Hodge v. Cheek
Decision Date | 14 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 89AP-206,89AP-206 |
Citation | 64 Ohio App.3d 296,581 N.E.2d 581 |
Parties | HODGE, Appellant, v. CHEEK et al., Appellees. * |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Jerry Silverstein, Columbus, for appellant.
Jacobson, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur Co., L.P.A., Daniel J. White and Janis L. Small, Columbus, for appellees.
Plaintiff, Emma J. Hodge, appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court dismissing her complaint and raises the following assignments of error:
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Franklin County Municipal Court alleging that defendant, John A. Cheek, D.D.S., negligently broke one of plaintiff's teeth while he was performing oral surgery upon plaintiff. As a result of this action, plaintiff alleges that she required a replacement tooth and that she further suffered pain and emotional embarrassment.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction as plaintiff did not attach an affidavit of merit to her complaint as required by R.C. 2307.42. 1 Plaintiff responded contending that R.C. 2307.42 is unconstitutional in that it denies plaintiff equal protection and due process. The trial court, by a one-line entry, dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff has timely appealed.
Plaintiff's three assignments of error will be discussed together as they raise three interrelated constitutional contentions. R.C. 2307.42 provides the mechanism by which a plaintiff alleging a medical malpractice claim must initiate the suit and, in pertinent part, states:
As stated in division (B), the filing of an affidavit with the complaint is a procedural prerequisite to the trial court's exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the action.
Plaintiff, in her brief, initially notes that she is not contending that the affidavit should not be required. Rather, plaintiff contends, in her first assignment of error, that requiring such an affidavit at the filing of the complaint denies her equal protection under the law and due process of the law.
A statute will be presumed to be constitutional and valid until it is demonstrated otherwise. See State, ex rel. Dickman, v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. Furthermore, the burden of overcoming this presumption is upon the one alleging that the enactment is unconstitutional. See State, ex rel. Ohio Hair Products Co., v. Rendigs (1918), 98 Ohio St. 251, 257, 120 N.E. 836, 837-838.
Both plaintiff and defendants concur that the appropriate test to be used in determining plaintiff's constitutional challenges of equal protectin and due process is whether R.C. 2307.42 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The parties are correct as no fundamental right requiring a stricter standard, such as strict judicial scrutiny, is at issue. See Beatty v. Akron City Hosp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 483, 492, 21 O.O.3d 302, 307, 424 N.E.2d 586, 592.
As the court stated in Beatty, at 493, 21 O.O.3d at 308, 424 N.E.2d at 592:
In other words, if reasonable minds can differ as to the relationship between the classification and the governmental interest, the statute is rationally related so long as the governmental interest is legitimate.
The Ohio Supreme Court has previously considered the issue of whether differing treatment for medical malpractice plaintiffs is warranted and concluded that it is. In Beatty, supra, the court recognized the legitimate governmental interest of keeping health care costs reasonable. Another well-founded governmental interest involves reducing the number of frivolous claims, while opening the courts to legitimate ones and allowing bona fide plaintiffs an effective and efficient means of litigating those claims. Therefore, there exists a rational basis for treating medical malpractice plaintiffs differently from other types of tort plaintiffs. See, also, Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 11 O.O.3d 290, 387 N.E.2d 231.
Having determined that there exists several legitimate governmental interests for classifying medical malpractice claims differently, we now examine R.C. 2307.42 in light of those interests. Plaintiff contends that she cannot comply with R.C. 2307.42 because she does not have enough facts to relate to an expert for him or her to form an opinion. As such, plaintiff contends that R.C. 2307.42 effectively denies her and others similarly situated their day in court.
However, plaintiff is misconstruing the requirements of R.C. 2307.42. The affidavit of the attorney is required merely to state that an expert has been consulted, has reviewed the patient's records, and finds reasonable cause for the claim. It does not require an examination, nor does it require the plaintiff to supply any more records than those of her attending dentist. This is not an "insurmountable burden" placed upon plaintiff. R.C. 2307.42(C)(1)(d) dispenses with the requirement of consultations with an expert if the dentist has failed to supply such dental records for such review within sixty days after a request therefor.
Furthermore, R.C. 2307.42 is rationally related to the government's legitimate interest of keeping health care affordable by quickly dismissing frivolous claims. By requiring plaintiff's attorney or plaintiff to consult with a qualified expert prior to filing a medical malpractice claim, claims having no bona fide merit can be weeded out without commencing an action. The affidavit of the attorney ensures that careful consideration has been given to the claim to ascertain that there is a good faith basis for a belief that there is good ground to support the claim. See Civ.R. 11.
Although this is a case of first impression in Ohio, other jurisdictions have held similar statutory provisions to be constitutional for the same reasons as pronounced herein. Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 110 § 2-622 is very similar to R.C. 2307.42 in that the Illinois statute also requires an affidavit of a meritorious claim to be filed with the complaint alleging medical malpractice. At least two Illinois appellate courts have interpreted this statute and found it to be constitutional. See Bloom v. Guth (1988), 164 Ill.App.3d 475, 115 Ill.Dec. 468, 517 N.E.2d 1154, and Sakovich v. Dodt (1988), 174 Ill.App.3d 649, 124 Ill.Dec. 438, 529 N.E.2d 258.
In reasoning akin to our analysis, the Bloom court held the Illinois statute to be rationally related to furthering a legitimate government interest. Specifically, the court reasoned at 164...
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