Hobbs v. Henley

• Citation: 186 S.W. 981
• Parties: HOBBS v. HENLEY et al.
• Decision Date: 31 May 1916
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

186 S.W. 981

HOBBS v. HENLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

May 31, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Walter A. Powell, Judge.

Suit by William C. Hobbs against Kate B. Henley and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Flournoy & Flournoy, of Kansas City, for appellant. Moore & Leacy, of Kansas City, for respondents.

WALKER, J.

This was a suit brought in the circuit court of Jackson county in 1911 to establish a parol agreement for the transfer of 42½ acres of land in said county under a contract alleged to have been made in 1880 between the plaintiff and his mother. The defendants are the other children and a grandchild of plaintiff's mother. Upon a trial the court found for defendants, and plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff's mother died testate in 1903. She devised the land in controversy to two trustees, who were to hold same in trust for the use and benefit of the plaintiff upon the conditions therein stated. The provisions of the will in regard to the trust are as follows:

"It is my will and desire that my trustees shall rent or dispose of the use of said premises as they may see fit and pay to my son William C. W. Hobbs the rents, issues, and profits of said real estate annually, semiannually or at such other intervals as they may deem best, after paying the taxes for keeping up such repairs and making such improvements as they may see fit to make and for any expenses connected with this trust, for and during the natural life of said William C. W. Hobbs and at his death, if he die single and unmarried and without issue, it is my desire and I hereby direct that said trustees shall convey said property in fee simple to my children (naming them) or their legal representatives or assigns, to have and to hold in equal parts. But if my said son William C. W. Hobbs should die leaving a wife or descendants then it is my will that one-half of said real estate, so held in trust, be conveyed as above directed and that the remaining one-half be conveyed to the wife of said William C. W. Hobbs for life and the remainder therein in fee simple to the children of said William C. Hobbs if he leave any such children, if not then that the said one-half of said trust estate is to go to his wife in fee simple instead of for life. It is my will and I hereby direct that said trustees shall have full power and authority to sell and convey said real estate if at any time they deem it best so to do and that they may invest the proceeds of such sale in other real estate to be held by them upon the same trusts and conditions or that they may lend the money arising from such sale or invest it in United States bonds or other desirable sureties or in such other personal property as to them may seem best and pay the interest or other profits arising from the use of said trust estate to said William C. W. Hobbs as above directed during his natural life, and at his death the corpus of the property aforesaid whether in land or personal property shall be conveyed or transferred as above directed. It is my desire that my said son William C. W. Hobbs shall have no power or authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise alien or encumber his said interest in said real estate or the property into which it may be converted or in any way dispose of the rents or income therefrom prior to the time the same may be paid to him as above provided.

"Item 4th. I bequeath to my said son William C. W. Hobbs all my furniture and household goods."

The plaintiff paid the costs for the probating of this will, accepted the bequest of the personal property, and joined with the other heirs in a deed to a small portion of the land for church purposes. Prior to this suit, plaintiff admitted in letters written to his brothers and sisters that he claimed a life estate in the land. This suit was not brought until eight years after the death of plaintiff's mother.

I. Estoppel. — In the view we take of this case it is not necessary to set forth the facts in detail. Enough is said to define the plaintiff's acquiescence in the somewhat remarkable provisions of the trust created by the will. We say remarkable advisedly, because of the absolute power it confers upon the trustees in the absence of any substantial evidence of plaintiff's incapacity and as at utter variance with affirmative testimony of a previous intention and purpose on the part of the testatrix that plaintiff should for his long years of service hold and enjoy a fee in the land in controversy. His own conduct, however, has precluded his recovery in this action.

It is a doctrine well established, which has received the express approval of this court (Wood v. Trust Co., 265 Mo. loc. cit. 525, 178 S. W. 201; Lindsley v. Patterson, 177 S. W....