Dep't of Human Res., Balt. City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hayward

• Citation: 426 Md. 638,281 Ed. Law Rep. 578,45 A.3d 224
• Decision Date: 23 May 2012
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2007.,No. 131,131
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Angela HAYWARD and William Dixon.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

426 Md. 638

45 A.3d 224

281 Ed. Law Rep. 578

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

v.Angela HAYWARD and William Dixon.

No. 131, Sept. Term, 2007.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 23, 2012.

Sandra Barnes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Keith J. Zimmerman (Kahn, Smith & Collins, P.A., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned), and DALE R. CATHELL (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

BELL, C.J.

We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether an individual accused of, but not found responsible for, child abuse or neglect has a right to appeal ¹ when a local department's investigation of the accusation results in a finding of “unsubstantiated.” The Court of Special Appeals answered this question in the affirmative, Hayward v. Dep't of Human Res., 177 Md.App. 402, 935 A.2d 493 (2007), and, so, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which had dismissed a mandamus action seeking that relief. We agree and, thus, affirm.

I. Background

At all times relevant to this appeal, the respondents, Angela Hayward, an instructionalaide, and William Dixon, a teacher, were employed by the Baltimore City Public School System (“BCPSS”). In December, 2005, in separate cases, the petitioner, the Department of Human Resources for the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (the “Department”) received reports accusing the respondents of committing child abuse. In each case, a Department caseworker was assigned the task of conducting an investigation, and, in each case, at the conclusion of the investigation, the Department issued a finding of “Child Physical Abuse—Unsubstantiated.” The respondents, along with their employer, BCPSS, were notified of the “unsubstantiated” finding, which, as it was explained to the respondents, meant “that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of indicated or ruled out.” As a result, neither respondent was “named as the alleged abuser.” Nevertheless, the respondents' names were entered into the central registry ² of child abuse investigations.

Both respondents, in separate cases, requested, pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2011 Supp.) § 5–706.1(c) ³ of the Family Law Article (“FL”), that the Departmentprovide them with a conference “to review the Department's redacted investigation records and potentially request corrections and/or supplements ....” Hayward v. Dep't of Human Res., 177 Md.App. 402, 405, 935 A.2d 493, 495 (2007). The Department denied the requests and, in identical letters to each respondent, explained:

“We are in receipt of your letter which requests an appeal regarding the decision of ‘unsubstantiated’ child physical abuse against your client, [respondent]. As a result of your request, I have reviewed the case record, and found that your client, [respondent], was not identified as the alleged abuser. Only an individual who is ‘identified’ has the right to appeal the department's decision.

“COMAR 07.02.26.05 provides that “An individual found responsible for indicated child abuse or neglect may appeal the finding....” Since your client, [respondent], was not identified as the responsible party [he/she] is not eligible for an appeal.”

(Emphasis in original). Faced with an interpretation of FL § 5–706.1 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to, and in clarification of, it that precluded appeal when the finding of the investigation was “unsubstantiated,” the respondents sought review of that interpretation by filing mandamus actions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The petitioner subsequently filed motions to dismiss in both cases, and the respondents moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court, after consolidating the actions, granted the petitioner's motion, thus disposing of the cases.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, concluding that it would be unjust if the respondents, “whose identifying information was placed in the central registry despite a finding of insufficient evidence, were denied their right to appeal and thus their opportunity to clear their names.” Hayward, 177 Md.App. at 416–17, 935 A.2d at 501. The intermediate appellate court, thus, held that “[t]he Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred when it refused to issue mandamus and dismissed the cases of ... Hayward and Dixon on the ground that it left them with no alternative means to legally resolve their dispute.” Id., 177 Md.App. at 417, 935 A.2d at 502. The Department petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, Social Services v. Hayward, 403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d 1104 (2008). The issue we are asked to consider is whether “the Department of Human Resources properly interpreted the law as providing standing to appeal solely to individuals found responsible for ‘unsubstantiated’ or ‘indicated’ child abuse or neglect and, if not, what is the scope of the appeal right?” We shall hold, like the Court of Special Appeals, that the Department failed to interpret FL § 5–706.1(c) properly, and that individuals who are investigated by a local department, with a resultant finding of “unsubstantiated,” have a right to appeal, regardless of any additional findings of actual responsibility.

