Hobbs v. Michigan State Highway Dept., Docket No. 19890
| Decision Date | 29 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 19890,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 58 Mich.App. 189,227 N.W.2d 286 |
| Parties | Edith L. HOBBS, Executrix of the Estate of Gailen L. Hobbs, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Martin M. Doctoroff, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Myron A. McMillan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellee.
Before BRONSON, P.J., and HOLBROOK and V. J. BRENNAN, JJ.
Plaintiff-appellant, Edith L. Hobbs, brought suit against defendant-appellee, Michigan State Highway Department, for damages arising out of an automobile accident occurring on I--75 in Royal Oak in which Gailen Hobbs, appellant's decedent, was killed when the automobile he was driving plunged off an overpass bridge.
The fatal accident occurred on May 22, 1972. Suit was filed in the Court of Claims on October 9, 1973, claiming, Inter alia, that the highway department had been negligent in designing, constructing and maintaining the bridge and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
A motion for accelerated and/or summary judgment, as amended, was filed by the highway department, which asserted that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction 1 over Hobbs' claim because she had failed to file her complaint, or a notice of intention to file the same, within one year after the claim had accrued as required by the Court of Claims Act, M.C.L.A. § 600.6431(1); M.S.A. § 27A.6431(1). The Court of Claims judge granted summary judgment in favor of the highway department on that basis. It is from this order that Hobbs appeals.
Both the parties and the Court of Claims judge concluded that the notice, statute of limitations, and liability provisions of the Court of Claims Act control this case. Summary judgment was predicated thereon, and this appeal has proceeded on that assumption. We are compelled to point out, however, and base our decision on, a different statutory scheme.
M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111) provides as follows:
'(1) Every claim against any governmental agency shall be subject to the general law respecting limitations of actions except as otherwise provided in this section.
'(2) The period of limitations for claims arising under section 2 of this act shall be 2 years.
'(3) The period of limitations for all claims against the state, except those arising under section 2 of this act, shall be governed by chapter 64 of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961.'
Chapter 64 of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961 is the Court of Claims Act. It appears, therefore, that any claim brought against the state under section 2 of the general highway statute M.C.L.A. § 691.1401 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.996(101) et seq., is subject to a different 2 two-year statute of limitations.
In addition, claims arising under section 2 are subject to a notice requirement different from and expressly exclusive of the notice provision appearing in the Court of Claims Act. The notice requirement of the general highway statute provides, in pertinent part:
* * * ' M.C.L.A. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104) (Emphasis added.).
Section 6431 of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961 is the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act about which the parties have argued and upon which the summary judgment was based. The italicized language suggests to us, however, that the notice provision of M.C.L.A. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104) will apply if this claim arises under section 2 of the general highway statute. It is to that question which we now turn.
Section 2, codified as M.C.L.A. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102), provides as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff's decedent clearly was a 'person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property'. The question whether his death was due to defendant's negligent failure to keep 'any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel', is of course one of fact, to be determined by the trier of fact at a later stage in these proceedings. 3 More important for our purposes here, plaintiff-appellant Hobbs has clearly pled sufficient facts to bring her claim under section 2. Accordingly, the notice and statute of limitations provisions previously set forth apply...
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