Hodges v. State

• Decision Date: 16 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC14–878,SC14–878
• Citation: 213 So.3d 863
• Parties: Willie James HODGES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

213 So.3d 863

Willie James HODGES, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC14–878

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 16, 2017

Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard, & Chastang, Bartow, Florida, for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney

General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

Willie James Hodges appeals an order denying his motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court's order as to Hodges's conviction but vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.

I. BACKGROUND

Hodges was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, we affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. Hodges v. State , 55 So.3d 515, 519 (Fla. 2010). The evidence showed that the victim was bludgeoned and stabbed in her home. Id. Her relatives came to the home while the intruder was still inside. Id. The relatives heard window glass breaking, and one of them saw the intruder run away and scale a fence into a neighbor's yard. Id. A claw hammer and a braided brown leather belt were found by the body. Id. at 520. The victim's purse was missing. Id. at 519. Some photographs and a knife with a black plastic handle were found on the ground outside the broken window. Id . at 520. The hammer and the knife were the probable murder weapons. Id. Police used a canine to track the suspect's path of escape. Id. at 519. Along the path they found a jacket, two shoes, and two white socks. Id. The victim's daughter testified that the jacket looked like the one she had seen on the fleeing intruder. Id. at 520. A witness who was married to Hodges's niece testified that he had previously seen Hodges wearing the jacket and shoes that were admitted into evidence. Id. Another witness testified that Hodges owned a braided leather belt and carried a knife with a black handle and identified the items in evidence as similar. Id. Another witness testified that some of the photographs found outside the victim's window were photographs that she had mailed to Hodges, and she identified her handwriting on the back of one of the photos. Id. The parties also stipulated that Hodges's writing was on another one of the photos, and Hodges's fingerprints were on two of the photos. Id.

A DNA profile developed from blood on one of the socks was compared to Hodges's DNA profile and was found to match on all thirteen available markers, with a random match probability of one in 990 quadrillion. Id at 521. Analysis conducted on mitochondrial DNA collected from a hair found on the victim's clothing and a hair found on the jacket did not exclude Hodges as the donor but would exclude 99.88 percent of randomly selected individuals. Id. Male DNA detected in material from an anal swab of the victim matched Hodges's DNA profile on the six available markers and would exclude 96 percent of the male population. Id. Material from the other sock yielded two separate partial DNA profiles that were consistent with Hodges's DNA but would exclude 99.92 and 99.9 percent of the male population, respectively, and all of the female population. Id. There was also testimony that Hodges admitted his guilt to a cellmate and to the daughter of a woman he had dated. Id. at 522.

Evidence of a collateral murder was admitted under the Williams ¹ rule. Id. at 521. The evidence included DNA from sperm cells detected on a vaginal swab, which matched Hodges's DNA profile on five markers. Id. A separate sample of epithelial cells from the swab matched his profile on seven markers. Id. at 521–22.

There was also evidence that a bruise on the body of the victim of the collateral murder was probably a bite mark, and a forensic dentist testified that the mark was consistent with Hodges's teeth. Id. at 522.

The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two. Id. at 525. The trial court found five aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder; (2) the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence; (3) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit sexual battery; (4) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 542. The court found the following statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) at the time of the murder the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the capacity of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; and (3) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Id. The court also found numerous nonstatutory mitigating circumstances having to do with Hodges's low intelligence, difficult upbringing and background, mental and emotional problems, and similar or related matters. Id.

In his direct appeal to this Court, Hodges argued: (1) that the trial court should have allowed the jury to determine the issue of mental retardation; (2) that the trial court erred in finding he was not mentally retarded; (3) that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could discuss the collateral crime evidence in its rebuttal argument; (4) that the trial court allowed the collateral crime evidence to become a feature of the trial; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hodges to waive a penalty-phase jury; and (6) that the death sentence was impermissible under Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Id . at 526. We rejected all of Hodges's arguments, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and the death sentence was proportionate, and we affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hodges filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Hodges v. Florida , 565 U.S. 846, 132 S.Ct. 164, 181 L.Ed.2d 77 (2011).

In his motion for postconviction relief, Hodges raised the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retain a DNA and statistics expert to help counsel challenge the admissibility of the State's DNA and statistics evidence and cross-examine the State's experts; (2) counsel was ineffective in cross-examining the State's scientific experts regarding their statistical calculations and in failing to present expert testimony to rebut the State's scientific evidence; (3) counsel was ineffective in failing to consult an expert and to object to testimony about DNA from the body of the collateral crime victim on the ground that the testing and analysis did not comply with applicable standards for accuracy and reliability; (4) counsel was ineffective in failing to present the testimony of Hodges, who would have testified that the personal belongings linking him to the crime scene were stolen from him prior to the murder; (5) counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the State's witnesses who identified the jacket and shoes linking Hodges to the crime scene on their inability to identify the items as the specific items they had seen before; (6) counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain telephone service records to impeach the testimony of a witness who testified that Hodges confessed to her in a telephone conversation; (7) counsel was ineffective in calling a witness whose testimony had the effect of identifying Hodges as the likely perpetrator; (8) counsel was ineffective in failing to rebut the testimony of a forensic dentist who testified about the identification of Hodges from the bite-mark evidence in the collateral crime case; (9) counsel was ineffective in cross-examining a crime scene investigator because the questioning brought out improper and unfavorable opinion testimony about possible or likely events relative to the murder; (10) counsel was ineffective in advising Hodges regarding the impeachment he would face if he testified; (11) counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court's failure to state reasons for denying Hodges's request to waive a penalty-phase jury; and (12) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional.

The trial court held evidentiary hearings on claims 1 through 10, Hodges abandoned claim 11, and the trial court denied claim 12. As to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court ruled that Hodges failed to establish that counsel's performance was deficient and even if it was, there is no reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, Hodges raises the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult experts to assist him to prepare to challenge the State's DNA and bite-mark evidence, cross-examine the State's experts, and present evidence to rebut the State's scientific evidence; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present Hodges as a witness at trial; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by calling a witness who gave testimony that incriminated Hodges; (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to obtain telephone records to impeach the testimony of a witness who testified that Hodges confessed his guilt in a telephone conversation; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine witnesses who identified articles of clothing linked to Hodges; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining a crime scene technician in a way that brought out testimony that was harmful to the defense.

A defendant challenging a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of showing that counsel was...