

The following are exceptions of defendant:

"(1) Because his honor erred in not granting the nonsuit: (a) Because there was a total failure of any evidence showing that plaintiffs were heirs at law of Mary Wolfe; (b) because the plaintiffs, having brought their action as remainder-men, could not recover as heirs at law. (2) Because his honor erred in refusing to charge the jury: 'That if jury believe from the evidence that James L. Beard was in possession of the lot in dispute, receiving rents and profits, and paying taxes, for over twenty years, and his possession was open, notorious, and continuous, then, from the possession of twenty years, a grant or title would be presumed in J. L. Beard, and he would have a good title;' and, on the contrary, charged the jury: 'There have been a good many requests to charge submitted; but, in the view I take of it, I propose to charge you generally, without saying anything about them,' etc., and refused said request. (3) That his honor erred in refusing to charge the following request, submitted by defendant: 'That if the jury believe from the evidence that James L. Beard occupied and possessed the land in dispute, using it and renting it, for ten years before the death of Mrs. Wolfe, then, if he held ten years adversely in his own right, at the expiration thereof the title would vest in him, and he would have a good title;' but, on the contrary, his honor refused so to charge. (4) That his honor erred in refusing to charge the following request, submitted by defendant: 'Even though the jury may believe that, on the death of Mary Wolfe, the plaintiffs

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