II. Writ of Mandamus

Although, at bottom, the issue to be resolved is the correctness of the Department's interpretation of FL § 5–706.1, it is presented in the context of the common law writ of mandamus; under review is the Circuit Court's dismissal of the respondents' consolidated Complaints for Writ of Mandamus.We begin, therefore, with a review of the nature and office of that writ. Ordinarily, mandamus does not lie where the action to be reviewed is discretionary or depends on personal judgment. Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145, 680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996); Board of Education of Prince George's County v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 46, 562 A.2d 700, 706 (1989); In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 305–06, 539 A.2d 664, 676 (1988); see also Tabler v. Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society, 301 Md. 189, 202, 482 A.2d 873, 880 n. 7 (1984); Bovey v. Executive Director, HCAO, 292 Md. 640, 646, 441 A.2d 333, 337 (1982); Maryland Action for Foster Children v. State, 279 Md. 133, 138–39, 367 A.2d 491, 494 (1977). Indeed, the writ generally is used “to compel inferior tribunals, public officials or administrative agencies to perform their function, or perform some particular duty imposed upon them which in its nature is imperative and to the performance of which duty the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right.” Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 514, 331 A.2d 55, 72 (1975); see also Nolan, 343 Md. at 145, 680 A.2d at 1047;George's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Commissioners, 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883). It also “is a summary remedy, for the want of a specific one, where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.” State ex rel. McClellan v. Graves, 19 Md. 351, 374 (1863). That is true even where discretionary actions are the subject of the review. Nolan, 343 Md. at 146, 680 A.2d at 1048. That office is also well settled. State Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 401, 380 A.2d 28, 37 (1977); Gould, 273 Md. at 503, 331 A.2d at 66;State Insurance Commissioner v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 302, 236 A.2d 282, 287 (1967); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945). In this State, mandamus is considered to be “in the nature of a prerogative writ,” as well as “an extraordinary remedy.” Ipes v. Board of Fire Com'rs of Baltimore, 224 Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961). “Circuit Courts of this State have been statutorily conferred with the power and discretion ... to issue writs of mandamus,” however, “that discretion must be exercised under the rules long recognized and established at common law,” which provide that mandamus is proper where a party would otherwise have no avenue for legal recourse. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 708, 752 A.2d 200, 210 (2000) (quoting Hardcastle v. Md. & Del. R.R. Co., 32 Md. 32, 35 (1870)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, this Court has recognized that, “prior to granting a writ of mandamus to review discretionary acts, there must be both a lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and an allegation that the action complained of is illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” Nolan, 343 Md. at 146, 680 A.2d at 1048. An agency's actions will be classified as arbitrary and capricious if they are “unreasonabl[e] or without a rational basis....” Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 297, 884 A.2d 1171, 1204 (2005) (quoting Arnold Rochvarg, Maryland Administrative Law, § 4.38 at 128 (2001, 2004 Supp.)).

This case reaches this Court in a somewhat unusual circumstance. As indicated, dispositive of the resolution of this case is the determination of which of the interpretations of FL § 5–706.1(c) offered by the parties and it is this difference in interpretation that precipitated the mandamus action. Although the respondents have, at all times, interpreted FL § 5–706.1(c) as affording them the right to a conference and subsequently an appeal,⁴ the Department, relying also on COMAR regulations promulgated pursuant to and in clarification of the statute, reached a contrary interpretation, one that restricted conference and appeal to those “found responsible” for “unsubstantiated” child abuse or neglect. Acknowledging the Department's interpretation, but not accepting it, indeed, believing it to be erroneous, the respondents used it as the basis for its mandamus action, ⁵ arguing that the Department's interpretation of § 5–706.1(c) establishes that there is “a lack...