Hochman v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1956 |
| Docket Number | 1 Div. 667 |
| Citation | 91 So.2d 500,265 Ala. 1 |
| Parties | M. HOCHMAN v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Chas. Hoffman, Mobile, opposed.
Writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals was granted. Revised Rule 39, Code 1940, Tit. 7, Appendix.
The State's petition for certiorari brings before us for review the opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals holding the complaint on which defendant (appellant) was tried subject to the demurrer.
The complaint charges that accused did keep on his premises at a designated place 'automobile and airplane tires in such a manner as to make it a menace or likely to become a menace to the public health * * * in violation of Title 22, Section 75, of the 1940 Code of Alabama.'
The claimed infirmity pointed out by the demurrer, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, is that the complaint did not sufficiently inform accused, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation made against him. More specifically, as appears from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the allegation that the tires were kept in such a manner as to make it a menace or likely to become a menace to public health was no more than a conclusion of the pleader, no facts being supplied to support it.
The Attorney General relied and relies upon the proposition that the complaint followed the language of the statute creating the offense and was, therefore, not demurrable.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is rested largely upon the case of Gayden v. State, Ala.App., 80 So.2d 495, as affirmed by this Court in 262 Ala. 468, 80 So.2d 501.
The complaint in this case follows substantially the language of the statute, Code, Tit. 22, § 75, to which it refers. That statute declares certain things, conditions and acts to be public nuisances per se, menacing public health and unlawful, inter alia '(7) * * * the doing of a thing, not inherently insanitary or a menace to public health in such a manner as to make it a menace or likely to become a menace to public health.' This statute constitutes a part of the article concerning Health and Health Regulations. Section 104 of the title provides that 'any person who violates any of the health or quarantine laws, except those for which a special penalty is prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
The general rule invoked by the Attorney General, to the effect that indictments and complaints substantially following the language of the statute are sufficient, has frequently been applied by the courts of this State, as appears from the cases collected in Vol. 12 Alabama Digest, Indictment and Information, k110(3). But the rule is not without qualification or exception, as also appears from the cases listed under k110(4) of the same subject. Some of the cases, upholding the indictment or complaint under the general rule, while reaching the correct conclusion, may be subject to the criticism of stating the rule too broadly. For the general rule is applicable only where the statute itself sufficiently defines, describes or sets forth the essential elements of the offense. The fact that affidavits or complaints following the language of the statute creating the offense have in some cases been upheld and in others condemned illustrates very clearly that the determinative factor is the sufficiency, vel non, of the language of the particular statute, when pursued in the accusation, to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation made against him, to the end that he may prepare his defense and be protected against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Analyzing the complaint here before us along with the statute creating the offense, it will be observed that the complaint goes beyond the statutory generality of the 'doing of a thing,' etc., and is specific in its designation of the thing done and the objects involved, e., the keeping of automobile and airplane tires. The manner of the keeping, the essence of the offense, as described or defined in the words of the statute and as charged in the complaint, is not lacking in specificity. The words 'in such a manner as to make it a menace or likely to become a menace to public health' inform the accused...
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Hunt v. State
...so that he may prepare his defense, that he may be protected against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See Hochman v. State, 265 Ala. 1, 91 So.2d 500 (1956), in which the Court distinguished Gayden v. State, 262 Ala. 468, 80 So.2d 501 (1955), a leading case on the sufficiency o......
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Smith v. State
...than of facts.... "[I]t is not required that an indictment set up the proof necessary to a conviction."` Hochman [v. State], 265 Ala. [1] at 3[, 91 So.2d 500 (1956), cert. stricken, 265 Ala. 404, 91 So.2d 502 (Ala.1956)]. Boyd v. State, 3 Ala.App. 178, 181, 57 So. 1019 (1912)." Copeland v. ......
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Kennedy v. State
...language. Gideon v. State, 28 Ala.App. 177, 181 So. 126.' Cusimano v. State, 33 Ala.App. 62, 31 So.2d 139, 141. In Hochman v. State, 265 Ala. 1, 91 So.2d 500, 501, there is a rather extended discussion from which we '* * * it should be borne in mind that under our system of pleading, indict......
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E.L.Y. v. State
...are rather a statement of legal conclusions, than of facts." ’ Ex parte Behel, 397 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala. 1981) (quoting Hochman v. State, 265 Ala. 1, 91 So.2d 500 (1956) ). Thus, ‘[a]n indictment is sufficient if it charges an offense in the language of a statute, and it need not set up proo......