U.S. v. Acosta Martinez

• Decision Date: 17 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. Crim.99-044 SEC.,Crim.99-044 SEC.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. [1] Hector Oscar ACOSTA MARTINEZ, [2] Joel Rivera Alejandro, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 311

106 F.Supp.2d 311

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. [1] Hector Oscar ACOSTA MARTINEZ, [2] Joel Rivera Alejandro, Defendants.

No. Crim.99-044 SEC.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 17, 2000.

Guillermo Gil, U.S. Attorney, John R. Teakell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of P.R., San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

M. Cristina Gutierrez, Baltimore, MD, Hector A. Deliz, Hato Rey, PR, for defendant Acosta Martinez.

Steve M. Potolsky, Miami, FL, Rafael F. Castro Lang, San Juan, PR, for defendant Rivera Alejandro.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

Defendants Héctor Oscar Acosta Martinez and Joel Rivera Alejandro stand accused for the commission of crimes punishable by death. They have moved to declare the federal death penalty inapplicable in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Because the Court concludes that the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. is "locally inapplicable" within the purview of section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. § 734, and because applying the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico unilaterally, without the consent of its people, violates defendants' substantive due process of law, it GRANTS defendants' motion (Docket # 247).¹

I

Defendants were charged on June 2, 1999, with violating, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (firearm murder in relation to a crime of violence) and 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B) (killing a person in retaliation for providing law enforcement officials with information relating to the possible commission of a federal offense), offenses which are both punishable by death. (Docket # 83). On January 24, 2000, the Attorney General of the United States authorized the United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico to seek the death penalty against defendants in the event of conviction. Thereafter, the government filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. (Docket # 221). On May 17, 2000, defendant Rivera Alejandro filed the instant motion (Docket # 247), which defendant Acosta Martínez adopted (Docket # 250).

Though not necessarily in this order, defendants make essentially four arguments in challenging the applicability of the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico: (1) that because the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico expressly prohibits capital punishment,² the federal death penalty is "locally inapplicable" within the meaning of section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. § 734; (2) that as part of the bilateral agreement governing the federal government's relations with Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth Constitution, even if considered a federal statute, may not be unilaterally altered by Congress; (3) that applying the federal death penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico,³ without their consent, and in view of their lack of representation in the enactment of Federal law, is unfair; and (4) that the applicability of the federal death penalty in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico violates Article X of the Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759-60 (1899), which, at the time Spain ceded sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United States, guaranteed the inhabitants of Puerto Rico the free exercise of their religion.

Defendants' second argument is in part premised on the theory that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a statute of Congress. This theory has been repeatedly rejected by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, see United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir.1985); Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir.1956), and need not be revisited.⁴ Defendants' argument is also based on yet another well settled point of law, i.e., that Congress may not unilaterally amend the Commonwealth Constitution. See Quinones, 758 F.2d at 42.⁵ The relevant implications of the latter part of defendants' argument is addressed in the discussion below. Moreover, in light of the Court's disposition of defendants' first and third arguments, it is unnecessary to address their fourth argument concerning the Treaty of Paris.⁶

II

The legislative history of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States leading up to the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on July 25, 1952, has been recounted on numerous occasions,⁷ and thus there is no need to rehash it here. Still, a few facts are worth reiterating. On July 3, 1950, Congress, "fully recognizing the principle of government by consent," adopted Pub.L. No. 600, "in the nature of a compact," to empower the people of Puerto Rico "to organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption." 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950), 48 U.S.C. § 731b (hereinafter "Public Law 600"). In accordance with its terms, Public Law 600 was submitted to, and accepted by, the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum held on June 4, 1951,⁸ upon which a constitutional convention was called by the Legislature of Puerto Rico to draft a constitution.⁹ A constitution was adopted by the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum held on March 3, 1952,¹⁰ and subsequently transmitted, via the President, to Congress for approval. The Constitution was approved by Congress on July 3, 1952, conditional upon certain modifications. See Pub.L. No. 447, 66 Stat. 327, 327 (1952) (hereinafter "Public Law 447"). With the acceptance of Congress's conditions, the constitution was ultimately approved by the people of Puerto Rico,¹¹ "the compact became effective, and Puerto Rico assumed `Commonwealth' status." Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 593-94, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). In sum, after 1952,

Puerto Rico's status changed from that of a mere territory to the unique status of Commonwealth. And the federal government's relations with Puerto Rico changed from being bounded merely by the territorial clause, and the rights of the people of Puerto Rico as United States citizens, to being bounded by the United States and Puerto Rico Constitutions, Public Law 600, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and the rights of the people of Puerto Rico as United States citizens.

Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir.1981) (Breyer, J.) (hereinafter "Cordova").¹² Thereafter, the authority exercised by the federal government emanated from the compact entered into between the people of Puerto Rico and the Congress of the United States.¹³

Also as a result of the Commonwealth Constitution becoming effective on July 25, 1952, and as provided in Public Law 600, numerous provisions of the Organic Act of 1917, commonly known as the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951 (1917), were repealed, and the remainder continued in force, now pursuant to the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and Congress, as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (hereinafter the "PRFRA"). See Public Law 600, 64 Stat. at 319-20.¹⁴

From the onset, the new Commonwealth status spurred litigation concerning the applicability of Federal law to Puerto Rico.¹⁵ In the context of this litigation, section 9 of the PRFRA, which in pertinent part provides that "the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable ... shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States," 48 U.S.C. § 734 (emphasis added), gained increased significance.¹⁶ Since then, section 9 has been applied in some cases to hold federal statutes inapplicable to intra-Commonwealth activities.¹⁷ And in Guerrido v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 234 F.2d 349 (1st Cir.1956), the First Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding in Lastra v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 2 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1924), that under section 8 of the PRFRA, 48 U.S.C. § 749, federal maritime law is locally inapplicable to Puerto Rico.¹⁸ Moreover, Puerto Rico enjoys broad fiscal autonomy, as the internal revenue laws of the United States are not applicable in the Commonwealth. See 48 U.S.C. § 734.¹⁹

Still, most federal legislation considered by the courts — including both pre and post 1952 legislation — has been held applicable to Puerto Rico.²⁰ Perhaps it need not have been so, for after all, as Judge — now Justice-Breyer stated in Cordova, "the phrase [`not locally inapplicable' contained in section 9] reflects at least some intent that not only developing social and economic conditions but also emerging territorial self-government could render general federal law inapplicable." 649 F.2d at 44 n. 38; see also United States v. Figueroa Rios, 140 F.Supp. 376, 381 (D.P.R.1956) (noting that, after the establishment of the Commonwealth, section 9 acquired new "vitality"); Liquilux Gas Services of Ponce, Inc. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F.Supp. 414, 418-21 (D.P.R.1969) (same).²¹

Probably the case involving the controversy most akin to the one at hand is United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir.1985). In Quinones, defendant moved to suppress a telephone conversation between him and a codefendant recorded pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (hereinafter "Title III"). The district court denied the motion and convicted defendant after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the applicability in Puerto Rico of Title III, grounded on the Commonwealth Constitution's prohibition against wiretapping. See P.R. Const. art. II, § 10. Defendant argued "that the Constitution of the Commonwealth should be considered a federal law — an organic act and that its prohibition against wire-tapping controls because it has the force of federal law." Quinones, 758 F.2d at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). In its opinion, the circuit court first rejected defendant's "federal law-organic Act" theory reiterating the well-settled law that the Commonwealth Constitution is not a statute of Congress. Id. at 42.²² Second, the court concluded that "[t]he intent behind the approval of the Puerto Rico Constitution was that the...