Hodges v. Nelson

Decision Date04 April 1979
PartiesClarence H. HODGES v. Linda W. Hodges NELSON. Civ. 1656.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Sterling G. Culpepper, Jr., Montgomery, for appellant.

Horace N. Lynn, Montgomery, for appellee.

BRADLEY, Judge.

This is a child custody case.

The parties were divorced on September 5, 1975. The decree incorporated an agreement of the parties that the custody of their two minor children be with the wife. The agreement also included a provision that the husband would deed his interest in the jointly owned home to the wife in lieu of periodic payments of child support. Subsequent judicial proceedings clarified the mechanics of applying any funds from the husband's interest in the home to the future needs of the children in the event the home was sold.

In July of 1978 the wife brought a petition to modify the child support provisions of the decree and requested that periodic payments of such support by the husband be ordered. The husband filed a cross-petition to modify the child custody provision of the decree and requested that he be given custody of the children two boys who, at that time, were ages nine and six. The trial court, after a hearing at which oral testimony was taken, denied both the wife's petition and the husband's cross-petition. The husband appeals.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify the original award of custody. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Our review of this case is made with due regard to certain well established principles. The primary consideration in this case, as in every custody case, is the welfare of the children. Perez v. Hester, 272 Ala. 564, 133 So.2d 199 (1961); Gould v. Gould, 55 Ala.App. 379, 316 So.2d 210 (1975). Where the children are of tender years, as in the instant case, their welfare is presumed to be best served by placing custody in the mother unless she is found unfit. Lansdell v. Snoddy, 269 Ala. 344, 113 So.2d 151 (1959); Gould, supra. The party seeking to modify the custody provisions of the original decree has the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances since the original decree and that the welfare of the children is thereby adversely affected. Roberson v. Roberson, Ala.Civ.App., 370 So.2d 1008 (1979); Frazier; Gould; Rowe v. Rowe, 45 Ala.App. 367, 231 So.2d 144 (1970). Finally, we accord a presumption of correctness to the decision of the trial court which can be overcome only by a showing that that decision was plainly wrong. Frazier; Gould.

In the instant case the father contends that the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the mother is morally unfit to be the custodian of the children. He points specifically to uncontroverted testimony that the mother has for two years been openly cohabiting with one David Nelson to whom she has not been formally married and by whom she has had a child. Although the father concedes that Nelson and the mother are in all likelihood common-law man and wife, a concession which is supported by the evidence in the record, he nevertheless contends that this common-law union is immoral and an unsuitable environment for the children.

We agree with the husband that the morality of the wife is relevant to a determination of her fitness as a custodian of the children, Roberson, supra; Anonymous v. Anonymous, Ala.Civ.App., 353 So.2d 510 (1977); Gould, supra, but we do not agree that a common-law marriage is inherently immoral. In fact, just the opposite is true. Common-law marriage has long been recognized in Alabama, Campbell's Administrator v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57 (1869), and is equal in validity with a marriage solemnized by formality, Piel v. Brown, Ala., 361 So.2d 90 (1978). Furthermore, a subsequent remarriage by a party to a divorce, while it is a factor to be considered by the trial court, is not of itself such a material change in circumstances as to justify a modification of custody. Parsons v. Parsons, Ala.Civ.App., 337 So.2d 765 (1976). Therefore, this court cannot say that a common-law marriage is per se an unsuitable environment for children or determinative of the custodial spouse's moral unfitness. Whether such a relationship is not socially accepted, as the father contends, goes more to the factual determination of whether the welfare of the children is thereby adversely affected. This determination as with other factual matters, is within the broad discretionary powers of the trial court.

We do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to leave the children with the mother. The evidence which the father advances to show that the best interests of the children would be best served by placing custody with him is persuasive, but not to the point of requiring reversal of the trial court's judgment.

There was evidence that the mother lived with...

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12 cases
  • Collier v. City of Milford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 9 d2 Fevereiro d2 1988
    ...within those states. Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So.2d 120, 122 (Ala.1986); Piel v. Brown, 361 So.2d 90, 93 (Ala.1978); Hodges v. Nelson, 370 So.2d 1020, 1021 (Ala.Civ.App.1979); Parker v. Parker, 46 N.C.App. 254, 258, 265 S.E.2d 237 (1980); Tedder v. Tedder, 109 S.C. 451, 96 S.E. 157 (1917); Luc......
  • Davis v. Davis
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 24 d5 Julho d5 2020
    ...parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981) ; Sain v. Sain, 426 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) ; and Hodges v. Nelson, 370 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979). However, restrictions on visitation should be tailored to protect the well-being of the specific children involved.......
  • Hawkins v. League
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 27 d5 Março d5 1981
    ...from those raised by the appellant. See Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Montgomery, 347 So.2d 1327 (Ala.1977); Hodges v. Nelson, 370 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Civ.App.1979); Boswell v. Samson Banking Co., 368 So.2d 547 (Ala.Civ.App.1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 552 (Ala.1979); Headley v. Housin......
  • Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 4 d5 Março d5 1988
    ...an adverse ruling of the trial court must do so by means of a cross-appeal as provided by ARAP 4(a)(2),' " quoting Hodges v. Nelson, 370 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Civ.App.1979). I believe that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly set forth the applicable law regarding the necessity of a cross-appeal ......
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