Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-265.,04-265.
• Parties: Antoinette HODGES, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. LEWIS & LEWIS, INC., Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

121 P.3d 138

2005 WY 134

Antoinette HODGES, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. LEWIS & LEWIS, INC., Appellee (Defendant).

No. 04-265.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

October 14, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Representing Appellant: Robert J. Reese, Green River, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Clark D. Stith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Antoinette Hodges appeals from the district court's order dismissing her personal injury case against Lewis & Lewis, Inc. (Lewis). After a bench trial, the district court found Ms. Hodges was not entitled, under Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, to recover for her injuries because she was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault. Earlier in the case, Lewis had missed a deadline for responding to Ms. Hodges' requests for admission, resulting in admissions under W.R.C.P. 36(a) of the matters contained in the requests. One of the requests asked Lewis to admit that Ms. Hodges did not contribute to her injuries. Prior to the trial, the district court allowed Lewis to amend its admissions in order to deny the request. Ms. Hodges claims that the district court erred by granting Lewis' request to amend or withdraw the admissions and allowing it to respond to the requests.

[¶ 2] We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Lewis to respond to Ms. Hodges' requests for admission and, therefore, affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] Ms. Hodges offers the following issues for our consideration:

ISSUE ONE. Did the District Court have discretion to grant a "renewed" motion filed more than two (2) months after it was deemed denied by Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

ISSUE TWO. Did the District Court have discretion to extend Appellee's time to file a "renewed" motion fifty-two (52) days after the time to serve papers allowed by Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

ISSUE THREE. Did the District Court err when it considered issues of comparative fault against Appellant after, under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure Appellee was deemed to have admitted that Appellant "did not contribute to her injuries . . ."?

Lewis responds with an extensive list of issues:

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting Appellee Lewis and Lewis, Inc.'s ("Lewis and Lewis") second discovery motion filed on June 17, 2004;

2. Whether Appellant Antoinette Hodges ("Hodges") is entitled to a second trial to have admissions deemed admitted as evidence, when counsel for Appellant Hodges did not seek to have any such alleged admissions entered as evidence during the first trial;

3. Whether Appellant Hodges, who appeals from an order on a motion determined within 28 days of its filing, may rely on W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), which provides that a motion not determined within 90 days is deemed denied;

4. Whether Appellant Antoinette Hodges has waived any argument based on the law of the case doctrine by failing to raise that issue both in the district court and in this Court;

5. Even if Appellant Hodges has not waived the law of the case doctrine, whether the doctrine would apply to prevent the proper filing of the second discovery motion;

6. Whether W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), the deemed denied rule, trumps a district court's inherent power to issue rulings on discovery motions;

7. Whether the granting of Appellant Hodges' appeal would violate due process; and

8. Assuming arguendo that the district court abused its discretion in granting Appellee Lewis and Lewis' second discovery motion, whether the trial court's final order dismissing Hodges' complaint was clearly erroneous.

FACTS

[¶ 4] For the purposes of this appeal, the underlying facts of the case are not disputed. Ms. Hodges worked as a traffic flagger on a highway construction project in Farson. Lewis was the asphalt paving contractor on the job, and Craig Cruz was employed by Lewis as a truck driver. On June 25, 2002, Mr. Cruz's truck ran over Ms. Hodges' right foot while making a turn at the intersection where she was stationed.

[¶ 5] Ms. Hodges filed a complaint against Lewis, alleging that Mr. Cruz was negligent when he ran over her foot. On November 26, 2003, Ms. Hodges served discovery requests, including requests for admission, upon Lewis. Request for Admission No. 26 is at the heart of this appeal and it stated: "Admit that Plaintiff did not contribute to her injuries on June 25, 2002." Lewis' counsel failed to respond to the requests for admission within thirty days, as required by W.R.C.P. 36.

[¶ 6] Lewis' counsel realized his oversight on January 6, 2004, and immediately contacted Ms. Hodges' attorney. Lewis' attorney requested an extension of time to respond to the discovery requests, but Ms. Hodges' attorney refused to allow Lewis more time to respond to the requests for admission. Nevertheless, Lewis did respond to the requests for admission on January 6, 2004. With regard to Request for Admission No. 26, Lewis provided the following response: "Denied. This request is not a proper request for an admission of fact but is rather a legal conclusion that Defendant has previously denied and asserted as an affirmative defense." Lewis also filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery or, In the Alternative to Amend or Withdraw Responses Under W.R.C.P. 36(b) on January 12, 2004.

[¶ 7] A hearing on Lewis' motion, together with a scheduling conference, was set for February 18, 2004. The scheduling conference took place; however, although the reason is not clear from the record, Lewis' motion apparently was not heard that day. Lewis subsequently filed a Renewed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery or, In the Alternative, to Amend or Withdraw Responses Under W.R.C.P. 36(b), or, In the Alternative, Motion of Defendant under Rules 60(a) and 60(b) to Grant Such Extension or Allow Such Amendment.

[¶ 8] The district court held a hearing on Lewis' renewed motion and, on July 8, 2004, granted it. The district court ordered Lewis to respond to Ms. Hodges' requests by July 14, 2004, and, in accordance with that order, Lewis served Ms. Hodges with its responses. Ms. Hodges filed a motion requesting a continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin July 20, 2004. She claimed that, in light of the district court's ruling allowing Lewis to amend its admissions, she needed more time to prepare for trial on the liability issue. The district court granted the continuance.

[¶ 9] On October 26 and 27, 2004, the district court held a bench trial on Ms. Hodges' negligence claim. The district court subsequently entered an order finding in favor of Lewis and dismissing Ms. Hodges' complaint with prejudice. The district court attributed more than fifty percent (50%) of the fault in the accident to Ms. Hodges and ruled, therefore, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b) (LexisNexis 2005), she could not recover for her injuries. Ms. Hodges filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] The parties present numerous issues for our review, but they all concern the same matter — whether the district court erred by allowing Lewis to amend its admissions to deny Request for Admission No. 26. W.R.C.P. 36 governs requests for admissions and states in pertinent part:

(a) Request for admission. — A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. . . .

. . . The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the party's attorney. . . .

* * *

(b) Effect of admission. — Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order,¹ the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other purpose nor may it be used against the party in any other proceeding.

W.R.C.P. 36 (footnote added). Rule 36 is identical to F.R.C.P. 36. Consequently, federal court interpretations of their rule are highly persuasive when we interpret our corresponding rule. Grove v. Pfister, 2005 WY 51, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 275, 279 (Wyo.2005). See also, Peters v. West Park Hospital, 2003 WY 117, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 821, 823 (Wyo.2003); Caldwell v. Cummings, 2001 WY 106, ¶ 10, 33 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 11] District courts have broad discretion to manage pretrial discovery matters. McCulloh v. Drake, 2005 WY 18, ¶ 16, 105 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Wyo.2005). We, therefore, review the district court's decision on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions under Rule 36(b) by applying the abuse of discretion standard. Raiser v. Utah County, 409 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (10th Cir.2005). See also, Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918, n.1 (Wyo.1989) (recognizing a court's broad discretion in determining whether a party should be allowed to withdraw an admission under Rule 36(b)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court:

"[a]cts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of...