Hochfelder v. Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 30 June 1954
• Citation: 126 Cal.App.2d 370,272 P.2d 844
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: HOCHFELDER et ux. v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY. Civ. 20008.

Page 844

272 P.2d 844

126 Cal.App.2d 370

HOCHFELDER et ux. v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY.

Civ. 20008.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

June 30, 1954.

Hearing Denied Aug. 26, 1954.

S. V. O. Prichard, Beverly Hills, for appellants.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Lloyd S. Davis, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

FOX, Justice.

Plaintiffs take this appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered upon demurrer sustained without leave to amend.

Only very few facts need be stated in order to present the question to be determined. The action is one against the County of Los Angeles. The complaint alleges that on Feb. 26, 1952, plaintiff Anna W. Hochfelder, a county employee, was injured while engaged in her official duties by reason of a dangerous and defective condition maintained by defendant county. On May 16, 1952 (which was within 90 days of the occurrence of the injury), Anna filed with the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles (hereinafter referred to as the Board), a claim for damages. The Board did not act upon the claim until April 7, 1953, at which time it formally adopted an order denying the claim. The present action was commenced May 5, 1953, which is more than six months subsequent to the ninetieth day following the filing of the claim but less than six months after the actual denial of the claim.

Defendant's demurrer was based upon general and special grounds, as well as upon the more specific grounds that plaintiffs' action was barred by certain designated statutes of limitation. It is conceded by both sides that the sole question to be decided is whether or not this action is barred by the provisions of section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 29714 and 29715 of the Government Code.

Section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: 'Actions on claims against a county, which have been rejected by the board of supervisors, must be commenced within six months after the first rejection thereof by such board.' Section 29715 of the Government Code states: 'A claimant dissatisfied with the rejection of his claim or with the amount allowed him may sue the county on the claim at any time within six months after the final action of the board.' The chronology of events as disclosed by the record is that the claim, which was filed on May 16, 1952, was rejected by the Board on April 7, 1953; the present complaint was filed on May 5, 1953. There would thus appear to be compliance with the requirement of section 342, that an action against the county upon a claim rejected by the Board of Supervisors, 'must be commenced within six months after the first rejection thereof by such board.' Similarly, it would seem that the provision of Government Code section 29715, limiting the time for institution of a suit upon a rejected claim, to 'within six months after the final action of the board' was likewise satisfied. (Italics added.)

In support of the trial court's judgment of dismissal, the county argues that plaintiffs' action is barred because the period prescribed by section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 29715 of the Government Code had already terminated at the time plaintiffs' action was commenced. The county relies on section 29714 of the Government Code which provides: 'If the board refuses or neglects to allow or reject a claim for 90 days after it is filed with the clerk, the claimant may treat the refusal or neglect as final action and rejection on the ninetieth day.' It is the county's position that under the wording of this section, a claim against a county is denied by operation of law on the ninetieth day after it is filed, and that the six months' statutes of limitations previously quoted commenced to run immediately upon such constructive rejection of the claim. Relating this to the sequence of events before us, the ninetieth day after filing fell on August 14, 1952, without any affirmative action having been taken by the Board. According to the county, this amounted to a constructive rejection and set in motion the six months' limitation period of section 342, Code of Civil Procedure, and section 29715 of the Government Code, which expired on February 14, 1953.

Hence, it is argued by the county that the formal rejection of the claim by the Board on April 7, 1953, was, in effect, a nugatory act, since the claim was already barred; and the present action, which was not commenced until May 5, 1953, falls under the ban of the same statutes of limitations. We are unable to agree with these contentions.

It may be of some benefit to scan briefly the legislative history of the provisions here under scrutiny. Sections 29714 and 29715 of the Government Code appear to have had their prototype in the County Government Act of 1897, Stats.1897, ch. 277, p. 471, at which time they were coalesced as an integrated entity in section 43 thereof. In 1907, the precise language of section 43 was reenacted as section 4078 of the Political Code, Stats.1907, ch. 282, § 1, p. 381. So far as is here pertinent, section 4078 provided: 'If the board refuse or neglect to allow or reject a claim or demand for ninety days after the same has been filed with the clerk, such refusal or neglect may, at the option of the claimant, be deemed equivalent to a final action and rejection on the ninetieth day, and a claimant dissatisfied with the rejection of his claim or demand, or with the amount allowed him on his account, may sue the county therefor at any time within six months after the final action of the board * * *.' (Italics added.) This phraseology remained unchanged until 1947, when section 4078 of the Political Code was repealed, and the Legislature enacted the chapter of the Government Code which now includes sections 29714 and 29715, Stats.1947, ch. 424, § 1, p. 1236. The language of Political Code section 4078 was simplified, severed, and enacted into separate sections of the Government Code. The first part of Political Code section 4078 above quoted was, with a slight change of language, embodied in section 29714 of the Government Code. This change consisted of the omission of the clause above italicized and the insertion in its stead of the words presently appearing: 'the claimant may treat the refusal or neglect as final action and rejection on the ninetieth day.' The balance of former section 4078 of the Political Code set forth above is now incorporated into section 29715 of the Government Code.

By way of orientation, it is to be observed that sections 29714 and 29715 are contained in Title 3, Div. 3, ch. 4 of the Government Code, which relates to claims against a county. Article 1 of chapter 4, covering sections 29700 to 29721, embraces the filing and approval of claims and prescribes in detail the manner and procedure by which specified types of claims must be presented to the Board before a suit may be initiated by a claimant. Section 29704 states in part: 'Any claim against the county * * * shall be presented to the board before any suit may be brought thereon. No suit shall be brought on any claim until it has been rejected in whole or in part.' Section 29713, which immediately precedes the two sections here under review, provides in part: 'If the board finds any claim is not a proper county charge, it shall be rejected. The rejection shall be plainly endorsed on the claim.' While section 29704, supra, provides that no suit shall be brought on any claim against a county until such claim has been presented as therein provided and rejected in whole or in part and while section 29713, supra, enjoins the Board to reject all improper claims and to place thereon a plain endorsement of such rejection, it is significant that nowhere is there placed upon the Board any specific limitation of time within which it must act in either allowing or rejecting the claim.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a provision under consideration by the courts should, whereever possible, be given such construction as will reasonably achieve its object and purpose within the context of the legislative scheme. Section 29714 of the Government Code constitutes a part of the machinery therein established requiring the presentation of claims to the Board as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit. One of the reasons for this type of legislation, requiring claims against a county to be first presented to the legislative body before suit is commenced, is to prevent public funds from being consumed in needless litigation by affording the county an opportunity for amicable adjustment before it could be charged with the cost of a suit and incur other expenses. Crescent Wharf, etc., Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430, 437, 278 P. 1028; Western Salt Co. v. City of San Diego, 181 Cal. 696, 186 P. 345. Another reason is that it provides the public body responsible for making preparations for the fiscal year with an opportunity to be informed in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it may be expected to meet. Crescent Wharf, etc., Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra; Arbios v. County of San Bernardino, 110 Cal. 553, 555, 42 P. 1080. A third reason, of course, is to give the county prompt notice of a claim in order to enable the Board to investigate and inform themselves of the merits or demerits of a claim while the evidence is still fresh and the witnesses available. See David, California Municipal Tort Liability, 7 So.Cal.L.Rev. 373, 402-405.

Since one of the principal objectives of this species of legislation is to facilitate adjustment of claims without suit and assure adequate time for consideration and investigation of the particulars of the alleged claim by the public authority, the Legislature has seen fit to abstain from fixing any period of time within which such claims must be allowed or rejected. This was undoubtedly a recognition of the fact that while simple claims could be...