Hodson v. Great Camp, Knights of Modern Maccabees

• Decision Date: 03 February 1911
• Docket Number: 6,889
• Citation: 93 N.E. 861,47 Ind.App. 113
• Parties: HODSON v. GREAT CAMP, KNIGHTS OF THE MODERN MACCABEES
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

93 N.E. 861

47 Ind.App. 113

HODSON v. GREAT CAMP, KNIGHTS OF THE MODERN MACCABEES

No. 6,889

Court of Appeals of Indiana

February 3, 1911

From St. Joseph Circuit Court; Walter A. Funk, Judge.

Action by Annie M. Hodson against the Great Camp, Knights of the Modern Maccabees. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Talbot & Talbot, for appellant.

J. B McIlwain, Daniel Pyle and Anderson, Parker & Crabill, for appellee.

OPINION

MYERS, C. J.

Appellant appeals from a judgment rendered on a verdict returned at the direction of the court. The overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial is assigned as error. Under this error we are called upon to review the action of the court in giving to the jury a peremptory instruction to find for appellee.

The complaint in this action was founded upon a benefit certificate issued by appellee certifying that William K. Hodson had been regularly admitted as a member of the order, and was entitled to all the rights, benefits and privileges of such membership, and that at his death one assessment on the membership, not exceeding the sum of $ 2,000, would be paid as a benefit to Annie Mulligan Hodson, his wife. The complaint shows that on February 14, 1904, said William K. Hodson died, and that proofs of death were furnished to appellee. Appellant is the beneficiary named in said certificate.

Appellee answered in three paragraphs. The first was a general denial. The second and third, so far as the facts are material to the questions here presented, in substance, aver that the laws of appellee, together with the certificate of membership, formed the basis of the contract for beneficial membership, and that said laws in force at the time of issuing said certificate provided, in substance, that no benefit should be paid under said certificate in case said member should come to his death from suicide within five years after his admission to life benefit membership; that in all cases where death should result from suicide within five years after the admission to life benefit membership, whether the member should be sane or insane at the time of death, the beneficiary of the member should be paid only the amount of money which the member had paid in the life benefit fund; that said William K. Hodson came to his death from suicide within one year after becoming a member.

Appellant replied to said affirmative paragraphs of answer, first, by a general denial, and by two additional paragraphs, each alleging facts tending to show that decedent's death was accidental.

The certificate was the foundation of the action, and the laws of appellee were made a part of the certificate by reference only. From a careful examination of the evidence in the record before us, it is clear that the only issuable fact about which there was any dispute at the trial was whether the decedent committed suicide. This issue was tendered by the second and third paragraphs of answer. The burden was upon appellee to establish suicide to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, and this appellee was required to do, not by a prima facie case alone, but by such proof as would withstand and overthrow all of the evidence to the contrary. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Nitterhouse (1894), 11 Ind.App. 155, 38 N.E. 1110; Modern Woodmen, etc., v. Craiger (1910), 175 Ind. 30, 92 N.E. 113; Hale v. Life Indemnity, etc., Co. (1895), 61 Minn. 516, 63 N.W. 1108, 52 Am. St. 616. "The statements in the proof of death, either of facts or of opinion, are not conclusive." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nitterhouse, supra.

While the evidence in this case tends strongly to support the theory that decedent committed suicide, yet there is evidence from which a contrary inference of this fact might be drawn. Therefore, as said in the case of Modern Woodmen, etc., v. Craiger, supra: "In determining the charge of suicide, the jury may properly consider the facts and circumstances bearing upon that question given in evidence, in the light of their common knowledge and experience that mankind instinctively love life and generally shun death, although occasionally men, both sane and insane, take their own lives. The cause of death was directly in issue in this case to be decided not by presumption of law, but as an inference of fact by the jury in the same manner as other facts are determined in civil actions." Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hebert (1906), 37 Ind.App. 373, 76 N.E. 1023; Hale v. Life Indemnity, etc., Co., supra.

In the case of Sovereign Camp, etc., v. Haller (1903), 30 Ind.App. 450, 66 N.E. 186, this court was strongly persuaded by the evidence to...