Hodgson v. UNION de EMPLEADOS de los SUPERMERCADOS PUEB.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 58-73.
• Citation: 371 F. Supp. 56
• Parties: James D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. UNION de EMPLEADOS de los SUPERMERCADOS PUEBLOS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

371 F. Supp. 56

James D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. UNION de EMPLEADOS de los SUPERMERCADOS PUEBLOS, Defendant.

Civ. No. 58-73.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 30, 1974.

Asst. U. S. Atty., Ignacio Rivera, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.

Federico A. Cordero, Santurce, P. R., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

CANCIO, Chief Judge.

This is an action brought by the Secretary of Labor of the United States under Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. (hereinafter the Act), to compel a local labor organization to comply with Section 401(b), 29 U.S.C. Section 481(b), which requires such labor organization to "elect its officers not less often than once every three years by secret ballot among the members in good standing." Jurisdiction is premised on Section 402(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 482(b), which requires the Secretary, upon a complaint filed with him by a member in good standing of the labor organization urging the compliance with Section 401(b) of the Act, to investigate said complaint and "if he finds probable cause to believe a violation . . . has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall within sixty days after the filing of said complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization as an entity in the District Court of the United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office . . . to direct the conduct of an election . . . under the supervision of the Secretary . . . ."

It is alleged in the complaint that defendant, Unión de Empleados de los Supermercados Pueblo (hereinafter "Unión"), is and at all times relevant has been a local labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 3(i), 3(j) and 401(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(i), 402(j), and 481(b);¹ that by letter of August 1, 1972, Filomeno Vargas Flores, a member in good standing of defendant Unión, acting in accordance with its constitution and bylaws, protested the failure of defendant to conduct an election of officers of defendant's Executive Board; that having failed to receive a final decision within three calendar months, Mr. Flores, on November 21, 1972, filed a complaint with the Secretary in accordance with Section 402(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482(a),² alleging violations of 401 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481; that after investigation of the complaint, plaintiff found probable cause to believe there was a violation of Section 401(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481(b), as aforementioned, and that it had not been remedied at the time of the institution of this suit. The following violations are alleged to have occurred: (1) failure of defendant to elect its officers not less often than once every three years by secret ballot among its members in good standing, in violation of Section 401(b) of the Act, and (2) failure of defendant to conduct an election as provided by its constitution and bylaws in violation of Section 401(e) of the Act. In its prayer, plaintiff requests for (1) judgment directing defendant to conduct nominations and an election of all officers, under supervision of plaintiff (2) the costs of this action, and (3) any other relief that may be appropriate.

Defendant Unión has moved to dismiss the complaint because this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter therein contained. — Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(1).

In his motion defendant alleges that the Act here in question is not applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and that Congress, in including Puerto Rico within the definition of the word "state" in Section 3(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(b),³ acted ultra vires and in contravention to the fundamental principle of government by consent as enshrined in Public Law 600, approved "in the nature of a compact" and authorizing the people of Puerto Rico to adopt a Constitution, 64 Stat. 319, 48 U.S.C. § 731b, and the Federal Relations Act incorporated therein as Section 4, 48 U.S. C. Sections 734-873.

At the outset, we point out that this case is one in which, due to the issue it presents, we would have preferred to write not only a well-thought and deeply-meditated opinion, but also a comprehensive one in which every aspect of the Court's thinking be written down to the utmost. The pressure of time which the resignation of the undersigned as judge of this court has brought with it, however, does not allow for writing down in all detail all the desired reasoning. No matter how well the Court has thought of the issues here present and how deeply it has meditated on their merits, this time it must yield to time limitations and, at the risk of oversimplifying complex legal matters, there is no other alternative but to dispose of the matter before it through a relatively brief memorandum and order.

A short historico-juridical background is necessary in order to place the factual and legal questions before the Court in the proper perspective for a judicial decision.

Since the very beginning of the acquisition of Puerto Rico by the United States in 1898, when the Spanish regime over the island gave way to the American regime, and up to July 25, 1952, Puerto Rico was a Territory or a colony governed by the United States under a system of delegated powers to local authorities. Both during the two years of military government of the island and during the life of its two organic acts⁴ approved by Congress to provide for its internal government, there was no doubt that Puerto Rico was governed by the United States under the authority granted to it by Article IV of the Constitution.⁵ Between 1950, and 1952 upon the approval of a congressional enactment⁶ "in the nature of a compact" with the people of Puerto Rico and its subsequent approval and acceptance by the direct secret vote of all the qualified electors of Puerto Rico, a series of politico-juridical events took place in Washington and in Puerto Rico which changed the relationship between the then territory of Puerto Rico, on the one part, and the United States, on the other. Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United States subject to the plenary powers of Congress as provided in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution. From July 25, 1952, in which the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was born, Puerto Rico ceased being governed by the unilateral will of the Congress; now it is being governed by the express, though generic, consent of its people, through a compact with Congress. Whatever authority was to be exercised over Puerto Rico by the Federal government would emanate thereon, not from Article IV of the Constitution, but from the Compact itself, voluntarily and freely entered into by the people of Puerto Rico, even without an express recognition of its sovereignty, and the Congress; a compact which cannot be unilaterally revoked either by Congress or by the people of Puerto Rico.⁷

With all this in mind, let us examine, from the facts here involved, the position of the defendant in this case, a position it wishes the Court to adopt as its own. Before 1952 the field of labor relations was preempted by the federal power, in the industries that Congress wanted to regulate, as far as the Constitution allowed it to extend its hand. In the case of the federated states of the United States, this was limited to those businesses "affecting" interstate commerce and was constitutionally grounded in the interstate commerce clause. — Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States. In the case of the territories and the District of Columbia, the preemption of the field was not limited to the activities affecting commerce. Congress, which had all the power imaginable under Article IV, and Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 1, respectively, decided to exercise it and, preempting the field, controlled even local enterprises which had no impact whatsoever upon interstate commerce as to affect it, even in the slightest respect. Thus, the National Labor Relations Act, more frequently referred to as the Wagner Act,⁸ since 1935, and later the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, more frequently cited as the Taft-Hartley Act,⁹ defined commerce, in the case of the federated states as interstate commerce, and in the case of the territories as "commerce within . . . any territory." (Emphasis added). It was perfectly clear that until July 25, 1952 all commerce within Puerto Rico, no matter how local in character, was covered by the labor laws. Since that date on, the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act, for whatever reasons that may have been taken in consideration by the pertinent federal authorities, has not extended beyond what in the federated states would be considered as interstate commerce. Therefore, as a practical matter there was no conflict which could prompt any party in Puerto Rico to raise the non-applicability of Taft-Hartley to local enterprises; that is to say, to activities which do not affect interstate commerce. Something more than a mere insinuation to that effect was expressed by this court, through Judge Cecil Snyder, in Cosentino v. ILA.¹⁰

This Court sees the situation today as follows: Since the creation of the Commonwealth and the recognition by the Congress of the right of the People of Puerto Rico to form their own local government and govern themselves in all local matters, recognizing "in the nature of a compact" the Commonwealth's authority over its own local affairs, Congress ceased having authority over those local matters which now can be dealt with only by the Commonwealth in the exercise of its local authority, not ceded by Congress as a mere act of grace under Article IV of the Constitution, as it did to a certain extent in 1900 and 1917 in the Organic Acts, but as a compact with the people of Puerto Rico. Consequently, as far as local commerce (as distinguished from...