Collier v. City of Milford

• Decision Date: 09 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13157,13157
• Citation: 537 A.2d 474,206 Conn. 242
• Parties: Juanita Williams COLLIER v. CITY OF MILFORD et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 474

537 A.2d 474

206 Conn. 242

Juanita Williams COLLIER v. CITY OF MILFORD et al.

No. 13157.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 10, 1987.

Decided Feb. 9, 1988.

Lorraine W. Osborne, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Douglas L. Drayton, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

Charles Collier, an employee of the city of Milford suffered work related injuries when he fell from a truck on April 24, 1978. He died from those injuries on May 3, 1978. It is undisputed that Collier's injuries and death arose out of and in the course of his employment. Subsequent to Collier's death, Fontella Rudene Williams, the daughter of the decedent and of Juanita Felder Williams, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits as a presumptive dependent under General Statutes § 31-306(a)(3). ¹ At the time of Collier's death, Fontella was eleven years old, had been supported by Collier, and had been living with Collier and the plaintiff Juanita Williams. ²

The daughter's claim was uncontested and, after a hearing on January 7, 1980, the workers' compensation commissioner for the third district issued a finding and award ordering compensation to be paid to Fontella Rudene Williams at the rate of $139.83 per week commencing May 4, 1978. The commissioner also ordered burial expenses in the amount of $1500 to reimburse Juanita Williams who had paid the funeral bill.

On September 21, 1981, Juanita Williams moved to open the January 7, 1980 order of compensation on the ground that she had an interest superior to that of her daughter in the receipt of any workers' compensation benefits resulting from Collier's death. The commissioner denied the plaintiff's motion to open. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the compensation review division, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301(a). ³ The compensation review division dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and affirmed the commissioner's denial of the plaintiff's motion to open. Thereafter the plaintiff appealed the decision of the compensation review division to the Appellate Court under General Statutes § 31-301b. This court transferred the appeal to itself. See Practice Book § 4023.

The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in her brief to this court, is that "she had lived with Charles Collier for sixteen years, that her union with Charles Collier was a valid common law marriage, that she was dependent on him for support, and that under the Workers' Compensation Act she is a presumptive dependent and entitled to compensation." ⁴ The commissioner and the compensation review division both found that the union of Juanita Williams and Collier did not constitute a common law marriage cognizable under Connecticut law. Therefore, the commissioner held, and the compensation review division affirmed, that "[t]he claims of Juanita Williams do not comply with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and must be denied."

The plaintiff contends that the commissioner and the review division erred when they determined that she was not married to Collier and was, therefore, not entitled to compensation as a presumptive dependent under General Statutes § 31-306(a)(1). Her argument is premised on the claim that her testimony before the commissioner ⁵ compelled a finding that she and Collier had contracted a valid common law marriage.

The plaintiff's testimony revealed that she was born Juanita Felder in Alabama on April 20, 1934. On May 7, 1952, she married Luke Williams in Montgomery, Alabama. "[A]bout 1959" Luke Williams left her and their five children in Alabama and moved to Ohio. In the "early 1960s" the plaintiff moved from Alabama, first to Rye, New York, and later to Connecticut. Shortly after moving to Connecticut she met and formed a relationship with Charles Collier. In approximately 1962 she and Collier commenced living together in Bridgeport. Their child, Fontella, was born of their liaison on October 16, 1966. Luke Williams, Juanita Williams' husband, from whom she had never been divorced, died in Cleveland, Ohio, on December 31, 1968.

The plaintiff's testimony also disclosed that, after the death of Luke Williams, she and Collier continued to live together in Bridgeport until Collier's death in 1978. During their years together, both before and after the death of her husband in Ohio, she and Collier took annual vacation trips together of approximately two weeks duration. On these trips, in alternate years, they visited Collier's mother in Orangeburg, South Carolina, and the plaintiff's sister in Montgomery, Alabama. While in South Carolina and Alabama, she and Collier stayed with the family member whom they were visiting. There they slept together, had sexual relations, generally represented themselves as being married to each other, and were generally regarded as married by those with whom they came in contact. ⁶

It is the plaintiff's contention that, because of their living arrangements while on vacation, their representations and the perception of their relationship by the community, and the fact that South Carolina and Alabama both recognize common law marriages, she and Collier entered into a valid common law marriage on their trips to those states. She concedes that she never went through a marriage ceremony with Collier anywhere.

