Hodgman v. City of Taunton

• Decision Date: 09 June 1948
• Citation: 323 Mass. 79,80 N.E.2d 31
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: MUNICIPAL LIGHT COMMISSION OF TAUNTON v. CITY OF TAUNTON& others.

323 Mass. 79

80 N.E.2d 31

MUNICIPAL LIGHT COMMISSION OF TAUNTON v. CITY OF TAUNTON& others.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

June 9, 1948

May 4, 1948.

Present: QUA, C.

J., LUMMUS, DOLAN SPALDING, & WILLIAMS, JJ.

Taunton. Municipal Corporations, Officers and agents, Municipal lighting plant.

Public Officer. Declaratory Judgment. Equity Jurisdiction, Declaratory relief.

The municipal light commission of Taunton, established by Spec. St. 1919, c. 150 are public officers under legislative mandate, and are not subject to ordinances of the city governing the awarding of contracts and fixing of salaries.

Chapter 231A of G L. (Ter. Ed.), inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1 confers no jurisdiction for determining the validity or possible effect of proposed municipal or other legislation.

BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on August 5, 1947, and afterwards amended.

The case was heard by Donahue, J.

L. Withington & S.

N. Towle, Jr., for the plaintiffs, submitted a brief.

No argument nor brief for the defendants.

DOLAN, J. The plaintiffs in this bill in equity are the three members of the municipal light commission of the city of Taunton established under the provisions of Spec. St. 1919, c. 150. The defendants are the city of Taunton, its mayor, its city clerk, and the members of its municipal council. The bill was brought in the Superior Court under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, for a binding declaration that two certain city ordinances and a proposed ordinance are invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs. It was agreed by the parties that the facts set forth in the bill as amended are true, and that the bill sets forth all facts material to the issues raised by the pleadings. This agreement was entitled "case stated" and the case was heard by the judge thereon.

The material facts are these: The first ordinance in question (c. 9, Section 5, of the Revised Ordinances of the city) provides so far as here material as follows: "No contract for construction work whether for repairs or original construction or for apparatus, equipment, supplies or other material the estimated cost of which amounts to five hundred (500) dollars or more, except in case of emergency involving the health and safety of the people or their property shall be awarded by the municipal council, any committee thereof, city official, board or commission having jurisdiction and supervision over the subject matter, unless sealed proposals for the same have been invited by advertisements inserted in at least one newspaper published in the city of Taunton once a week for two consecutive weeks the last publication to be at least one week prior to the date and time stated therein for the opening of said proposals . . . the city shall reserve the right to reject any and all proposals. All proposals shall be opened in public and in the presence of at least a majority of the members of the municipal council if they are authorized or the duty devolves upon them to make the award, or of a committee designated by them to act in the matter, and, in the case of a board or commission, in the presence of at least a majority of membership thereof and in the case of an official of the city government, in his presence and that of the mayor, and, at least a majority of the members of the committee on finance and salaries of the municipal council." "On July 1, 1947, at a regular meeting of members of the municipal council . . . it was voted that the plaintiffs be notified that in the future, in accordance with city ordinances, . . . no expenditures over $500 be made without sealed bids and after being advertised in local newspaper, and the plaintiffs were so notified by letter dated July 2, 1947, signed by the defendant,

Henry L. Galipeau, clerk." In the matter of that ordinance the plaintiffs contend that they are not officers or employees of the city under the control of its municipal council, and are not bound by the ordinance.

The second ordinance in question is Section 1, cl. 31, of c. 18 of the Revised Ordinances of the city, pertaining to salaries of janitors, matrons and custodians, which so far as here pertinent provides as follows: "Custodians Janitors and matrons (city hall, sanitaries) $30 to $33 Junior building custodians (sanitaries) $30 to $33 Junior custodian $36.40 to $38 Senior building custodian $39.60 to $43." "On July 8, 1947, at a regular meeting of members of the municipal council . . . it was voted that the plaintiffs be requested to bring up the salary of the junior custodians so as to conform with the city ordinance, and the plaintiffs were so notified by letter dated July 9, 1947, signed by the defendant, Henry L. Galipeau, clerk." The contention of the plaintiffs concerning that ordinance is the same as that with respect to the first ordinance.

The proposed ordinance prescribing eligibility requirements of persons seeking employment by the city of Taunton is pending before the municipal council. The provisions of the proposed ordinance are as follows: "Section 1. No person shall be eligible for employment by the city of Taunton in any of its several departments unless he or she is a legal resident of the city of Taunton and has domiciled in said city for at least one year, with the exception of the school department the policy and administrative duties thereof being vested under the law in the school committee the members of which being elected as city officials by the registered voters of the city of Taunton. Section 2. If the head of any department or a majority of the members of any board or commission deem it necessary or advisable to employ persons who are not legal residents of the city of Taunton advanced approval of such action must be obtained by a two-thirds vote of the membership of the municipal council after an order introduced therein, in each instance, suspending the applicable provisions of section 1 of this ordinance. . . ." At a meeting of the members of the municipal council it was stated by one of its members that this ordinance was designed to take effect immediately in the case of the commercial representative of the "Taunton municipal lighting plant."

The judge "ordered that a decree . . . be entered to the effect that...