Hodge v. Carroll County Dept. of Social Services, Civ. No. HM-92-155.

Decision Date21 September 1992
Docket NumberCiv. No. HM-92-155.
Citation812 F. Supp. 593
PartiesDavid R. HODGE, et al. v. CARROLL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tracy E. Mulligan, Rockville, MD, Edwin Vieira, Jr., Independent Hill, VA, for plaintiffs.

Donna R. Heller, Shelly E. Mintz, Baltimore, MD, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HERBERT F. MURRAY, Senior District Judge.

The plaintiffs, David and Marsha Hodge, individually and on behalf of their son, Joseph Hodge, have filed this § 1983 action against the defendants, the Carroll County Department of Social Services ("CCDSS"), M. Alexander Jones, Director of CCDSS, Alan Katz, Assistant Director of CCDSS, and Carolyn Colvin, Director of the Maryland Department of Human Relations ("MDHR"), with respect to an investigation by CCDSS into a report of suspected child abuse. Pending before this Court are the motion of the defendants to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment and the motion of the plaintiffs for interlocutory summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, this Court will grant the defendants' motion in part and deny that motion in part, and grant the plaintiffs' motion.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendants raise three arguments in support of their motion to dismiss: first, that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; second, that the defendants enjoy absolute immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; and third, that the individual defendants enjoy qualified immunity in this case. This Court will consider each of those arguments, although in a slightly different order.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides the States and their agents with absolute immunity from suit in the federal courts. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355-56, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). When considering whether that immunity precludes federal claims against a particular local entity, courts must examine the essential nature of that entity under state law. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit already has examined Maryland's social services system in the context of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and has concluded that the county departments of social services are agencies of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Keller v. Prince George's County, 923 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir.1991); see also Williams v. Anderson, 753 F.Supp. 1306, 1311 (D.Md.1990) (holding Kent County Department of Social Services immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment precludes this action against CCDSS.

To the extent that the plaintiffs seek monetary damages, the Eleventh Amendment also precludes claims in federal court against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355-56. However, an exception to immunity exists for federal claims for purely prospective equitable relief, even if such claims might have an ancillary effect on the State Treasury. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Finally, absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend in any event to individual state officials sued in their individual capacities.

In this case, the plaintiffs have named Jones, Katz, and Colvin in both their official and individual capacities. Within the Eleventh Amendment framework outlined above, the plaintiffs may seek equitable relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities and monetary relief against those defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, this Court will not grant the defendants' motion to dismiss those claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B. Failure to State a Claim

In further support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, the individual defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the parties both have submitted matters outside the complaint, this Court will transform the defendants' motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a grant of summary judgment only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of such issues of material fact. For the purposes of deciding the defendants' motion, this Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Mindful of these well-established principles, this Court will proceed to a reading of the complaint and evidence submitted in this case in connection with the defendants' motion.

On January 20, 1989, David and Marsha Hodge admitted their three-month-old son, Joseph, into Carroll County General Hospital for examination and treatment of swelling in Joseph's right arm. Diagnosing Joseph's condition as a broken right ulna "without adequate historical explanation," the doctor treating Joseph referred the case to CCDSS as a case of suspected child abuse. At the same time, the doctor informed the Hodges of his decision to report the case to CCDSS.

The next day, a social worker from CCDSS named Richard Loper began an investigation of the reported abuse. Accompanied by a Maryland State Trooper, Loper interviewed the Hodges and the doctor who reported the suspected abuse at the hospital. Loper also conducted interviews of other persons, including Phyllis A. Hodge, David's mother. Finding no evidence of abuse, Loper classified the case as "unsubstantiated" and "ruled out" and filed his report with the CCDSS.

At CCDSS, Loper's investigatory report was entered onto the Automated Master File ("AMF"), a comprehensive computerized data base that contains a record of every individual in Maryland who has received any kind of "service" from any of the local DSS offices. "Services" range from food stamps to, as in this case, "Child Protective Services" ("CPS"). From any computer terminal connected to the AMF, CCDSS employees and any other users can obtain information about any recipient of DSS services from any DSS computer terminal, i.e., at the present time, any individual in Maryland using the AMF can learn that Joseph, son of David and Marsha Hodge, received CPS services in January 1989.1 Using the case number listed on the AMF, a DSS worker also can obtain the Hodge's case file, which contains a copy of all of the documents generated in the case.2

Unsatisfied with the initial diagnosis of a fractured arm, the Hodges took Joseph to another doctor. Discovering no broken bones at all, the second doctor diagnosed the swelling condition as osteomyelitis, a bacterial bone infection, and successfully treated Joseph for that ailment. On January 27, 1992, Martha Hodge notified Loper about the second diagnosis and treatment and pointed out that child abuse could not possibly have caused the problem with Joseph's arm.

Confident that the diagnosis of osteomyelitis had ended any suspicion that they had abused their son, the Hodges requested in February 1989 that CCDSS permit them to inspect their case file to ensure that it completely and accurately noted the disposition of the case. Instead of the file, however, the Hodges received a brief summary of the contents of the case file prepared by Katz. Later, Katz acknowledged that the Hodges' names were entered on the AMF.

Skeptical of Katz' version of their case file and concerned over the implications of their inclusion on the AMF, the Hodges turned to Carolyn Colvin, Director of the Maryland Department of Human Resources ("MDHR"). Referring to the State confidentiality statute, Md.Code art. 88A, § 6, and its supporting regulations, COMAR 07.01.02, 07.02.07, Colvin also refused to disclose the contents of the case file to the Hodges.

The "AMF" and the "Central Registry"

At the direction of the Maryland Legislature, the State Department of Welfare, the predecessor to the Social Services Administration ("SSA") within MDHR, created the Central Registry for Child Abuse in 1966. Providing that "MDHR shall maintain a central registry of cases" of suspected child abuse, 1966 Md.Laws 469 (emphasis added), the Legislature noted its intent "to facilitate compliance with and enforcement of the law regarding the assaulting of children within the State." Id. at 466. The Legislature later provided for certain procedural safeguards in connection with the central registry, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard for any person named as a suspected child abuser. 1977 Md. Laws 2351-52.

In 1987, the Maryland Legislature consolidated its child abuse laws into Md.Fam. Law Code §§ 5-701 to 5-715. As part of that effort, the Legislature approved a measure proposed by MDHR to make the central registry requirement permissive rather than mandatory. See Md.Fam.Law Code § 5-714. Soon afterward, MDHR stopped adding records to the Central Registry for Child Abuse.

Meanwhile, however, in 1981 MDHR established the AMF, which, as noted above, is a comprehensive computerized data base that includes everyone in Maryland who has received "services" of any kind from any of the local DSS offices, including all children who receive CPS services. In a typical record of CPS services on the AMF, alphanumeric codes identify the names of child in the case, the child's parents or guardians, other members of the family, and still other persons associated with the family if those persons are child...

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