Hodges v. Tomberlin, 67628
Decision Date | 07 May 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 67628,67628 |
Citation | 170 Ga.App. 842,319 S.E.2d 11 |
Parties | HODGES et al. v. TOMBERLIN et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Cletus W. Bergen II, Savannah, for appellants.
G. Paris Sykes, Jr., Atlanta, R. Jonathan Hart, Savannah, Robert C. Williams, Atlanta, for appellees.
Appellants Hodges and Mikell were discharged from their employment with appellee Georgia Ports Authority (Port) for falsifying company records. They allegedly left work earlier than the times they noted on their log sheets. Appellants instituted the instant tort suit against the Port and several Port employees on the basis of the circumstances surrounding their termination. The case came on for trial, and after the close of appellant's evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of appellees. Appellants appeal.
1. Appellants sought damages for defamation based upon their supervisor's oral announcement of their termination. Each appellant was summoned separately to the supervisor's office to be informed of his discharge. Appellants alleged that other Port employees were present at the confrontations and heard the supervisor accuse appellants of falsifying company records.
Jones v. J.C. Penney Co., 164 Ga.App. 432, 434, 297 S.E.2d 339 (1982). In the instant case, it is undisputed that certain higher-level Port employees were present in the supervisor's office and witnessed appellants' discharge. These employees had the requisite "need to know," and any publication as to them was privileged. Appellants contend, however, that co-workers who were not covered by the privilege were in the vicinity of the office in the course of performing their duties, and that these co-workers overheard the loud verbal exchange which occurred.
Even if such co-workers were in the vicinity at the time, there was a failure of proof with regard to appellants' defamation claim. The statement at issue here did not, as a matter of law, impute to appellants a crime punishable by law. Since special damages were not shown, whether or not the spoken words were actionable depended upon their innuendo and the meaning which was understood by the unauthorized persons who allegedly heard them. Southland Corp. v. Garren, 135 Ga.App. 77, 217 S.E.2d 347 (1975), rev'd on other grounds 235 Ga. 784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976). Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga.App. 47, 50, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981). In the case at bar, none of the "unauthorized" co-workers who allegedly overheard the remarks testified at trial. The only evidence of any unprivileged publication was the testimony of appellants themselves. Both appellants testified that co-workers were present during the event, but neither testified with absolute certainty that the allegedly defamatory statements were actually heard by them. Moreover, there was no evidence whatsoever that the remarks, even if overheard, were understood in a defamatory sense. In fact, appellant Hodges testified that he himself had not known what "falsification of time" meant, and that the supervisor had to explain it to him.
Since the evidence presented did not sustain appellants' defamation allegation, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict for appellees as to this claim.
2. Appellants also sought damages for defamation arising from a telephone call made by the Port's personnel manager to Patricia Bowers, a former Port employee who was a witness for appellants. The circumstances surrounding that telephone call were as follows: Appellants needed evidence that there had been an unprivileged publication of the alleged defamation discussed in Division 1. They experienced difficulty in locating anyone who was willing to testify on their behalf. Eventually, appellant Hodges found one Redding, who was a former Port employee and who had previously offered to assist appellants. Appellant Hodges asked Redding to submit an affidavit for use in appellants' case. Redding asked what was in it for him, and requested half of the proceeds of the suit. Hodges counter-offered a third of the proceeds, which Redding accepted. Hodges then told Redding, "Not in this life." After further discussion, Redding declined to assist appellants. Subsequently, appellants procured the necessary affidavit from Patricia Bowers.
Two days after Patricia Bowers furnished her affidavit, she received the telephone call from the personnel manager at the Port. The conversation was recorded, and the relevant portion of the personnel manager's message was:
Appellants contend that the personnel manager's remarks imputed to them the commission of a crime punishable by law, so as to constitute...
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