Hoeffner v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue
| Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | 110,323. |
| Citation | 50 Kan.App.2d 878,335 P.3d 684 |
| Parties | William HOEFFNER, Jr., Appellant, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
John M. Linder, of Linder, Marquez & Koksal, of Garden City, for appellant.
John D. Schultz, of Legal Services, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
After leaving an incident at a casino, William Hoeffner, Jr., was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officers read him the required implied consent advisory before requesting he submit to a breath test. He refused to do so until the officers repeatedly indicated that they would obtain a search warrant for a blood test; then, he agreed to the breath test, which he failed. Although Hoeffner argued the officers unlawfully coerced him into submitting to a breath test by threatening to obtain a search warrant, his driving privileges were suspended. His suspension was affirmed after an administrative hearing. Hoeffner appealed the suspension to the district court, again claiming unlawful coercion and also that the hearing officer used an improper form, which rendered his suspension a nullity. The district court upheld the suspension.
Hoeffner appeals to us raising the same issues. We find no merit to Hoeffner's claim that the proceedings before the hearing officer were rendered a nullity based on language in the form. But we agree with Hoeffner that the officers did not have legal grounds upon which to obtain a search warrant to draw Hoeffner's blood at the time the officers repeatedly advised Hoeffner that they intended to do so. The officers' misinformation transformed the breath test Hoeffner previously had refused to take into an involuntary search because it necessarily deprived Hoeffner of the opportunity to revoke his statutorily implied consent. Although the results of Hoeffner's failed breath test are the fruits of an unlawful seizure, our Supreme Court has long held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress incriminating evidence in administrative driver's license suspension cases. Accordingly, we find substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that Hoeffner had an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater in his blood and, in turn, affirm the court's decision to uphold the agency's suspension of Hoeffner's license.
In late June 2011, Officer Daniel Hadovanic of the Dodge City Police Department responded to a call regarding a disorderly man at a casino. Dispatch stated that the man and a younger companion left the casino in a convertible. Officer Joan Addison offered to serve as Hadovanic's backup for the call and encountered the car first. After the car sat at a green light without immediately going forward, Addison initiated a traffic stop. Hoeffner was the driver.
Despite the fact that the car was a convertible, Addison noticed the odor of alcohol when she approached the car. Addison also noticed Hoeffner was very talkative, “hyped up,” and that his eyes were watering—the “perfect demonstration of something you would teach a beginner ... to look for in an impaired driver.”
When Hadovanic arrived on the scene, he also noticed the odor of alcohol and Hoeffner's bloodshot eyes. Hoeffner struggled to get out of the car when requested, and he admitted to Hadovanic that he had been drinking beer prior to the traffic stop.
Hadovanic administered field sobriety tests to Hoeffner, which he failed. Hoeffner refused a preliminary breath test, after which officers arrested him and transported him to the county jail. There, they read Hoeffner the applicable implied consent advisory and provided him a written copy, but when they requested Hoeffner to submit to a breath test, he refused. Hoeffner asked Hadovanic whether he should submit to the test, but Hadovanic replied that he could not give Hoeffner advice about whether to take it. During this time, one or both of the officers informed Hoeffner that if he did not submit to the breath test, they would obtain a search warrant for a blood test. In fact, at the time of Hoeffner's arrest, Dodge City police officers routinely attempted to obtain search warrants for blood tests after drivers refused to consent to a request for breath test. After a while, Hoeffner announced that if the officers were going to get a sample one way or another, he might as well submit to the breath test. When he again showed hesitation, the officers repeated that they intended to obtain a search warrant if Hoeffner failed to submit to and complete the test. Hoeffner ultimately acquiesced to the breath test, the results of which showed a blood-alcohol content of .215, nearly three times the legal limit.
Because he failed the test, Hoeffner's driving privileges were suspended. Hoeffner subsequently requested a hearing with the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR). Although originally scheduled for December 2011, the hearing was delayed until June 2012, over a year after Hoeffner failed the test. By this time, certain provisions of the Kansas implied consent law had changed, and the KDOR had revised its hearing form to conform to those changes.
Hoeffner claimed at the administrative hearing that the officers' statements about obtaining a search warrant if he continued to refuse testing was coercion that rendered his consent involuntary. The hearing officer apparently took the matter under advisement because Hoeffner later submitted a brief in support of his position. In the end, however, the hearing officer determined that Hadovanic “was merely stating protocol when he told [Hoeffner] blood would be drawn upon refusal.” The hearing officer affirmed Hoeffner's suspension.
Hoeffner then appealed the KDOR's decision to the Ford County District Court. Although Hoeffner raised approximately six issues before the district court, only two are relevant to this appeal: whether the KDOR erred by using the revised hearing form and whether the officers' statements regarding the potential search warrant constituted coercion. After hearing testimony and argument, the district court determined that the revised form did not change the penalty that applied to Hoeffner and that the officers provided Hoeffner with the correct implied consent notices at the time of his arrest. As such, any error by the KDOR in using the wrong form was harmless. With regard to the coercion issue, the district court determined that because the statements made by the officers regarding their ability to obtain a search warrant were true, the statements did not constitute coercion. The district court affirmed the suspension.
The revised hearing form
Hoeffner's first argument involves the hearing order form, which reflected changes in the law effective after his breath test. Hoeffner contends that using this form is such an egregious error that it renders the hearing's outcome a nullity. We disagree.
When reviewing the district court's ruling in a driver's license suspension case, this court generally employs a substantial competent evidence standard of review. Schoen v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 31 Kan.App.2d 820, 822, 74 P.3d 588 (2003). However, when the issues raise only questions of law—such as the interpretation of a statute—this court exercises unlimited review. Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 629, 176 P.3d 938 (2008).
Hoeffner concedes that the implied consent notices provided to him on the night of his breath test complied with the law at the time. Hoeffner also concedes that he suffered no prejudice, as he received the penalty in effect in June 2010. The crux of Hoeffner's contention, then, is that the KDOR is required to strictly comply with the law such that any irregularity in its own internal processes, such as using the wrong form, irreparably taints the proceedings.
However, this assertion is unsupported by Kansas law. “[I]t is generally recognized that substantial compliance with statutory notice provisions will usually be sufficient” when advising a driver of his or her rights under the Kansas implied consent law, provided that the notice in question “conveyed the essentials of the statute and did not mislead the appellant.” Barnhart v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 243 Kan. 209, 213, 755 P.2d 1337 (1988). This rule stems from the fact that the implied consent statute is a remedial statute, and such statutes are “to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose for which [they were] enacted.” Smith v. Marshall, 225 Kan. 70, Syl. ¶ 1, 587 P.2d 320 (1978) ; see also K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8–1001(v) (). When, for example, an arresting officer read a driver an out-of-date implied consent advisory that warned her of significantly different penalties than those in effect at the time, our Supreme Court held the officer failed to substantially comply with the implied consent law. Meigs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 251 Kan. 677, 681, 840 P.2d 448 (1992).
Obviously, these cases are factually distinguishable from the instant case as they discuss only the initial implied consent notices required by statute, not the hearing form used by the KDOR. However, the situations are analogous. Hoeffner was read the notices in effect at the time of his arrest and received the penalty applicable in June 2011. Hoeffner never even saw the form memorializing these facts until after the hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that the outcome of the hearing changed due to this technical irregularity, and, as previously stated, Hoeffner admits he suffered no prejudice.
To further analogize from other areas of the law, our Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure states that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record ... arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time.” K.S.A. 22–3504(2). The Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure allow a court to “correct a clerical mistake or a...
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