Hoch v. Doughty

• Decision Date: 16 November 1966
• Citation: 224 A.2d 54
• Parties: Gretl J. HOCH v. Sidney L. DOUGHTY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 54

224 A.2d 54

Gretl J. HOCH v. Sidney L. DOUGHTY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 16, 1966.

Burton G. Shiro, Waterville, for plaintiff.

Locke, Campbell & Chapman, By Joseph B. Campbell, Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, RUDMAN and DUFRESNE, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

After jury verdict for plaintiff the defendant seasonably filed motion for judgment n. o. v. This motion was denied and defendant appeals.

On a blustery winter day in Jackman the plaintiff's small Volkswagen was in collision with a snowplow driven by defendant. The road surface was 26 feet wide with snowbanks on either side rising to a height of 7 to 10 feet.

In accordance with familiar principles we must view the evidence with its inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Crockett v. Staples, (1952) 148 Me. 55, 89 A.2d 737. The plaintiff says that she came around a right hand curve in the road proceeding at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour; that because of the high banks of snow she could not see the plow approaching in the opposite direction beyond the curve; that she was suddenly confronted by the defendant's vehicle occupying a portion of her side of the road and no more than 30 feet in front of her, and that this snowplow, several times the size of her own car, presented to her and directly in her path the appearance of a 'big wall', a 'monster'. She relates that she instantly applied her brakes seeing no opportunity to steer her car safely to the right of the plow, and that she skidded forward to a point of impact which occurred on her side of the center line of the highway. The snowplow was in fact a large dump truck with plowing attachments on the front and right sides. It was not engaged in plowing snow at the time of the accident. The front blade was 13 feet 2 inches wide. Defense witnesses estimated the speed of the plow as it proceeded along the highway at 10 to 12 miles per hour. Measurements taken by disinterested witnesses after the accident indicated that the right front of the plow was against the snowbank on its side of the road but the left rear of the vehicle was about a foot over the center line on the plaintiff's side.

This case clearly falls within well established legal principles and in our view presents typical jury questions. The applicable principles may be summarized as follows:

29 M.R.S.A. Sec. 941. 'When persons traveling with a team are approaching to meet on a way, they shall seasonably turn to the right of the middle of the traveled part of it so that they can pass each other without interference. * * *'

'The word 'team' has been broadened in meaning so as to include automobiles. Bragdon v. Kellogg, 118 Me. 42, 105 A. 433, 6 A.L.R. 669.

"They shall seasonably turn,' etc., means that each of the drivers of two passenger automobiles, when approaching to meet on a public road, shall turn to the right, with such promptness, in due season, in such season that neither shall be retarded in his progress by reason of the other occupying any part of such road, except the half to that other's right.

'That a party was at his left of the road at the time of collision is strong evidence of carelessness is held to be law by this court, which has said further that, unexplained and uncontrolled, such position would be, not only strong, but conclusive evidence of carelessness. Neal v. Rendall, 98 Me. 69, 56 A. 209, 63 L.R.A. 668.' American Mut. Liability Insurance Co. v. Witham (1925), 124 Me. 240, 241, 127 A. 719.

'If at a corner or bend or on a straight road one car can see the other, it is a statutory duty to 'seasonably turn' to the right. A fortiori should it be a statutory duty to so turn, at a blind corner, or turn in the road, when legally bound to anticipate that an approaching car may at any moment appear.' (Emphasis ours) Bragdon v. Kellogg, (1919) 118 Me. 42, 48, 105 A. 433, 436.

Plaintiff was not bound to anticipate defendant's negligence. She could fairly assume that the defendant would obey the law until the contrary became or should in the exercise of reasonable care have become apparent. Davis v. Simpson, (1941) 138 Me. 137, 23 A.2d 320; Crockett v. Staples, supra; Tinker v. Trevett (1959) 155 Me. 426, 156 A.2d 233; Goldstein v. Sklar, (1966) Me., 216 A.2d 298.

'When a person is required to act in an emergency and in a place of impending personal peril, the law will not declare that reasonable care demands that he must choose any particular one of the alternatives presented. In such cases the law invokes the judgment of a jury.' Coombs v. Mackley, (1928) 127 Me. 335, 339, 143 A. 261, 262; Kimball et al. v. Breton, Ex'x, (1958) 153 Me. 476, 485, 138 A.2d 637.

'If one...