Hobgood v. Pennington, 1429

Decision Date08 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 1429,1429
Citation387 S.E.2d 690,300 S.C. 309
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesBobby E. HOBGOOD, Respondent, v. Horace H. PENNINGTON, Dan C. Gunter, Jr., Pennington Realty, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation and The Gastonia Group, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation, Defendants, Of whom Pennington Realty, Inc., and The Gastonia Group, Inc. are, Appellants. Appeal of PENNINGTON REALTY, INC., and The Gastonia Group, Inc. . Heard

Howell V. Bellamy and Preston B. Haines, III, Myrtle Beach, for respondent.

GARDNER, Judge:

Bobby E. Hobgood (Hobgood) sued Pennington Realty, Inc., (Pennington Realty), The Gastonia Group, Inc., (The Gastonia Group), Horace H. Pennington (Pennington) and Dan C. Gunter, Jr., (Gunter) for intentional interference with a contractual relationship. Upon trial, the jury returned a verdict for Hobgood. We affirm.

ISSUES

The only issue of merit is whether (1) there is any evidence of record that a contract existed between Hobgood and Johnny and Vanessa Cox (the Coxes).

FACTS

We review the facts in a light most favorable to Hobgood. The Gastonia Group was the developer of a 21-unit condominium complex in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, known as the Ocean Drive Dunes Horizontal Property Regime. Horace Pennington (Pennington) was a 50 percent owner in and President of The Gastonia Group. Gunter was the secretary of The Gastonia Group; the record does not disclose his percentage of interest in The Gastonia Group. Pennington Realty entered into a contract with The Gastonia Group to market and sell the condominium units. Pennington was a 50 percent owner of Pennington Realty and the broker in charge.

In order to obtain financing, all 21 units in the condominium complex had to be "pre-sold." Hobgood, along with other sales persons working with Pennington Realty, purchased some of the units at a reduced price.

There is of record a contract of sale between Hobgood and The Gastonia Group which is dated February 19, 1986. The contract provides, inter alia, (1) that Hobgood will buy and The Gastonia Group will sell Unit 5 of Ocean Drive Dunes Building A, (2) that it is subject to all governmental ordinances, etc., (3) that the purchase price is $59,900.00 and recites a down payment of $2,500.00, (4) that it is subject to the purchaser's obtaining financing and (5) that possession of the premises will be given the purchaser on or before the closing date of June 1, 1987. Importantly, the contract does not provide a provision that time is of the essence.

Thereafter, Hobgood entered into a similar contract of sale with the Coxes. This contract was the same as the contract between Hobgood and The Gastonia Group except that the selling price was $74,900.00 and the closing date was June 15, 1987.

The record reflects that the condominiums were not completed by June 1 and that the City of North Myrtle Beach did not issue a certificate of occupancy until June 11, 1987.

On June 15, 1987, Pennington wrote Hobgood that the closing of all units had to occur before July 15, 1987. Upon receipt of the letter, Hobgood talked to Pennington and according to his testimony, was told not to worry about it and that as long as the unit was under contract and/or a loan was in process, there would be no problem. Pennington, in his testimony, admitted that the July 15 date was really not enforced and that several units were closed after July 15 and that if a loan was in process there would not be any problem.

Although Hobgood's contract with the Coxes provided that the Coxes would obtain financing for the purchase of Unit 5, he voluntarily assisted the Coxes in arranging financing. The people that Hobgood dealt with would not agree to finance the property for $74,900.00. Hobgood, according to his testimony, reduced the sales price to $70,000.00 and thereby obtained financing for the Coxes. Hobgood testified that the Coxes agreed by telephone to this modification and that the closing would be extended until sometime in August 1987.

Lynn Dunn was called as a witness for Hobgood. She testified that she handled the real estate closings for Jim Pike, who was the closing attorney for the savings and loan association with whom Hobgood had arranged financing for the Coxes. She testified that on August 4, 1987, she forwarded a loan package to the Coxes providing for financing for Unit 5. She testified that when the loan package was returned to her on about August 11 or 12, 1987, the Coxes had stricken Unit 5 and in its place inserted Unit 2.

Hobgood testified that he first learned of the Coxes intent to purchase Unit 2 on August 15 when he talked to the closing attorney about his plan to close with the Coxes.

Hobgood attempted to communicate with Pennington but was unable to find him and on August 20, 1987, Hobgood wrote The Gastonia Group a letter in which he reviewed the history of this situation and stated that he objected to Pennington's interfering with his contract with the Coxes. There is of record a check dated two days later, i.e., August 22, 1987, from the Coxes to Pennington for the purchase of Unit 2. This check was never cashed.

There is a deed of record from The Gastonia Group to the Coxes for Unit 2. This deed is dated August 27, 1987. Interestingly, the record reflects that the same loan package which Hobgood had negotiated for the Coxes was used in the closing of August 27, 1987. It is also interesting that Pennington did not cash the Coxes' check but used instead Hobgood's earnest money to close the sale to the Coxes.

It is undisputed of record that Pennington knew of Hobgood's contract with the Coxes when it was originally executed, knew of the amended contract and also used Hobgood's loan package to complete the contract with the Coxes. Moreover, he never raised with Hobgood the issue of the dual contracts prior to the time he completed the sale of Unit 2.

I.

The contention of Pennington and the Gastonia Group is that the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict and in overruling their post-judgment verdict for n.o.v.

In ruling upon motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., the trial judge must view the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If there is any evidence to sustain the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict, this court must affirm. Blackburn and Co., Inc. v. Dudley, 298 S.C. 538, 381 S.E.2d 918, 919 (Ct.App.1989).

In order to establish an action for intentional interference with a contract, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract, (3) the intentional procurement of its breach, (4) the absence of justification, and (5) resulting damages. Todd v. South...

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  • Vinson v. Hartley
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 14, 1996
    ...had the right to find that she was not injured, and we do not have the right to second-guess the jury. See Hobgood v. Pennington, 300 S.C. 309, 313, 387 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ct.App.1989) ("If there is any evidence to sustain the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict, this court must B......
  • Ingram v. Kasey's Associates
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    ...is of the essence, the law implies that [closing of the sale] is to be done within a reasonable time." Hobgood v. Pennington, 300 S.C. 309, 314, 387 S.E.2d 690, 693 (Ct.App.1989).6 We note that the court in two other South Carolina cases, while not expressly discussing whether notice is suf......
  • Frampton v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.
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    • August 25, 2014
    ...of the damages, and this court may not second-guess determination of credibility by the trier of fact. See Hobgood v. Pennington, 300 S.C. 309, 313, 387 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ct.App.1989) (“If there is any evidence to sustain the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict, this court must a......
  • Vessell v. DPS Associates of Charleston, Inc.
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    • July 8, 1998
    ...three. Whether the parties have a meeting of the minds is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide. Hobgood v. Pennington, 300 S.C. 309, 387 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1989). In this case, however, the most Gibbons and Vessell could be said to have had agreed on was a deal whereby Vessell......
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