In order to qualify as a presumptive dependent under § 31-306(a)(1), (4), and to have a claim for compensation superior to that of her daughter, the statute requires that the plaintiff be the legal "wife" of the deceased. ⁷ Wheat v. Red Starr Express Lines, 156 Conn. 245, 250, 240 A.2d 859 (1968). Connecticut does not presently recognize, as valid marriages, living arrangements or informal commitments entered into in this state and loosely categorized as common law marriages. McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. 277, 285, 334 A.2d 437 (1973); Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 593, 316 A.2d 379 (1972); State ex rel Felson v. Allen, 129 Conn. 427, 432, 29 A.2d 306 (1942). Only recently this rule of law has been reaffirmed. "In this jurisdiction, common law marriages are not accorded validity. The rights and obligations that attend a valid marriage simply do not arise where the parties choose to cohabit outside the marital relationship." (Citations omitted.) Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 339, 521 A.2d 142 (1987).

In order to have any possible claim for benefits under the workers' compensation act, therefore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the commissioner and the compensation review division erred when they determined that the periodic sojourns of the plaintiff and Collier in South Carolina and Alabama did not result in a valid common law marriage. Both South Carolina and Alabama recognize as valid common law marriages contracted within those states. Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So.2d 120, 122 (Ala.1986); Piel v. Brown, 361 So.2d 90, 93 (Ala.1978); Hodges v. Nelson, 370 So.2d 1020, 1021 (Ala.Civ.App.1979); Parker v. Parker, 46 N.C.App. 254, 258, 265 S.E.2d 237 (1980); Tedder v. Tedder, 109 S.C. 451, 96 S.E. 157 (1917); Lucken v. Wichman, 5 S.C. 411 (1874).

This court has never had the occasion to rule directly on the question of the validity in this state of a common law marriage validly contracted in accordance with the law of another state. The Superior Court in Delaney v. Delaney, 35 Conn.Sup. 230, 405 A.2d 91 (1979), however, held that the validity of a marriage is governed by lex loci contractus and recognized the validity of a common law marriage contracted in Rhode Island. See also Parker v. Parker, 29 Conn.Sup. 41, 43, 270 A.2d 94 (1970). Further, it is the generally accepted rule that a marriage that is valid in the state where contracted is valid everywhere; Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 291, 170 A.2d 726 (1961); Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 197-98, 175 A. 574 (1934); Matter of Jenkins, 133 Misc.2d 420, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y.Sur.1986); unless for some reason the marriage is contrary to the strong public policy of the state required to rule on its validity. Catalano v. Catalano, supra, 148 Conn. 291-92, 170 A.2d 726; Hager v. Hager, 3 Va.App. 415, 416, 349 S.E.2d 908 (1986).

We are not, however, called upon to decide that question. The commissioner found that it would be "spurious to contemplate under the facts presented that said Juanita Williams and Charles Collier contracted a valid common law marriage in the States of South Carolina and Alabama." The compensation review division also determined that a valid marriage had not been contracted in South Carolina or Alabama. ⁸ The review division, therefore, affirmed the commissioner's decision that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits and that the commissioner did not err when she refused to open the compensation award to the plaintiff's daughter.

The existence of a common law marriage is a question of fact. Byers v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 268 S.C. 68, 71, 231 S.E.2d 699 (1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 545-46, 112 S.E.2d 647 (1960); Campbell v. Christian, 235 S.C. 102, 105, 110 S.E.2d 1 (1959). Where the evidence is in conflict, the determination of whether there exists a common law marriage is for the trier. Mitchell v. Smyser, 236 S.C. 332, 333-34, 114 S.E.2d 226 (1960); Johnson v. Johnson, supra, 235 S.C. 551, 112 S.E.2d 647; Campbell v. Christian, supra. The findings of the trier of fact "will not be disturbed unless palpably wrong...." Downs v. Newman, 500 So.2d 1062, 1063 (Ala.1986); Etheridge v. Yeager, 465 So.2d 378, 380-81 (Ala.1985); Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So.2d 975, 977 (Ala.1978); King v. King, 269 Ala. 468, 114 So.2d 145, 148 (1959); Baker v. Townsend, 484 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Luther v. M & M Chemical Co., 475 So.2d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). "It was the commissioner's function to find the facts and determine the credibility of witnesses." Wheat v. Red Star Express Lines, supra, 156 Conn. 249, ...