Hobbs v. Hurley

• Decision Date: 15 November 1918
• Citation: 104 A. 815
• Parties: HOBBS v. HURLEY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

104 A. 815

HOBBS

v. HURLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 15, 1918.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Joint Tort-Feasors.]

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County, at Law.

Action by Josiah H. Hobbs against William P. Hurley. On report from the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for plaintiff.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, and MORRILL, JJ.

Charles T. Smalley, of Rockland, for plaintiff.

A. S. Littlefield, of Rockland, for defendant.

CORNISH, C. J. This is an action on the case to recover from the defendant the sum of $274.05 as contribution towards the payment of a joint judgment rendered against both the plaintiff and defendant, the entire sum having been paid by the plaintiff.

The material facts leading up to this action are, briefly, as follows: On September 7, 1912, one Jethro D. Pease was thrown from his wagon and injured by reason of an automobile, driven by one Herrick as chauffeur, suddenly backing against and frightening the horse of Pease and causing him to cramp the wheels. The automobile was owned by Mr. Montgomery, and an action of negligence was first brought against him by Pease; but it was held that the suit could not be maintained, because, while Mr. Montgomery was the owner of the machine, he was not in the possession, control, and management of it, nor was the chauffeur acting as his servant at the time of the injury. Pease v. Montgomery, 111 Me. 582, 88 Atl. 973.

Then suit was brought by Pease against Messrs. Gardner, Hobbs, Hurley, and Herrick, and judgment was rendered in favor of the then plaintiff against Messrs. Hobbs and Hurley, the parties in the case at bar, in the sum of $500, and judgment in favor of Gardner and Herrick. Pease v. Gardner. 113 Me. 264, 93 Atl. 550. The liability of Messrs. Hobbs and Hurley was placed upon the ground that they had secured this automobile from its owner, Mr. Montgomery, to take Mr. Gardner, and perhaps others, who were on a political speaking campaign, from Rockland to other towns in Knox county: that for that trip they had the legal possession, control, and management of the car and were responsible therefor; that the engagement and operation of the car was a joint enterprise on their part as chairmen of certain political committees, and Herrick, the chauffeur, was for the time being their servant.

The defendant raises two contentions: First, that the parties to this action against whom the judgment was rendered were joint tort-feasors, and that one joint tort-feasor cannot enforce contribution from another; second, if the plaintiff is legally entitled to recover, it is only for one-fourth of the amount of the joint judgment, as four persons were involved in the original transaction which was the basis of the judgment.

1. Right of Contribution.

It is undoubtedly a general rule of law that as between joint tort-feasors, in pari delicto, there is no right of contribution.

The reason of the rule is that the law will not lend its aid to him who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. It leaves him where it finds him. The leading case is Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186, and this has been uniformly and consistently followed. The term "tort-feasor," as used here, applies to persons who by concert of action intentionally commit the wrong complained of.

But an exception to this rule is equally well settled, and that is that when the parties are not intentional and willful wrongdoers, but are made wrongdoers by legal inference or intendment, are involuntary and unintentional tort-feasors, so to speak, then the preceding rule does not apply, and contribution may be enforced. The rule ceases because the reason for it has ceased. Contribution is not contractual. It is an equitable right founded on acknowledged principles of natural justice and enforceable in a court of law.

The exception was suggested by Lord Kenyon in Merryweather v. Nixan, supra, which announced the rule, and has been fully developed and recognized by later decisions, both in England and this country. Betts v. Gibbons, 2 Ad. & Ell. 57; Pearson v. Skelton, 1 Mees. & Wels. 504; Wooley v. Batte, 2 Car. & P. 417; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; Id., 37 Conn. 349; Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105; Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295; 6 R. C. L. 1055, and cases cited.

The distinction between the two classes of cases, and therefore between the rule and the exception, was clearly set forth by the Massachusetts court in these words:

"It is undoubtedly the policy of the law to discountenance all actions in which a party seeks to enforce a demand originating in a willful breach or violation, on his part, of the legal rights of others. Courts of law will not lend their aid to those who found their claims upon an illegal transaction. No one can be permitted to relieve himself from the consequences of having intentionally committed an unlawful act, by seeking an indemnity or contribution from those with whom or by whose authority such unlawful act was committed. But justice and sound policy, upon which this salutary rule is founded, alike require that it should not be extended to cases where parties have acted in good faith, without any unlawful design, or for the purpose of asserting a right in themselves, or others, although they have thereby infringed upon the legal rights of third persons. It is only when a person knows, or must be presumed to know, that his act was unlawful, that the law will refuse to aid him in seeking an indemnity or contribution. It is the unlawful intention to violate another's rights, or a willful ignorance and disregard of those rights, which deprives a party of his legal remedy in such cases. It has therefore been held that the rule of law, that wrongdoers cannot have redress or contribution against each other, is confined to those cases where the person claiming redress or contribution knew, or must be presumed to have known, that the act, for which he has been mulcted in damages, was unlawful." Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287, supra.

It may be safely asserted...